bepress university libraries

DigitalCommons@bepress
NIU Test
9-15-2007

Frozen at 435 : the size of the U.S. House of Representatives,
district constituency populations and the implications for
representation
Brian Frederick

Follow this and additional works at: https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test

Recommended Citation
Frederick, Brian, "Frozen at 435 : the size of the U.S. House of Representatives, district constituency
populations and the implications for representation" (2007). NIU Test. 1255.
https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test/1255

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@bepress. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NIU Test by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@bepress.

ABSTRACT

Name: Brian Frederick

Department: Political Science

Title: Frozen at 435: The Size of the U.S. House of Representatives, District
Constituency Populations and the Implications for Representation

Major: Political Science

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

Approved by:

Date:

(JL i a *

3 Qi

07

Dissertation Director

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT

The United States House of Representatives has been frozen at 435 members for
almost a century. Notwithstanding the remarkable durability of this alignment, in its
first century of existence, the U.S. House experienced a virtually uninterrupted string of
decennial increases in its membership. This dissertation documents the historical
development of the size of the U.S. House by highlighting specific debates over how
many seats should be apportioned for the nation’s lower chamber at various points in
U.S. history, starting with debate at the Constitutional Convention until contemporary
times. This debate revolved around a tradeoff between representation and legislative
efficiency. In deciding to permanently cap the size of the House, lawmakers
determined that continued increases would undermine legislative operations in the
institution. Since opting for this policy course there has been no external or internal
impetus to consider further enlargements.
The major consequence of refusing to increase the size of the body is that the
average number o f citizens each House member represents has risen dramatically in the
subsequent decades. While not encompassing the largest constituency size in the world,
U.S. House districts are noticeably more populous than legislative districts in other
democratic countries. This growth in constituency population size actually injects more
competition in House elections, but not enough to increase the probability incumbents
will be defeated. However, most of the evidence presented in this study indicates that
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an expanding constituency size has negatively impacted representation. District
constituency size is negatively related to the probability citizens will have contact with
and approve of their House member. Furthermore, it is also reduces the likelihood
citizens will perceive that their House members are helpful and that they keep in touch
with the district. Members representing more populous districts are more likely to
compile extreme voting records and diverge from median voter in the policy
representation they provide.
Despite its negative consequences for representation, maintaining the 435 seat
limit on the size of the House is a policy that draws broad support among citizens in the
general population. Survey results compiled for this study show that the U.S. public
does not support an increase to improve the overall quality of representation House
members provide, to prevent states from losing seats or to enhance descriptive
representation for women and minorities. Therefore, the paradoxical conclusion of this
study is that maintaining the 435 seat limit on the size of the House has made the
institution less representative but that it also represents a policy that is generally
supported by the American people.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The quality o f representation the citizenry receives from its political leaders is
central to evaluating the character o f any democratic institution. Moreover, the
numerical size of those institutions can be vital in determining whether citizens have
access to and can influence the decisions of their representatives.1 The United States
House of Representatives has been frozen at 435 members for almost a century.
Notwithstanding the remarkable durability of this alignment, in its first century of
existence, the U.S. House experienced a virtually uninterrupted string of decennial
increases in its membership. Despite the magnitude of this change in the development
of this institution, American political scientists have largely overlooked it in terms of its
effect on representation.2 In some sense it is taken as a given that since the membership
of the U.S. House was capped, there was no pressing need to evaluate what impact this
departure from historical precedent has had on the political system. In the past fifteen
years a few scholars have taken notice of this aspect of institutional development, the

1 Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1973).

2

One exception is Michael G. Neubauer and Joel Zeitlin, “Outcomes o f Presidential Elections and the
House Size,” PS: Political Science and Politics 36 (2003): 721-725. This article looks at how variation in
the size o f the U.S. House would have brought about alternative outcomes in the Electoral College for the
closely contested 2000 U.S. presidential election.
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2
most notable being the analysis of John and Charles Kromkowski.3 Their work is a
cogent explication of the legal and historical background of the apportionment process
and size of the U.S. House, in addition to an urgent plea to enlarge the body for a
variety of reasons. Other authors have also explored this question in the interim,
although their emphasis has typically been normative in character, centering on whether
it is an advisable policy to adjust the size of the U.S. House.4
While the House has remained constant in size for nearly 100 years, the nation’s
population has grown by more than 200%. Given the context of this population
expansion, there is a glaring need to empirically parse out what the substantive impact
of retaining the 435-seat figure has had on the representational capacity of this
institution. Members of the U.S. House represent far more citizens than ever before and
yet there has still not been a full accounting of the consequences of this development for
the U.S. political system. This chapter discusses the previous scholarship on this topic,
dissecting its strengths and weaknesses, and outlines how this manuscript will
systematically analyze the impact of the size of the U.S. House of Representatives.
3

Charles A. Kromkowski and John A. Kromkowski, “Why 435? A Question o f Political Arithmetic,”
Polity 24(1991): 129-145.
4 Charles A. Kromkowski and John A. Kromkowski, “Beyond Administrative Apportionment:
Rediscovering the Constitutional Calculus o f Representative Government,” Polity, 24 (1992): 495-497; L.
Marvin Overby, “Apportionment, Politics and Political Science: A Response to Kromkowski and
Kromkowski,” Polity 24 (1992): 483-494; Christopher St. John Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House
W e’ve Outgrown? An Argument for Increasing the Size o f the House o f Representatives,” Columbia
J o u rn a l o f L a w a n d Social Problems 25 (1992): 157-196; Lawrence C. Evans and Walter J. Oleszek, “If
It A in’t Broke Don’t Fix It a Lot” in The US House o f Representatives: Reform or Rebuild, eds. Joseph
Zimmerman and Wilma Rule (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2000), 187-194; Arend Lijphart,
“Reforming the House: Three Moderately Radical Proposals.” in The US House o f Representatives:
Reform or Rebuild, eds. Joseph Zimmerman and Wilma Rule (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing 2000),
135-140; DeWayne L. Lucas and Michael D. McDonald, “Is it Time to Increase the Size o f the House of
Representatives?” American Review o f Politics 2 1 (2000): 367-381; Joseph Zimmerman, “Eliminating
Disproportionate Representation in House,” in The US House o f Representatives: Reform or Rebuild, eds.
Joseph Zimmerman and Wilma Rule (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2000), 163-186; Bryan W.
Brickner, Article the First o f the Bill o f Rights (United States: Lulu.com, 2006).
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3
Historical Treatment

Scholars have investigated the size of the U.S. House in historical perspective
but have tended to concentrate on specific debates that have emerged periodically
through the years. Zagarri looks at the issue as part of more comprehensive research on
the politics of size-related issues during the pre-Civil War era of American history. Her
study finds that in the debate over ratification the Anti-Federalists lambasted the
original 65-seat figure for the U.S. House as harmful for both descriptive and
substantive representation. These arguments were dismissed by the defenders of the
Constitution on the grounds that the House would eventually be allowed to grow in line
with the U.S. population. Zaggarri details how the size of the U.S. House of
Representatives was one of the key issues dividing small and large states in this time
frame. Representatives hailing from less populated states felt expanding the body
diluted their influence in the legislative process. For representatives of the large states,
i

boosting the membership total after each decennial census was critical to ensuring that
they were afforded representation in the process commensurate with the true proportion
o f their state’s population figure.5
Johanna Nicol Shields systematically analyzes the debate over the 1842
Apportionment Act that mandated the first reduction in the membership of the U.S.
House in the nation’s history. She finds that this decision was driven by the Whig
reformers who wished to curtail growth in the institution for the sake of ameliorating

5 Rosemarie Zagarri, The Politics o f Size: Representation in the United States, 1776-1850 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1987).
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what they believed was an unwieldy legislative environment. Detractors of this move
complained it would swell district constituency size and disrupt the ability of
representatives to fully interact with their constituents. Nevertheless, this downsizing
was inconsistent with the norm of increasing seat levels that would reign for more than
a century after the U.S. Constitution was adopted.6
Charles Eagles gives extensive coverage to the tumultuous transition from this
norm as members o f Congress eventually imposed by statute the 43 5-seat limit. He
points out that in 1920 rising institutional opposition to further increases beyond the 435
membership figure led to a situation where there was no reapportionment enacted for
the decade of the 1920s. Eventually this failure led to the permanent fixture of 435
seats, and it also caused a transfer of the apportionment process from the legislative
branch to the executive.7 From 1929 on, the U.S. Commerce Department would
automatically reapportion the House after each decade rather than Congress handling
the matter, as it had done for more than a century.8
Each of these studies is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the
institutional development of the U.S. House. Nonetheless, they do not capture the full
dimensions o f the changes in the size of the body across the full space of American
history. A handful o f scholars have made concerted attempts to fill this vacuum but
6 Johanna Nicol Shields, “Whigs Reform the ‘Bear Garden’: Representation and the Apportionment Act
o f 194 2 ,” Journal o f the Early Republic 5 (1985): 355-82.
7 Charles W. Eagles, Democracy Delayed: Congressional Reapportionment and Urban-Rural Conflict in
the 1920s (Athens, GA: University o f Georgia Press, 1990). For another discussion o f the failure to
reapportion in the 1920s, see Margo J. Anderson, The American Census: A Social History (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1988), Chapter 6.
8 Laurence F. Schmeckebrier, Congressional Apportionment (Westport, CT: Glenwood Press, 1976);
Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 134-135.
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these articles do not go into the level of depth required to accomplish this task.9
Balinski and Young conducted a diachronic analysis of the House apportionment
process, but they pay little attention to how the size of the institution itself influences
representation, focusing exclusively on the formula for apportioning seats among the
states.10 No work has yet been able to comprehensively trace the historical changes in
the size of the U.S. House and convey the central themes that have emerged from all of
these debates in their entirety.

Analysis of Legislative and Constituency Size

The question o f the number of members serving in the U.S. House cannot be
divorced from the issue o f legislative size more generally. This avenue of research has
been more fully probed than the specific case of the U.S. House, although, it too has yet
to fully blossom.11 A tremendous amount of to the literature in this area has been
produced by public choice scholars.12 The emphasis of this work has been on the effect

9 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435”; Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve
Outgrown”; Lucas and McDonald, “Is It Time to Increase the Size o f the House o f Representatives?”
10 Michael Balinski and H. Peyton Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal o f One Man One Vote
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).
11 Peverill Squire and Keith E. Hamm, 101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures and the Future o f
L eg isla tiv e Studies (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press: 2005), 55-58.

12 George. J. Stigler, “The Sizes o f Legislatures,” Journal o f Legal Studies 5 (1976): 17-34; W. Mark
Crain and Robert D. Tollison, “Legislative Size and Voting Rules,” Journal o f Legal Studies 6 (1977):
235-241; W. Mark Crain, “Cost and Output in The Legislative Firm,” Journal o f Legal Studies 8 (1979):
607-621; Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth Shepsle and Christopher Johnson, “The Political Economy o f
Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics,” Journal o f Political Economy 93
(1981): 642-664; Robert E. McCormick and Robert D. Tollison; Politicians, Legislation and the
Economy: An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory o f Government (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishing, 1981); William F. Shugart and Robert D. Tollison, “On the Growth o f Government and the
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of assembly size on fiscal and economic policy, i.e, to what extent is the level of
taxation and government spending related to the number of seats in a legislative
chamber. This research has not been able to establish a firm causal connection between
a jurisdiction’s legislative size and fiscal policy. None of these authors examine this
phenomenon in relation to the U.S. House of Representatives exclusively, nor do they
address representation outside of the context of fiscal policy.
Legislative size has not solely been the province of public choice. Comparative
politics scholars have investigated the subject as well.13 This research attempts to
determine empirical patterns in the variation of assembly size across nations and among
state legislative chambers in the U.S. It has consistently substantiated the positive
relationship between legislative size and population. The consensus findings of this
research indicate that the U.S. is an outlier in terms of the diminutive size of its lower
house when compared to its overall population.14 Other scholarship in this area has
delved into whether assembly size influences rules and procedures of legislative

Political Economy,” Research in Law and Economics 9 (1986): 111-127; Thomas W. Gilligan and John
G. Matsusaka, “Deviations from Constituents Interest: The Role o f Legislative Structures and Political
Parties in the States,” Economic Inquiry 33 (1995): 383-401; Thomas W. Gilligan and John G.
Matsusaka, “Fiscal Policy, Legislature Size, and Political Parties: Evidence from State and Local
Governments in the First Half o f the 20th Century,” National Tax Journal 54 (2001): 57-82; John Charles
Bradbury and W. Mark Crain, “Legislative Organization and Government Spending: Cross-Country
Evidence,” Journal o f Public Economics 82 (2001): 309-325; Reza Baqir, “Districting and
Overspending,” Journal o f Political Economy 110 (2002): 1318-1354.
13 Stigler, “The Sizes o f Legislatures”; Rein Taagepera, “The Size o f National Assemblies,” Social
Science Research 1 (1972): 385-401; Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy, Rein Taagepera and Mathew
Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants o f Electoral Systems (New Haven CT:
Yale University Press, 1989); Rein Taagepera and Steven Recchia, “The Size o f Second Chambers and
European Assemblies,” European Journal o f Political Research 41 (2002) 165-185; Squire and Hamm,
101 Chambers, 48.
14 Lucas and McDonald “Is It Time to Increase the Size o f the House of Representatives,” 374.
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institutions.15 One extensive comparative analysis of legislative chambers throughout
the world showed that smaller legislative bodies tend to have more decentralized
operating procedures.16
In the U.S., the bulk of research on legislative constituency size has been
undertaken on the U.S. Senate.17 Nonetheless, the studies that have been carried out
pertaining to this subject have produced some valuable findings. Lee and Oppenheimer
empirically analyze how equal representation based on geography rather than
population in the Senate is manifested in policy outcomes and discover that smaller
states benefit tangibly from the present arrangement.18 There is also tenuous evidence
that support for government spending is positively correlated with U.S. senators’
constituency size.19 Erikson and Wright uncover a negative link between the liberalism
of a state’s citizenry and a state’s population level.

00

Several studies have demonstrated

that the magnitude o f a state’s population can introduce greater competitiveness into

15 Crain and Tollison, “Legislative Size and Voting Rules,” 238.
16 Andrew Taylor, “Size, Power and Electoral Systems: Exogenous Determinants o f Legislative
Procedural Choice,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 31 (2006): 323-345.
17 Squire and Hamm, 101 Chambers, 55-56.
18 Frances Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences o f Equal
Representation, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1999).
19 Mark Thornton and Marc Ulrich, “Constituency Size and Government Spending,” P u b lic F in a n ce
Review 27 (1999): 588-599.
20 Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. Mclver, State House Democracy: Public Opinion and
Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Chapter 2; Robert S.
Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections” in Congress
Reconsidered, 8th ed., eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press,
2005), 100.
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U.S. Senate election outcomes.21 A handful of scholars, however, have cast doubt
upon this finding.22 According to data from the American National Election Study,
senators from larger states are less likely to have had direct contact with their
constituents.23 There is conflicting evidence regarding how state population size
influences the approval ratings of governors and U.S. senators.24 At the state legislative
level research has shown that the approval rating o f legislators is a negative function of
constituency size.25
Nevertheless, there is a paucity o f research when it comes to the exponential
growth in U.S. House district populations. As Squire and Hamm observe in their
comprehensive study of legislative chambers in the United States, “The effect of
constituency size on legislative behavior is a relatively unexplored area. Research
comparing the electoral and representational effects of constituency size has been
21 John R. Hibbing and Sarah Brandes, “State Population and the Electoral Success o f U.S. Senators,”
American Journal o f Political Science 27 (1983): 808-819; Alan I. Abramowitz, “Explaining Senate
Outcomes,” American Political Science Review 82 (1988): 385-403; Alan I. Abramowitz and Jeffrey
Segal, Senate Elections (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University o f Michigan Press, 1992); Frances Lee and
Bruce I. Oppenheimer, “Senate Apportionment: Competitiveness and Partisan Advantage,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 22 (1997): 3-24; Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate, 93-95.
22 Jonathan Krasno, Challengers, Competition and Reelection: Comparing Senate and House Elections
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).
23 John R. Hibbing and John R. Alford, “Constituency Population and Representation in the U.S. Senate,”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 15 (1990): 581-598.
24 Hibbing and Alford, “Constituency Population and Representation in the U.S. Senate,” 581-598;
Krasno, Challengers, Competition and Reelection; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, “The Effect o f State
Population on Senator-Constituency Linkages,” American Journal o f Political Science 40 (1996): 12801299; Sarah B inder, Forrest Maltzman, and Lee Siegelman, “Accounting for Senators’ Home State
Reputations: Why Do Constituents Love a Bill Cohen So Much More than an A1 D ’Amato,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 23 (1998): 545-560; Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate, 64; Jeffrey E. Cohen
and James D. King, “Relative Unemployment and Gubernatorial Popularity,” Journal o f Politics 66
(2004): 1267-1282; James D. King and Jeffrey E. Cohen, “What Determines a Governor’s Popularity,”
State Politics and Policy Quarterly 5 (2005): 225-247.
25 Peverill Squire, “Professionalization and Public Opinion o f State Legislatures,” Journal o f Politics 55
(1993): 479-491.
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conducted using the U.S. Senate.... Little attention, however, appears to have been
given to this variable in studies of the U.S. House.”26 The challenges posed to
researchers interested in this phenomenon include the dramatic shifts in the numerical
composition of congressional districts that occurs within the ten-year window between
when the next census is taken. In addition, the lack of variation that exists between
districts that follows the latest round of reapportionment is also problematic. These
realities present obstacles to conducting comparable research for the U.S. House, but
they are not insurmountable.

Normative Debate in Political Science and the Popular Press

Virtually all of the literature dealing with the size of the U.S. House consists of
normative suggestions about the wisdom, or lack thereof, of augmenting the current
435-seat figure.

77

Proponents of an upward adjustment have advanced several lines of

argument on behalf of taking this step. One recurring theme is that failing to do so is
not in line with the original intentions of the framers of the U.S. Constitution, who
wanted the size of the House to rise to facilitate effective representation as the
population experienced robust growth.

Others maintain the status quo number places

26 Squire and H am m , 101 C h a m b ers, 5 4 -5 5 .

27 One exception is Lucas and McDonald, “Is It Time to Increase the Size o f the House o f
Representatives,” 367-381. They find that size o f the U.S. House directly influences the “swing ratio,” the
rate at which the aggregate vote for House candidates is translated into the percentage o f seats gained by
each party.
28 Charles Kromkowski, “Framers Would Approve o f a Larger House,” New York Times, January 31,
1991, A22; Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 134; Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Beyond
Administrative Apportionment”; Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve Outgrown,” 159-160;
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the U.S. outside of international legislative norms.29 Many editorial writers echo the
charge leveled by the Anti-Federalists that the growth of House district populations
resulting from preserving the 435-seat limit weakens the connection between
representatives and their constituents.30 A few conservative commentators have posited
that a reduction in the size of government could be brought about by a substantial
increase in the number of House seats.31 A sizable contingent of scholars insists an
increase will enhance descriptive representation by creating new openings every ten
years for historically underrepresented groups like women and minorities to serve in the
House based on the additional apportionment of seats that would occur following each
census.32 Another common complaint is that less rapidly growing states have had their
delegations slashed in spite o f actual population growth in the century since the
statutory cap of 435 was implemented, a development large House proponents want

Lucas and McDonald, “Is It Time to Increase the Size o f the House o f Representatives,” 371-34;
Brickner, Article the First o f the Bill o f Rights.
29 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes', Lijphart, “Reforming the House”; Lucas and McDonald “Is it
Time to Increase the Size o f the House o f Representatives”; Margo Anderson, “Growth o f US Population
Calls for Larger House o f Representatives,” Population Today 28 (2000): 1-4.
30 Phil Duncan, “Enlarging the Congress: Boon for Democracy,” CQ Weekly Report, October 28 1989,
2914; Matthew Cossolotto, “Enlarge the House,” Christian Science Monitor, December 22, 1989, 19;
James Glassman, “Let’s Build a Bigger House: Why Shouldn’t the Number o f Congressmen Grow with
the Population,” Washington Post, June 17, 1990, D2; Michael Merrill and Sean Wilentz, “The Big
House an Alternative to Term Limits,” New Republic, November 16, 1992, 16-18; Matthew Cossolotto,
“America Has Outgrown the House o f Representatives,” The H ill , November 21, 2001; Jeff Jacoby, “A
Bigger More Democratic Congress,” Boston Globe, January 13, 2005.
31 Robert Novak, Completing the Revolution: A Vision fo r Victory in 2000 (New York: The Free Press
2000), 187-188; George Will, “Congress Just Isn’t Big Enough,” Washington Post, January 14, 2001, B7.
32 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435”; Wilma Rule, “Expanded Congress Would Help Women,”
New York Times, February 24, 1991, E l 6; Yates, “A House o f Our Own or Have We Outgrown,” 193.
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reversed, or at the very least halted.33 Altogether, Kromkowski and Kromkowski
identify 25 specific reasons why the U.S. House should receive an upward adjustment
in its numerical size.34 Collectively, however, very few of these propositions have been
empirically examined, an observation that skeptics of the idea are quick to play up.35
The primary criticisms launched against enlarging the U.S. House are that it
would impose increased costs on the taxpayer, lead to a diminished capacity for
deliberation in the chamber, and it could undermine legislative effectiveness.36 Some of
the opponents in this debate express little reverence for members of Congress and
fundamentally see more members of the U.S. House as an additional expense neither
the country’s taxpayers nor the federal government can afford to assume. In fact, some
opponents even suggest that the U.S. House should undergo a downward adjustment in
its membership. Former U.S. Senator William Proxmire, WI-D, relied on fiscally
conservative justifications to bolster his contention that the makeup of Congress is too
numerous. In his view, Congress overspends on staff and thus contributes to run away
deficit spending that has routinely plagued the federal budget. Cutting the membership
of the U.S. House would provide a small yet symbolically meaningful contribution to
the goal of eliminating unneeded spending. Proxmire countered the charge that such a
dramatic change would weaken representation by suggesting that it would have an

33 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 137-144; Yates, “A House o f Our Own or A House W e’ve
Outgrown,” 169; Brickner, Article the First o f the Bill o f Rights.
34 For the most comprehensive listing o f all o f the reasons for increasing the size o f the House see
Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 144-145.
35 Overby, “Apportionment, Politics and Political Science,” 483.
36 Morris Silverman, “Better Yet, Reduce the Size o f House,” New York Times, January 14, 1991, A17.
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opposite effect. Because there would be fewer members of Congress, each
representative’s vote would carry more clout within the institution. In other words, U.S.
House members might be less accountable, but they would carry more influence and
cost less, too.37
Other opponents list a constricted, diminished quality of debate in the chamber
with a greater number o f representatives battling for even more sought-after time for
debate as grounds for continuing the status quo.38 Another concern cited in this sphere
of literature is the implications for legislative efficiency and functional effectiveness.
Under this line of reasoning, if the U.S. House is enlarged any further then an incredibly
unwieldy legislative setting will ensue. Evans and Oleszek warn that if a substantial
increase in the size of the membership were to occur, “delays and stalemates would
multiply” in the legislative operations of the House.39 This outcome would make
legislating more difficult because coalition building would be harder to achieve and
communication between members undermined.40 This tension forms the core of the
debate that occurs when institutional designers of legislatures seek to balance the need
for adequate representation and legislative functionality.41

37 William Proxmire, “A House Divided in Half; Wanna Save Money Fire Every Other Person on Capitol
Hill,” Washington Post, February 5, 1989, D5.
38 Zimmerman, “Eliminating Disproportionate Representation in the U.S. House,” 178; Evans and
Oleszek, “If It Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix It a Lot,” 189-190.
39 Evans and Oleszek, “If It Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix It a Lot,” 190.
40 William F. Willoughby, Principles o f Legislative Organization and Administration (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1934), 263; Silverman, “Better Yet, Reduce the Size o f House,” A17; Evans
and Oleszek, “If it Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix it a Lot,” 190.
41 Nelson W. Polsby, “The Institutionalization o f the House o f Representatives,” American Political
Science Review 62 (1968): 144-168; Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Representation and Governance: The Great
Legislative Trade-off,” Political Science Quarterly 103 (1988): 461-484.
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Main Research Questions

This dissertation seeks to build on the prior literature by synthesizing its major
elements in order to develop a set of hypotheses to empirically test the impact of
maintaining the present 435-seat limit of the U.S. House while the growth of the
nation’s population has expanded unabated. It also explains how representation was
once given primacy in the debates over legislative and constituency size but was
eventually supplanted over concerns from House members about retaining the
institution’s capacity to legislate. Did the decision to downplay representation in favor
of institutional maintenance really compromise the democratic nature of the U.S.
House, or have other intervening political developments offset some of the
consequences feared by critics of placing a ceiling on the number of members
authorized to serve?
The implications for legislative representation are potentially enormous, as
illustrated in vivid terms by the fact that each individual member on average now
represents approximately 640,000 constituents. To place this number in context, during
the chamber’s formative years that figure was closer to one representative for every
30,000 people. Does the present arrangement interfere with the representational linkage
as Anti-Federalists contended during the debate over ratification of the Constitution and
as many contemporary political scientists have argued?42 If so, what are the

42 For one representation o f this view see, Federal Framer, “Letter VII December 31, 1787,” in The
Essential Antifederalist, 2nd ed., eds. W. B. Allen and Gordon Lloyd (Lanham, MD: Rowan and
Littlefield, 2002), 289.
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consequences if indeed there is a diminished capacity for representation and how can
this proposition be empirically tested?
Most of the prior research consists of either normative suggestions to increase
the number o f seats in the U.S. House or limits empirical inquiries of legislative size or
district constituency size to fiscal outcomes. While there have been efforts to study
these phenomena as they apply to representation in the U.S. Senate and at the state
legislative level, there has been a paucity of research about the ramifications for the
U.S. House.43 This dissertation fills the void by attempting this first in depth
comprehensive study of this subject that employs a series of quantitative measures to
analyze several dimensions o f representation as they relates directly to ending the
practice of allowing the House to grow in line with the U.S. population. The
dissertation seeks to empirically assess whether representation has been undermined,
enhanced, or been at all in the aftermath. Though there have been many suppositions
forwarded in the debate about the ideal size of the U.S. House and its members’
constituencies, there has been a shortage of studies aimed at testing these hypotheses.
Legislative theorists have identified several conceptions of the representational
linkage, including policy, service, allocation, symbolic, collective and descriptive.44
The spheres of representation empirically examined in this dissertation are constricted

43 Squire and H am m , 101 C h a m b ers.

44 Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps, “The Puzzle o f Representation: Specifying Components o f
Responsiveness,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 2 (1977): 233-255; Robert Weissberg, “Collective Versus
Dyadic Representation in Congress,” American Political Science Review 72 (1978), 535-547; Janet BoxStefensmeier, David C. Kimball, Scott Meinke, and Katherine Tate, “The Effects o f Political
Representation o f the Electoral Advantages o f House Incumbents,” Political Research Quarterly 56
(2003): 259-270.
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by data limitations. Ideally there would be pre-existing survey data that actually
inquired of citizens their thoughts about whether the size of the U.S. House should be
increased and whether congressional districts are too heavily populated, in addition to
more direct measures o f the interaction of legislative size and the quality of
representation. This dissertation will address this absence of information by
undertaking a survey probing the attitudes of the U.S. population on the question of
whether the size of the U.S. House ought to be increased. To supplement these
attitudinal data, this study will marshal evidence in other areas of representation
amenable to empirical investigation, including a comparative assessment of the U.S.
House in historical and international context, estimating the effects on electoral
competition, policy responsiveness, citizen contact with and approval of their
representatives and the impact on the states. This study may not delve into all of the
aspects of the debate outlined previously, but it does serve as a starting point for
systematically addressing a number of fundamental questions revolving around the size
o f the U.S. House and the citizens represented by each of its 435 members. The main
research questions explored include:
•

To what extent does the size of the U.S. House and its average district
populations deviate from historical and international norms?

•

What have been the repercussions for the states and regions of the country that
have stemmed from ending the practice o f increasing the total number o f seats
apportioned after each census to prevent any state from losing representation in
the U.S. House?
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• How has the explosion of the ratio of population per representative that has
occurred since the U.S. House was frozen at 435 members impacted the
electoral process and roll-call voting behavior?
•

Has this expansion of district constituency populations undermined the level of
citizens’ contact with and perceptions of their members of the U.S. House?

• What are American citizens’ opinions about the present size of the U.S. House
and the average number of citizens per congressional district?

Outline of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 documents the historical changes in the House’s size by highlighting
specific debates over how many seats should be apportioned for the nation’s lower
chamber at various points in US history, starting with debate at the Constitutional
Convention until contemporary times. It begins by reviewing the deliberations of the
founders at the Constitutional Convention over what constituted the optimal size of the
nation’s lower house and how that figure should be modified based on future population
growth. Next, it concentrates on the disputes between the Federalists and the AntiFederalists over this issue and how this exchange framed many of the future
congressional debates on the matter. The chapter continues with a look at how
Congress grappled with balancing the competing needs for a representative assem bly
and one that could carry out its legislative functions in an efficient manner. It shows
that for over a century the primary concern was for the representational imperative of
not undercutting the link between House members and their constituents. However, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17
decision to institute a statutory limitation of 435 seats in the early twentieth century
was rooted in a belief by House members that continued enlargement would make
deliberation more restricted and the legislative process unmanageable, thereby
threatening the institution’s position within the federal government. Since reaching this
conclusion, the collective membership of the body has refused to seriously revisit the
issue because the costs to representation have not exceeded the benefits of preserving
the status quo. The sources of data for this chapter are mostly primary source materials
including, the complete collection of Farrand’s Records o f the Federal Convention,
various selections from the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists and transcripts of
legislative debates from the Congressional Globe and Congressional Record?5 Textual
analysis of these documents is the chief methodological approach utilized in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 investigates three common complaints leveled against the decision to
put an end to decennial enlargements of the U.S. House of Representatives. First, the
size of House districts is out of line with international and historical standards. Second,
the size of the House itself is not as large as would be projected based on the level of
population in the United States. Third, it has led to the loss of House seats by states and
regions in the country that have failed to keep pace with the national rate of population
growth. All three criticisms are empirically scrutinized utilizing data from the U.S.
Census Bureau and data on legislative size in 35 other countries with bicameral

45 These sources include Max Farrand ed., Records o f the Federal Convention o f 1987, vols. 1-2 (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1966); Allen and Lloyd, eds., The Essential Antifederalist; Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, ed. Terrence Ball (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
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assemblies rated as free by Freedom House’s rankings.46 While all of the previous
analyses have correctly identified these trends, this chapter updates the previous work
and comes to more nuanced conclusions about the representational implications of
almost a century of maintaining the present size of the U.S. House.
One o f the most prominent features of scholarship in American political science
is the sharp rise in the incumbency advantage over the past generation. Incumbent reelection rates for the U.S. House in some recent elections have hovered close to 100%
while margins of victory have soared to lopsided proportions.47 Chapter 4 explores
whether the growth in the average population of House districts has had any impact on
electoral outcomes. Drawing on data from the 1970, 1980,1990 and 2000 elections
when census estimates of House district populations are most precise, multivariate
models are formulated predicting the margin of victory and probability of defeat for
incumbent House members. The results reveal what effects, if any, constituency size
has in U.S. House elections.
Critics o f allowing the growth of House district populations to expand argue it
creates greater distance between House members and their constituents. Chapter 5
utilizes survey data from the American National Election Studies and National
Annenberg Election Survey in years where accurate estimates of House district
population are available to determine whether constituency size influences the level of
46 These sources include United Nations Department o f Economic and Social Affairs, World Population
Prospects: The 2002 Revision, Volume III: Analytical Report, (2002); Arthur Banks, Thomas C. Muller
and William R. Overstreet, eds. Political Handbook o f the World 2000-2002 (: Binghamton, N Y : CSA
Publications, 2003); U.S. Census Bureau, Interim Projections o f the Total Population fo r the United
States and States: April I, 2000 to July I, 2030 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005); Vincent B. Thompson
“Projecting Reapportionment,” Indiana Business Review 40 (2005): 4-6; The World Fact Book 2006,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publ.ications/factbook/ ; Freedom House, Freedom in World 2006,
http://www.ffeedotnhouse.org/uploads/pdfyCharts2006.pdf.
47 Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics o f Congressional Elections, 6th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2004).
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contact citizens have with their House members. It also delves into what extent the
House members representing more heavily populated constituencies are perceived as
being any less helpful or are as successful in staying in touch. It also tests whether
incumbent House members’ approval ratings are tied to the number of citizens they
represent.
Another trend obvious to even the most casual observer of U.S. politics over the
past generation is the rise in partisan and ideological polarization in the Congress,
especially the U.S. House. Chapter 6 investigates whether the failure to augment the
size o f the U.S. House in line with population growth has had any bearing on voting
patterns in that body. Using Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores, the level
o f divergence from constituency opinion exhibited by House members in their voting
records is ascertained.48 This approach allows for an assessment of whether
representatives from more heavily populated districts display more extreme tendencies
in the policy representation they provide their district.
There is no available survey data gauging public opinion on the size of the size
o f the U.S. House. If the full representational implications of retaining the 435-seat
limit on the House and permitting the ratio of persons per House district to escalate are
to be evaluated there must be some understanding of how the American public feels
about these issues. Do citizens believe that the size of the House of Representatives
ought to be boosted to offset the growth in the number o f citizens each m em ber
represents? Chapter 7 provides the results of survey questions asked of a national
sample o f more than 1,000 citizens on the size of the U.S. House and congressional

48 Data made available for download by Keith Poole at http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm.
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district populations. These questions allow the U.S. public to answer the question of
whether it is a good idea to tinker with the size of the U.S. House to improve
representation. The survey includes items asking respondents whether they would
support an increase in the number of House seats to offset the growth in the average
district constituency size, to prevent states from losing seats in the House and to
enhance descriptive representation for women and minorities.
Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings of this work and deals with its
implications. What does it really mean for the character of representation in the U.S.
House that it has been frozen at 435 members for almost a century while the population
levels in House districts have mushroomed to historic highs? This chapter will restate
and summarize the findings generated by this study and discuss the implications of the
representational tradeoff that has resulted from maintaining the House size status quo
for such a lengthy period of time. Further, is delves into how each side of the debate
over enlarging the House will potentially react to the main findings of this study. It also
discusses the enormous obstacles that any proposal to significantly lift the number of
seats beyond the 435-seat figure is certain to encounter.
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CHAPTER 2

FROM 65 TO 435 AND 30,000 TO 640,000

Introduction

A series of studies by historians and political scientists has added to the body of
knowledge on specific periods in the nation’s history when the size of the U.S. House
arose as a significant issue.1 All of this research has brought about a greater
understanding of the unique features that surrounded each debate. Yet this literature has
not successfully linked these individual cases to this debate over time. Moreover, there
has not been much integration of some of the key theoretical questions that arise related
to the numerical composition of seats in the institutional design of the legislature.
Many o f these themes occur repeatedly in discussions of the optimal size of the U.S.
House throughout the nation’s history.

1 Johanna N icol Shields, “Whigs Reform the ‘Bear Garden’: Representation and the Apportionment Act
o f 1942,” Journal o f the Early Republic 5 (1985): 355-82; Eugene W. Hickock, “The Framers’
Understanding o f Constituional Deliberation in Congress,” Gerogia Law Review 21 (1986): 217-272;
Rosemarie Zagarri, The Politics o f Size: Representation in the United States, 1776-1850 (Ithaca, N Y :
C ornell U n iv ersity Press, 1987); Charles W . E agles, D e m o c ra c y D e la y e d : C o n g re ssio n a l

Reapportionment and Urban-Rural Conflict in the 1920s (Athens, GA: University o f Georgia Press,
1990); Charles A. Kromkowski and John A. Kromkowski “Why 435? A Question o f Political
Arithmetic,” Polity 24 (1991): 129-145; Christopher St. John Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House
W e’ve Outgrown? An Argument for Increasing the Size o f the House o f Representatives,” Columbia
Journal o f Law and Social Problems 25 (1992): 157-196; DeWayne L. Lucas and Michael D. McDonald
“Is It Time to Increase the Size o f the House o f Representatives,” American Review o f Politics 21 (2000):
367-381; Bryan W. Brickner, Article the First o f the Bill o f Rights (United States: Lulu.com, 2006).
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The purpose of this chapter is to document the historical changes in the
House’s size by highlighting specific debates over how many seats should be
apportioned for the nation’s lower chamber at various points in U.S. history, starting
with debate at the Constitutional Convention until contemporary times. Textual
analysis is employed to delineate many of the theoretical propositions that have been
advanced in assessing what constitutes the optimal size of the nation’s lower house.
The chief argument of this chapter is that as the House was evolving as an institution it
confronted a requirement to balance the need for representation with the demands for
legislative efficiency and adequate deliberation. This tradeoff has been recognized as a
tension for legislative institutions struggling to allow representation of the interests of
individual members and their constituencies while maintaining an organizational
structure that facilitates functional effectiveness of the body. Although political selfinterest often shaped the positions individual legislators may have taken in these
debates, one’s stance on how many seats the nation’s lower house should comprise
came down to whether constituency representation or institutional maintenance ought to
take precedence.
The decision to institute a statutory limitation of 435 seats in the early twentieth
century was rooted in a belief by House members that continued enlargement would
make deliberation more restricted and the legislative process unmanageable, thereby

2 Nelson W. Polsby, “The Institutionalization o f the House o f Representatives,” American Political
Science Review 62 (1968): 144-168; Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Representation and Governance: The Great
Legislative Trade-off,” Political Science Quarterly 103 (1988): 461-484.
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threatening the institution’s position within the U.S. political system.3 Since reaching
this conclusion, the collective membership of the body has refused to seriously revisit
the issue because there has been no perceived need to alter the present configuration.
Neither internal political or organizational dynamics nor exogenous forces have dictated
that representatives reverse the legislative inertia that has maintained the status quo for
decades. Though the ratio of the population per representative has climbed to
unprecedented levels, increasing the size of the House to offset this growth has not
received serious consideration in over forty years.

Legislative Size: Balancing Representation and Legislative Effectiveness

Political scientists emphasize that any legislature must balance the
responsibilities of governance and representation.4 This tradeoff applies not only to the
numerical size of the institution but also to what rules and procedures to establish,
whether the legislature ought to have one chamber or two, the role of committees, or the
length of terms, among many others.5 In order to pass laws, a legislature must operate
in an efficient manner, which often requires rules and structures that expedite the
process. Representation is both a dyadic and collective concept. The former

3 William F. Willoughby, Principles o f Legislative Organization and Administration (Washington, D.C.:
T he B rook in gs Institution, 19 3 4 ), 2 6 3 .

4 Polsby, “The Institutionalization o f the House o f Representatives,” 144; Shepsle, “Representation and
Governance,” 482.
5 Lucas and McDonald, “Is It Time to Increase the Size o f the House o f Representatives,” 368; Peverill
Squire and Keith E. Hamm, 101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures, and the Future o f Legislative
Studies (Columbus, OH: The Ohio University Press, 2005).
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encompasses the relationship between the district constituency and the member,
whereas the latter deals with the institution collectively.6 When a legislature
collectively responds to the needs of the citizenry of the nation by carrying out its
governing requirements in an expeditious manner, it can come into conflict with the
necessity of dyadic constituency representation by the individual legislator. The former
may be better served in a smaller legislative body. The latter is more likely to be
fostered in a larger House with less populous districts.7 While not always incompatible
with one another in all areas of institutional maintenance,8 legislative functionality and
responsiveness inevitably clash when the issue of optimal numerical size comes to the
forefront. This reality is an especially vexing conundrum in heavily populous, highly
diverse societies.9
In order to accommodate the diversity of interests in any society, a legislature
must be constituted with enough seats so that various constituencies can have their
voices heard. This obligation poses a burden on the internal operations of any
legislative institution. Since the legislative calendar places limits on the number of days
a legislative body can be in session, not every speaker can be heard on each item that
comes to the floor if the membership is so voluminous. Empirical inquiry has
confirmed that the restrictive nature of legislative rules and procedures and the

6 Robert Weissberg, “Collective Versus Dyadic Representation in Congress,” American Political Science
R e v ie w 72 (1 9 7 8 ): 5 3 5 -5 4 7 .

7 Willoughby, Principles o f Legislative Organization and Administration, 258.
8 Shepsle, “Representation and Governance,” 482.
9 Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1973), 80-81.
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threshold at which debate can be terminated is a negative function of legislative
size.10 As the size o f a legislature becomes progressively larger, the time for speeches
allotted to individual members must decline or the consequence is that the legislative
process becomes more cumbersome.11 On the other hand, if the legislature is not
enlarged in line with the population constituency size will grow, placing a strain on the
representational relationship between legislators and their constituents.12
In an ideal assembly everyone could represent themselves individually and full
representation could be achieved, though at the cost o f making legislative action and
discussion of the issues virtually impossible. Conversely, in a legislature of only a
handful of members the legislative process could be highly efficient, time for debate
plentiful, but at the expense of severely limiting the representation for various segments
of society.13 Since both options are unrealistic, institutional designers must devise a
numerical formula that reconciles the need for a representative assembly while
maintaining a taxonomical legislative structure capable of enacting policy favored by
the collective membership o f the body.
The vexation o f resolving the tension between these imperatives is exacerbated
as a country’s population increases. If the numerator, in this case the population,

10 W. Mark Crain and Robert D. Tollison, “Legislative Size and Voting Rules,” Journal o f Legal Studies
6 (1977): 235-241; Andrew J. Taylor, “Size Power and Electoral Systems: Exogenous Determinants o f
Legislative Procedural Choice,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 31 (2006): 323-345.
11 Bertrand De Jouvenal, “The Chairman’s Problem,” American Political Science Review 55 (1961): 368372; Dahl, and Tufte, Size and Democracy, 80-81; Lucas and McDonald, “Is It Time to Increase the Size
o f the House o f Representatives,” 370.
12 Rein Taagepera and Mathew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants o f
Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
13 Willoughby, Principles o f Legislative Organization and Administration, 258.
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remained constant, then experimenting with the value of the denominator, the number
of seats in the legislature, an evaluation of the optimal ratio of citizens per legislator
required to achieve both adequate representation and organizational maintenance could
be undertaken. However, because the population of the U.S. has been on a permanent
upward trajectory, the numerator cannot remain fixed and thus the denominator must
automatically increase just to keep the number of citizens per district constant. Therein
lies the severe quandary in endeavoring to determine the proper size of the U.S. House.
How can the interest of representation be served if there is some limit to the absolute
numerical size of the House that will stymie the effectiveness of the legislative process
while the total population expands unabated?
Two focal questions were weighed extensively during the original debates over
the size o f the House beginning with the Constitutional Convention and throughout all
of the subsequent debates on this subject. First, at what point would the U.S. House be
composed of so many members that the legislative process would be undermined to an
extent that threatened its independent position within the larger political system?
Second, at what level would the ratio of population per representative jeopardize
representational connection between the citizenry and the members of the U.S. House?
The answer to the first question varied until the early twentieth century when the House
finally settled on 435 seats as a ceiling beyond which further growth was inimical to
performing its tasks as a governing institution. The second question, once drawing
serious attention, has now been rendered obsolete, at least by members of the House
since they arrived at the 435-seat figure.
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The Constitutional Convention Opts for 65

When the delegates arrived in Philadelphia in 1787 for the Constitutional
Convention, there was an array of issues they would have to confront. Foremost among
them was what form the new national legislature should take, including whether it ought
to consist of two houses or one. George Mason of Virginia adamantly insisted upon
bicameralism, as an essential feature of any proposed national legislature.14 The
delegates saw the wisdom o f this argument and on June 21 approved language
mandating that the Congress would consist of two separate houses by a vote of 7-3.15 In
discussing the shape o f the lower chamber, determining how many members it would be
composed of captured a substantial measure of attention from the delegates.16
According to William Riker’s quantitative analysis of various founding documents, the
size of the House was the most frequently debated issue related to constitutional
structure, accounting for almost one third of the comments on the subject. 17 This
•

•

controversy was magnified because it was so central to the quality of representation that
would be afforded by the institution most closely linked to the people.
In arriving at a numerical target for the membership for the lower house, the
delegates had to deal with several complicated issues, such as the ratio of population per
14 Max Farrand, ed., Records o f the Federal Convention, vol. 1 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
1966), 351.
15 Ibid., 354.
16 Laurence F. Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment (Westport, CT: Glenwood Press, 1976);
Hickock, “The Framers’ Understanding o f Constitutional Deliberation in Congress,” 230.
17 William H. Riker, “Why Negative Campaigning Is Rational: The Rhetoric o f the Ratification
Campaign o f 1787-1788,” Studies in American Political Development 5 (1991): 224-283.
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representative and how to account for changes in population growth. There was also
a collective recognition o f the necessity to achieve a balance between a chamber that
was representative o f the people and accommodating of legislative deliberation.18 The
ratio of citizens per representative was initially set forth in language presented to the
delegates at not more than one representative for every 40,000 inhabitants.19 This
threshold drew the ire of some delegates because it did not take wealth into account,
whereas others were concerned that fixing the ratio at this level would eventually lead
to a House size that was incompatible with adequate deliberation.21 On August 8,
James Madison, who preformed a delicate balancing act over the representative nature
of the House during the entire Convention, proposed an amendment adopted by the
delegates, stating that the number of inhabitants should not exceed 1 for every 40,000
because it would have the effect of “rendering the number of Representatives
excessive.”22 Although Madison’s motion was adopted 7-3 by the Convention, some
delegates were uneasy with this ratio. During the final day of the convention, Nathaniel
Gorhum o f Massachusetts, cognizant o f this sentiment, moved to augment the final draft
of the Constitution so that the ratio would stand at not more than one representative for
every 30,000 inhabitants. George Washington found the matter so compelling that he

18 Hickock, “The Framers’ Understanding o f Constitutional Deliberation in Congress,” 237.
19 Farrand, Records o f the Federal Convention, vol. 1, 526.
20 Ibid., 533.

21 Ibid., vol. 2, 553-554. Alexander Hamilton voiced his concern over the apportionment ratio
complaining “it was essential that the popular branch should be on a solid foundation. He was seriously
o f the opinion that the House o f Representatives was so narrow a scale to be really dangerous, and to
warrant a jealousy in the people for their liberties.”
22 Ibid., 221. Roger Sherman o f Connecticut made the motion in concert with Madison.
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cast aside his self-imposed neutrality as presiding officer to rise in favor o f the
motion. Madison quotes Washington as decreeing the motion was of such great
consequence that its approval was essential so that objections to the Constitution “might
be made as few as possible.”

Washington expressed sympathy with delegates

uncomfortable with the ratio, observing, “The smallness of the proportion of
Representatives had been considered by many members of the Convention, an
insufficient security for the rights & interests of the people.”24 According to Madison’s
notes, Washington informed the Convention it would give him “much satisfaction to see
it adopted.”25 Washington’s stature and the late hour o f the proceedings restrained
anyone from objecting and the amendment was adopted unanimously. The figure of
30,000:1 for the ratio o f population per representative was enshrined in the final
document and has not changed since the ratification of the Constitution. It ought to be
noted that the Constitution sets only a minimum level the ratio cannot go below and
does not impose a maximum threshold the population per representative cannot exceed.
Determining how to apportion the House in response to future population
increases also drew the attention of the delegates. George Mason o f Virginia
underscored the gravity o f population growth’s impact upon representation in the
House, declaring “a revision from time to time according to some permanent and
precise standard as essential to ... fair representation required in the 1st branch.”26

23 Ibid., 643-644.
24 Ibid., 644.
25 Ibid. Washington’s action was likely in anticipation o f the forthcoming attacks from the AntiFederalists over this issue.
26 Ibid., vol. 1, 578.
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Edmund Randolph of Virginia sought to alleviate this problem by proposing that the
national legislature take a census to determine the number of inhabitants in each state.
Guevenuer Morris o f Pennsylvania dismissed this idea as tying the hands of future
legislatures, whom he believed would readjust representation without such a measure.27
The Convention followed the lead o f Randolph by first prescribing that a census be
taken every 15 years

and then quickly altered the duration to once every ten years the

next day on July 12.29 This standard was maintained until the ultimate version o f the
Constitution was approved.
The first apportionment of seats for the House was not based on an actual
enumeration of the population, but rather on a rough approximation of the population of
each state. The first census would not be taken until the first session of the new
Congress convened two years later. Though it was the subject of controversy, the
delegates were willing to proceed without a true head count for reasons of convenience.
Madison openly conceded the first apportionment of the House was built on a
foundation of conjecture, although he sought to reassure the Convention this was only a
temporary measure.30
When the debate shifted to how many representatives should actually sit during
the first session of the House itself, the delegates expressed various conceptions over
what number would be optimal for legislative representation. Some wished to see a

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 577.
29 Ibid., 590.
30 Ibid., 358.
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body as representative as possible, a posture which stood in contrast to those
delegates who emphasized need for the legislature to function in a reasonable manner.31
This conflict reflected the essence of the tradeoff between representation and
effectiveness identified by scholars of the legislative process.32 The delegates first
approved a total o f 56 seats to be apportioned amongst the states for the first Congress
on July 9.33 The next day this figure was revised upward by the Convention to 65.34
Several state delegations were disgruntled over the number of seats they were allotted,
though attempts to change it were repeatedly rebuffed throughout the convention.
Contrary to his previous apprehensions about the future growth in House
membership, Madison urged that each state’s total be doubled to buttress support
among the people. He discounted concerns over the costs of such a move, noting his
foremost worry was that “a majority of a Quorum of 65 members, was too small a
number the whole in habitants” of the United States.

For Madison there was a danger

in a majority of twenty members being allowed to pass laws in the national legislature,
an outlook endorsed by George Mason.36 Elbridge Gerry weighed in on behalf of the
Madison amendment on the grounds that enlarging the House would diminish the

31 Hickock, “The Framers’ Understanding o f ConstituTional Deliberation in Congress,” 236.
32 Polsby, “The Institutionalization o f the House o f Representatives,” 144; Sheplsle, “Representation and
Governance,” 482.
33 Farrand, Records o f the Federal Convention, vol. 1, 557.
34 Ibid., 563.
35 Ibid., 568.
36 Ibid., 569.
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likelihood its members could be susceptible to corruption.

-57

Some delegates made

the case that an increase was advisable because a failure to do so would leave some
states with only one member, which in their mind was not sufficient for these states to
receive adequate representation.

•5 0

Others felt enlarging the House was ill-advised,

relying on the conduct o f state legislatures as a reference point. Madison’s motion to
double the 65-seat allocation was soundly rejected by the Convention on a vote of 9-2.39
This debate reappeared sporadically throughout the convention once the figure
was established as the benchmark, although further attempts to alter it did not
materialize. Madison’s position reflected both an effort to appease delegates focused on
the functional effectiveness o f the House and the anticipated complaints of the AntiFederalists that representation o f the people would be severely undermined with such a
diminutive numerical membership. The compromise total may not have satisfied all the
delegates but the assurance that this figure was only temporary managed to quell
lingering doubts about the issue to resolve it for the rest of the Convention. When the
Constitution was finalized the House was to consist of 65 members, and following a
census in two years after the first Congress, a reapportionment would occur. The action
taken by the Convention far from settled the issue as the debate over ratification would
demonstrate, for the Anti-federalists would incorporate the size of the U.S. House as
one o f the critical elements of their vigorous assault against the U.S. Constitution.
Richard Henry Lee articulated his dissatisfaction, insisting “That in order to secure the

37 Ibid., 569.
38 Ibid., 570.
39 Ibid.
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rights o f the people more effectually from violation, the power and respectability of
the house of representatives be increased, by increasing the number of delegates to that
house where the popular interest must chiefly depend for protection.”40

The Anti-Federalists Attack

A centerpiece o f the Anti-federalist attack upon the size of the House revolved
around the concept o f “actual representation.”41 By this term they meant that the
legislature should be an actual reflection of the demographic composition of society at
large. This view is concomitant with descriptive representation, meaning that genuine
legislative representation was only possible through the inclusion o f legislators who
shared the characteristics of groups that comprise society.42 The Anti-Federalists’
vision of actual representation did not encompass women and racial minorities, the
parameters of the debate in modem times; their concern was rooted in class and
occupation. Federal Farmer summarized this case: “Fair representation, therefore,
should be so regulated that every order o f men in the community, according to the
common course o f elections, can have a share in it. In order to allow professional men,
merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, etc. to bring just proportion of their best
informed men respectively into the legislature the representation must be considered
40 Richard H enry L ee, “O bjections, O ctober 16, 1787” in The E sse n tia l A n tifed era list, 2nd ed., eds. W.B.

Allen and Gordon Lloyd, (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2002), 23. Lee was but one o f the AntiFederalists to denounce the small size o f the House and urge an increase in its membership.
41 Zagarri, The Politics o f Size, 89.
42 Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept o f Representation (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press,
1967).
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numerous.”43 This form of representation was the prevailing view throughout the
population in many o f the states, a departure from which the Anti-Federalists found
untenable.44
Not only did the Anti-Federalists take issue with who would serve in the House
but, also the ability of these representatives to reflect the will of the people. Its
membership would be isolated from the masses and would not be of sufficient numbers
to grasp the wishes of the majority. Brutus lamented, “One man or a few men cannot
possibly represent the feelings, opinions, and characters of a great multitude. In this
respect, the new constitution is radically defective. The house of assembly, which is
intended as a representation of the people of America will not, nor cannot in the nature
of things be a proper one. Sixty-five men cannot be found in the United States who
hold the sentiments, possess the feelings, or are acquainted with the wants and interests
of this vast country.”45 This forceful condemnation encapsulated the fears of the Anti
federalists that the House would become overly detached from the public, placing their
liberties in severe jeopardy of being eroded.
It was not merely the absolute size of the chamber that drew their scorn but also
the ratio of population per representative. A small legislative constituency size was a
vital linkage mechanism in maintaining the representative character of the House.
According to Federal Farmer:
A small representation can never be well informed as to the circumstances o f the people; the
members must be too far removed from the people in general to sympathize with them, and too
43 Federal Farmer, “Letter II, October 9 ,1 7 8 7 ,” in The Essential Antifederalist, 149-150.
44 Zagarri, The Politics o f Size, 90.
45 Bratus, “Essay III, November 15, 1787,” in The Essential Antifederalist, 254.
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few to communicate with them. A representation must be extremely imperfect where the
representatives are not circumstanced to make the proper communications to their constituents,
•and where the constituents in turn can not, with tolerable convenience make known their wants,
circumstances and opinions, to their representatives. Where there is but one representative to
30,000 or 40,000 inhabitants it appears to me he can only mix and be acquainted with a few
researchable characters among his constituents; even double the federal representation, and then
there must be a great distance between the representatives and the people in general
represented.46

The Anti-Federalists’ vision of effective representation held that it could only
occur within a limited sphere of population. Brutus cited representation in Great Britain
as an example where the district constituency size was half that of the United States.
With an even more widely dispersed population, the United States necessitated an even
smaller ratio than Great Britain “because this country is much more extensive, and
differs more in productions, interests, manners and habits.”47 Being accountable to a
relatively diminutive constituency would mitigate the effects of geographic distance
from the nation’s center of government but also be amenable to serving the
heterogeneous population in the extended republic. Patrick Henry honed in on the
language o f the Constitution, noting it simply placed a floor on the ratio and not a
ceiling. He invoked the specter that Congress could impose a limit of one House
member per state. 48
A third component of the Anti-Federalists’ indictment against the size of the
House was the prospect that its membership could be too easily corrupted. A
voluminous number of representatives would create a buffer against a national

46 Federal Farmer, “Letter VII, December 31, 1787,” in The Essential Antifederalist, 279.
47 Brutus, “Essay III, November 15, 1787,” in The Essential Antifederalist, 254.
48 Patrick Henry, “Virginia Ratifying Convention June 4 and 5, 1788,” in The Essential Antifederalist,
132. Henry openly wondered why provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the ratio o f population per
representative were so vague. He suggested this lack o f clarity would severely undermine representation.
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legislature captured by nefarious influences. Federal Farmer maintained, “Where
there is a small representation a sufficient number to carry any measure may with ease
be influenced by bribes, offices and civilities; they may easily form private juntos and
outdoor meetings, agree on measures, and carry them by silent votes.”49 In the spirit of
preserving an honest government paying heed to its citizens’ liberties, a larger house
was essential to this cause. Federal Farmer continued, “I mean the constant liability of
a small number of representatives to private combinations. The tyranny of the one, or
the licentiousness o f the multitudes, are, in my mind, but small evils, compared with
factions of the few.”50 Frightened by a government overtaken by tyrannical forces that
could eviscerate their liberties, the Anti-Federalists were convinced an enlarged House
was an insurance policy against such an outcome. Brutus scoffed at the size of the
House, charging, “No free people on earth, who have elected persons to legislate for
them, ever reposed that confidence in so small a number.”51 The Anti-Federalists
dismissed the argument that larger legislative bodies could not effectively function by
highlighting images o f a treacherous band of legislators subverting the democratic
process.

What could be more dangerous to the functionality of the legislative process

than one overridden by corruption, they asked? This potential outcome outweighed the
possible gridlock and unwieldy legislative atmosphere that might emerge in a more
expansive House of Representatives.

49 Federal Farmer, “Letter III, October 10, 1787,” in The Essential Antifederalist, 159.
50 Federal Farmer, “Letter VII, December 31 1787,” in The Essential Antifederalist, 280.
51 Brutus, “Essay III, November 15, 1787,” in The Essential Antifederalist, 256.
52 Federal Farmer, “Letter III, October 10, 1787,” in The Essential Antifederalist, 154.
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The Federalists Respond

The Federalists were well aware of the need to engage in a systematic response
to the attacks leveled against the Constitution more generally and the size of the House
more specifically. It was James Madison who was designated with the responsibility of
defending the size of the U.S. House of Representatives in Federalist Nos. 55-58
against the onslaught of the Anti-Federalist crusade. In Federalist No. 55 he
acknowledged the immense burden associated with determining the ideal size of the
national legislature, observing, “It may be remarked on this subject, that no political
problem is less susceptible of a precise solution, than that which relates to the number
most convenient for a representative legislature.”

ST

Madison conceded there was merit

in a national legislature with enough members to guard against corruption, noting,
“Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree o f power than
six or seven.”54 Although he had supported doubling the size of the House at the
Constitutional Convention, he was unwilling to extend this logic to a legislative body
consisting of six or seven hundred members. Madison saw the need to place a limit on
the membership o f the House “to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a
multitude.”55 For Madison a larger assembly was no panacea and could lead to negative
consequences for representative government. He sought to allay fears of corruption by
expressing his confidence in the people’s judgment. They were fully capable of
53 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist, ed. Terrence Ball (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 269.
54 Ibid., 270.
55 Ibid.
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rejecting anyone unfit for public office every two years at election time. Madison
was “unable to conceive that the people of America” would consistently re-elect 65
members of the House who were corrupt or who would endanger liberty.56
In Federalist No. 56 Madison trained his focus on the Anti-federalists’
accusation that the size o f the House would be inconsistent with allowing its members
to be responsive to the desires of their constituents. He accepted the premise that “it is a
sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the
interests and circumstances o f his constituents.”57 Nevertheless, this concession did not
imply that the representatives of the House would be incapable of doing so. The
legislator need not be versed in every aspect of the district constituency but only issues
of relevance to legislative process. Madison articulated a picture o f members of the
House who would “bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local
knowledge of their respective districts,” since they most likely would have served in the
capacity of state legislator prior to coming to the House, diminishing the fear that they
would be oblivious to the concerns of the people.58 He claimed that a fair comparison
to the British House o f Commons indicated the ratio of population per representative
called for in the Constitution was adequate to safeguard the interests of liberty.59
In Federalist No. 57 Madison addressed the issue of actual representation,
defending the proposition that elite citizens were best suited to serve in the national

56 Ibid., 271.
57 Ibid., 274.
58 Ibid., 275.
59 Ibid., 276-277.
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legislature. He stressed that it was “distinguished” members of the district
constituency who would be selected to serve in the House of Representatives.60 The
Federalists were generally unified in their belief that descriptive representation was not
an ideal basis for legislative representation.61 In Federalist No. 35, Hamilton also
discounted the need for a true demographic reflection of the constituency, describing
“the idea o f an actual representation of all classes of the people by persons of each
class” as an extremely unlikely prospect.62 Responding to the allegation that
representatives would not be sufficiently responsive because of district size, Madison
alleged that in several states legislative districts contained approximately the same
number of citizens as House districts would encompass under the first apportionment.
On the question of adjusting the membership of the House in accordance with
population growth, Madison made it clear in Federalist No. 58 that the initial figure of
65 representatives was only temporary and that, as it had been for state legislatures, the
requirement for the taking of decennial census would permit the ratio of population per
representative from escalating too dramatically. He highlighted the experience of the
state legislatures as evidence that “a gradual increase of representatives under the state
constitutions has kept pace with that of the constituents.”64 While Madison’s defense of
the original size o f the House explicitly rejected many of the assertions of the Anti-

60 Ibid., 278.
61 Zagarri, The Politics o f Size, 100.
62 Hamilton, Madison and Jay, The Federalist, 159.
63 Ibid., 281.
64 Ibid., 282-283.
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Federalists, his willingness to accentuate the virtual certainty that the House would
need to be enlarged along with population growth indicated that he believed legislative
size was a crucial variable in ensuring that representation of the people was not
seriously undermined.65

Apportionment of the House: The Early Years

Following the ratification of the Constitution the first session of the House of
Representatives would convene with a membership total of 65 until the inaugural
census could be taken. After the results of the first census were revealed, the question
of how to apportion the seats among the states moved to the forefront. As Balinski and
Young point out in their comprehensive study of apportionment methods “The habit of
thought in those days was not first to determine the total number of seats or house size
and then to distribute them, but rather to fix upon some ‘ratio of representation,’ that is
to declare that there shall be ‘one representative for every x persons,’ and then allow for
the house size to fall where it may.”66 Nevertheless, there was a near consensus that the
amount o f seats allocated to the states would have to be adjusted upwards.67 At this
stage o f the House’s institutional development the issue of securing representation
outweighed concerns over whether additional members might hinder the legislative
process.
65 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 131-132; Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve
Outgrown,” 178; Brickner, Article the First o f the Bill o f Rights.
66 Balinski and Young, Fair Representation, 10-11.
67 Ibid., 13.
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The principal disputes over the first apportionment bill revolved around
whether the House should consist of 120 members as called for by representatives of the
large states or 105 members as urged by advocates of the small states and what to do
with the fractional remainders that existed after dividing the apportionment population
by the total number of seats.68 On the first issue, members from small states preferred
the lower number to maintain maximum influence in the House while the large-state
congressmen viewed the additional seats as more representative of their interests.69 The
disagreement over apportionment divided not only small-state and large-state factions
but followers o f Jefferson and Madison as well.70 Jeffersonians felt a larger House
“would be more democratic.”71 In regard to the second question, supporters of the
Hamiltonian position insisted that states be ranked by the size of their fractional
remainders. Jefferson and defenders of the small-state interests proposed a method that
would apportion seats on the basis of the percentage of unrepresented population rather
than absolute number o f the remainder.72 After passing legislation that contained the
outlines of the Hamilton proposal, President Washington vetoed the measure at the
prompting o f Thomas Jefferson.73 He objected to the bill on the grounds that it did not
include a single divisor that could be applied to the states to produce 120 representatives

68 Zagarri, The Politics o f Size, 136.
69 Ibid., 135-136.
70 B alin sk i and Y o u n g , F a ir R ep re se n ta tio n , 13.

71 Margo J. Anderson, The American Census: A Social History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1988), 15.
72 Zagarri, Politics o f Size, 136-137.
73 Balinski and Young, Fair Representation, 19-20.
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and that for several o f the individual states the ratio of population per representative
had exceeded the Constitution’s limitation on one seat for every 30,000 inhabitants.74
Eventually Washington signed legislation on April 14, 1792, that settled on Jefferson’s
equal proportions method and set the size of the size of the House at 105 members with
a ratio of persons per representative of 33,000.

nc

The first amendment to the

Constitution proposed in Congress aimed to standardize the process of apportioning
House seats to avoid future controversies of this sort, but it was never ratified.

7 f\

The First Reduction in the Size of the House

Over the next four decades the fault lines between the small and large states was
the pivot point in the decennial battle over reapportionment rather than a fear that the
House was expanding to an unmanageable level.77 From the period of 1790-1830 the
House jumped from 105 to 240 seats and the ratio of population per representative had
only gone up to 47,700.78 However, the consequences of legislative size would return
to the forefront in the debate over the 1842 Apportionment Act. During the course of
deliberation over the Act, many Whig members of Congress sought to ameliorate the
condition of what they believed was an unwieldy legislative body by scaling back the
74 John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings o f George Washington (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1931-1944), 16-17.
75 Balinski and Young, Fair Representation, 21.
76 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 132; Brickner, Article the First o f the Bill o f Rights, 64.
77 Zagarri, Politics o f Size, 139.
78 Balinski and Young, Fair Representation, 23.
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number of members in the US House.79 Rep. Joseph Underwood of Kentucky called
large legislative bodies “mob government by confusion,”80 while Rep. John Thompson
o f Kentucky warned that a reduction was essential to prevent the House from becoming
Q -l

“emasculated” in its dealings with the Senate and the executive branch.
Several members suggested that a smaller House would bring about a larger
constituency size for each representative, lessening the importance of catering to voters’
immediate passions. Large House proponents denounced such sentiments and claimed
that downsizing the House would mean enlarged district populations, severely
jeopardizing representative government. Rep. John Pope of Kentucky averred, “as you
increased the number o f the people’s Representatives in the Legislature you increased
the actual power of the people.” He “advocated a comparatively small Congressional
district as better enabling the Representative to have a personal acquaintance with his
constituents.”

Other members downplayed complaints that the legislative process

would be less efficient by stressing the interests of the lessening o f corruption and the
ability of members to serve as responsive agents of the people that was afforded by
sparely populated congressional districts.83 Maryland Rep. John Mason countered the
Whigs’ assertion that the “independence” of the body from other branches was at stake
without a cutback in membership, contending it was “much easier for the executive to

79 Shields, “Whigs Reform the ‘Bear Garden,’” 363.
80 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, Second Session, April 21, 1842, 436.
81 Ibid, June 21, Appendix, 884.
82 Ibid., April 21, 1842,437.
83 Shields, “Whigs Reform the ‘Bear Garden,”’ 372-373.
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corrupt a small majority of the house floor than a large one.”84 Former Speaker
Henry Clay in opposing his party on this matter objected to the proposed reduction,
maintaining that a large House could function as well as a smaller body if the rules were
fashioned properly.85 This view would not ultimately prevail and for the first time in
the nation’s history the U.S. House of Representatives would experience a drop in its
total membership when President John Tyler signed the Apportionment Act into law in
June o f 1842.

ozr

t

t

The Act trimmed the House to 223 members, required smgle-member

districts, and expanded the ratio of population per representative from about 50,000 to
around 71,000. This development marked the end o f holding the average House district
constituency size at a level hovering around what it had been in the first couple of
decades after the ratification of the Constitution.87

435 Is the Limit

Despite this temporary deviation, the second half of the nineteenth century
would witness a return to the regular order o f increasing the size of the chamber to
accommodate a rapidly escalating population.

oo

From 1850 to 1910 the US population

grew more than fourfold, going from almost 22 million to just above 91 million over

84 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, Second Session, April 21, 1842, 436.
85 Shields, “Whigs Reform the ‘Bear Garden,’” 380.
86 5 Stat. 491.
87 Lucas and McDonald, “Is It Time to Increase the Size o f the House,” 369-370.
88 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 133.
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this duration. The size of the House did not match that pace, but, it did nearly double
during this period, while the average number of persons per representative crept up
from approximately 93,000 to slightly above the 200,000 mark. While controlling the
soaring growth of constituency size was still of concern to House members, the
foremost reason behind apportioning additional seats following each census was to
prevent any state delegation from suffering a loss of seats due to shifting population
patterns.89 This trend continued when Congress approved the 1911 Apportionment Act
that allocated 433 seats plus two more when New Mexico and Arizona entered the
union later in the decade.90
Yet, as the Congress geared up for the apportionment process in 1920,
projections indicated that more than 60 seats would be required to adhere to this
precedent. This imperative to accommodate colleagues from slower growing states now
ran up against a powerful segment of elite opinion that believed that it was time to
curtail the growth o f the chamber. Several prominent publications including the New
York Times, Washington Post, and The New Republic, opposed going beyond 435

members on the grounds the House floor had become exceedingly crowded and
inefficient.91 In an editorial published October 9, 1920, the New York Times
complained that the House was “too unwieldy to enact legislation effectively and even
committees say they are too big to perm it... proper and deliberate consideration of

89 Willoughby, Principles o f Legislative Organization and Administration, 263.
90 37 Stat. 13.
91 Eagles, Democracy Delayed, 32-33.
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measures.”92 This perspective was also shared by former leaders of the institution as
well. Ex-Speakers Joe Cannon and James Clark announced their support for a
diminution in the size of the House, with Clark going as far as endorsing a
constitutional amendment to cap the membership of the body at 300.93 The views of
these former leaders indicate support for the notion that managing orderly legislative
business became progressively more difficult as the House grew in size, necessitating
action to reverse or at least counter this trend. This position stands in stark contrast to
Henry Clay’s feeling that rules and procedures were sufficient to maintain a reasonable
environment in which to legislate as the House expanded during the course of the 1842
debate over reduction.
These sentiments expressed by the press and ex-speakers were not persuasive
enough to win over the House Census Committee responsible for drafting
reapportionment legislation. On January 6,1921, the committee approved the bill HR
14498 to increase the House to 483 members despite the objections of a vocal minority
that bitterly complained about the negative implications this decision would have for the
institution.94 Once the bill reached the House floor, proponents of enlargement were
put on the defensive by critics who felt 435 members were already dysfunctional and
that the underlying legislation would make matters worse by prolonging legislative
action needlessly, in addition to the extra fiscal burden o f more members.95 Rep.

92 “Congress Must Fix House Membership,” New York Times, October 9, 1920, 7.
93 Ibid. Clark became House Minority Leader in the 66th Congress when the Democrats lost control o f the
House in the 1918 midterm elections.
94 Eagles, Democracy Delayed, 36.
95 Ibid., 40.
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Andrew Montague of Virginia groused that the additional members would exacerbate
the “top-heavy and inefficient legislative operation” the House had become.96 House
Census Committee Chairman Isaac Siegel of New York promised his colleagues that he
would sponsor a constitutional amendment to limit the membership in the House at 500
but urged that the underlying bill be approved nonetheless.97 The fundamental logic
presented by large-House supporters was that to ensure adequate representation
congressional districts had to be of a magnitude that members could keep in close
contact with their constituents’ wishes. The only way to keep the nation’s population
growth from creating House constituencies that were too enormous was for the number
of seats apportioned to rise. Tennessee’s Thetus Sims asserted that an increase was
essential so “that the individual citizen should have the greatest opportunity to present
his views to his immediate representative.”98 Despite such pleas on behalf of
representation, the House approved an amendment offered by Rep. Henry Barbour of
California that kept the membership at 435 by an overwhelmingly bipartisan vote of
279 to 76 and went on to pass the final version of the bill.99
While some past and present House leaders were adamantly in favor of
preventing another expansion of the membership total, there was also broad support in
the House for this action as exhibited by the lopsided voted in favor o f the Barbour
Amendment. Some members assailed further enlargement of the House as an inevitable

96 Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, January 18, 1921, 1632.
97 Ibid., 1626.
98 Ibid., 1635.
99 Eagles, Democracy Delayed, 42.
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transfer of power to the leaders of the institution. Rep. Clifton McArthur of Oregon
summed up the feelings of members who opposed an increase on the grounds that it
would “centralize power in the hands of a few leaders. The larger the lawmaking body
the less the individual Member feels his responsibility and the more he is tempted to
pass it along to the leaders.”100 This outlook reflected the desire for greater
decentralization in the legislative process that prevailed in this era.101
To more systematically analyze the factors that led members to support retention
of the 435-seat limit, a pair of logit models were formulated predicting how members
voted on the Barbour Amendment (Table 1). These models include an independent
variable that codes whether a member was an elected party leader, a committee chair, or
a ranking member. They also incorporate other variables that might influence how
members may have voted on this issue, including whether the representative’s state
would gain or lose a seat if the House remained at 435 members, ideology, partisan
affiliation, and whether they were members of the Census Committee which had
jurisdiction over this matter.

109

100 Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, January 18, 1921,1642.
101 Joseph Cooper and David Brady, “Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from
Cannon to Rayburn,” American Political Science Review 75 (1981): 411-425; Eric Schickler, Disjointed
Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development o f the U.S. Congress (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
U niversity Press, 2 0 0 1 ).

102 Ideology is measured using the first and second dimensions o f Poole and Rosenthal’s DWNOMINATE scores. These scores are routinely used as an estimate of the ideological position o f
members o f Congress. Members’ ideal points are derived by utilizing a dynamic, weighted, nominal
three-step estimation procedure based on all nonunanimous roll call votes taken in each Congress. For
more details on this measure see Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political- Economic
History o f Roll Call Voting (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Data collected from:
http://voteview.com/dwnomm.htm.
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Table 1 Logistic Regression Analysis o f Roll Call Vote on
Amendment in the 66th Congress to Keep the House at 435 Members
Independent Variable
Model 2
Model 1
Committee Leader

-.516
(.399)

Democrat

-525
.397
-.664
(.789)

First Dimension DW-NOMINATE

-1.002*
(.433)

-1.681#
(.923)

Second Dimension DW-NOMINATE

-.039
(.366)

-.067
(.367)

Member o f the Census Committee

-1.257
(.787)

-1.283
(.797)

Member’s State Gained Seats

.537
(.570)

.511
(.571)

Member’s State Lost Seats

-3.448***
(.406)

-3.441***
(.407)

Party Leader

-.355
(1.421)

-.361
(1.426)

Constant

2 513***
(.285)

2.878***
(.525)

Pseudo R2

.352

.354

Log-likelihood

-117.796

-117.430

344

344

N

# p < . l *p < .05 ***p<.001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable is coded 1 for a yes vote and 0 for a no vote on the Barbour
Amendment to HR 14498, January 19, 1921.
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The results depicted in Table 1 indicate that those individuals charged with
institutional maintenance were not significantly more likely to back retaining the 435seat limit. Though many leaders may have believed the House was becoming
unmanageable, their view was not distinct from other members of the body. The
negative sign o f the coefficient for the first dimension DENOM INATE variable
signifies that more conservative members were less likely to support the Barbour
Amendment but that partisanship was not a factor as evidenced in Model 2, with
Democrats not significantly more likely to support it than Republicans. The other
variable yielding significant leverage in both models was whether a member’s state was
projected to lose a seat if the 435-seat figure was not increased. Political selfpreservation and retention of the state’s present level of representation seemed to trump
the concern that the House was growing too large in number. In fact, although Minority
Leader Clark had been open to the idea of cutting back on the seats apportioned to the
states, when it became clear Missouri would lose two seats if the House was not
increased as called for in the underlying bill, he cast his vote against the Barbour
Amendment. Clark was not alone in protecting his own political interests.
Figure 1 displays the predicted probabilities of how representatives voted on this
amendment, comparing members for states losing and not losing states under a
continuance o f the 435-seat allocation, holding all the other variables in Model 1 at their
appropriate means and modes.103 Representatives in states not facing a loss of a seat if
the amendment passed had a predicted probability of .914 o f voting for it versus a .264
103 Predicted probabilities calculated using CLARIFY. See Gary King, Michael Tomz and Jason
Wittenberg “Making the Most o f Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation,”
American Journal o f Political Science 44 (2000): 347-361.
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predicted probability for members from states who would be cost a seat if it were
adopted. Therefore, very few members of the House regardless of their position within
the institution were willing to ascent to another enlargement of the House unless their
state or potentially their own career would suffer. As one scholar observed, this
decision by most members of “the House was actuated solely by the desire to keep
down its size.”104

100%

90%

80%
70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
I

□ Member’s S tate Losing a S eat____________B Member's S tate Not Losing a Seat

j

Figure 1 Predicted Probability o f Voting to Keep the House at 435 M embers in the 66th Congress

However, once the amended version o f HR 14498 reached the Senate no action
was taken prior to the final adjournment of the 66th Congress. Senators from the 11
states that would have lost seats were instrumental in obstructing the passage of the
104 Willoughby, Principles o f Legislative Organization and Administration, 263.
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apportionment bill.105 This inaction was critical because in this era the House was
not automatically reapportioned after every ten years, as new legislation had to be
adopted before seats could be reallocated based on the new population estimate. If no
legislation was passed then the House would continue as currently constituted
regardless of whether changes in the population skewed representation. This scenario
did unfold despite several ill-fated attempts to salvage a compromise during the 1920s.
For the first time in the nation’s history the Congress failed to reapportion House seats
among the states.106
Members of the House tried again to pass an apportionment bill in 1921 that
would have only increased the body to 460 members; however, this measure met stiff
resistance from opponents who criticized it as a political move to spare certain states
from losing seats. Yet before the bill could reach final passage a motion to recommit
the bill was approved narrowly, 146-142, dooming its prospects for enactment.107
During much of the 1920s the Congress neglected to deal with the issue at all.108 By the
end of the decade, however, pressure began to mount for action on reapportionment as it
became apparent that inequities in the distribution of seats based on the 1910 population
were extremely pronounced. In March o f 1928 the House Census Committee approved
a bill to retain the 435-seat limit that garnered critical support from Speaker Nicholas
Longworth and Majority Leader John Q. Tilson, but it was once again thwarted by a

105 Anderson, The American Census, 140.
106 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 132-133; Eagles, Democracy Delayed, Chapter 3.
107 Eagles, Democracy Delayed, 51.
108 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 134.
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motion to recommit.109 In the waning days of the 70th Congress in 1929 the House
leadership intensified its support for reapportionment legislation sponsored by House
Census Committee Chairman E. Hart Fenn of Connecticut, that would have
permanently frozen the House at 435 and provided for an automatic apportioning of
seats to be determined by the Secretary of Commerce as an administrative action.110
Allies of a permanent ceiling on the House membership gained valuable
assistance when Senator Arthur Vandenburg of Michigan began a crusade for
apportionment legislation citing the gross negligence of the House in its inability to
act.111 By this time, the obligation o f enacting an apportionment bill eclipsed the debate
over the proper size of the House. During the first session of the 71st Congress each
chamber passed slightly different versions of legislation that permanently fixed the
House at 435 members by substantial margins.

11?

The emphasis of the floor

proceedings over these debates was devoted largely to the merits of transferring the task
of apportioning the House to the executive branch, whether the alien population should
be counted in the process, and the date for taking the census. Given their earlier failure,
House enlargement advocates seemed consigned to the reality that a majority in
Congress felt it was ill advised to take such a step. After the 1929 Apportionment Act
was agreed to in Conference Committee the House gave it a truncated debate and
passed it without a roll call vote, while it was only approved by a vote of 48-37 in the
109 E agles, D e m o c ra c y D e la y e d , 6 4 -6 7 .

110 Orville Sweeting, “John Q. Tilson: The Reapportionment Act o f 1929,” Western Political Quarterly 9
(1956): 442.
111 Eagles, Democracy Delayed, 69.
112 Ibid., 78-81.
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• law on June 19, 1929. 113 The Act
Senate. Finally, President Hoover signed it• into
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mandated that the Secretary of Commerce automatically apportion 435 seats for the
House following the completion of the decennial census.114
According to legislative scholar Nelson Polsby one of the hallmarks of an
institutionalized organization is that an “organization tends to use universalistic rather
than particularistic criteria, and automatic rather than discretionary methods for its
internal business.”115 It can be argued that by relinquishing this responsibility to the
executive branch the House set up an automatic process of reapportionment rather than
having to carry out this exercise every ten years. To a certain extent, this development
was another measure of how the House was becoming institutionalized in a variety of
ways during the early twentieth century.116 The view of most members was that the
House needed a degree o f stability in its size for an efficient legislative process to
•

•

remain viable and adopting this policy facilitated that objective.

I 17

•

•

This action not only

relieved the House membership of having to deal with the question of legislative size
but also the ratio of citizens per House district. Additionally, it freed members from
having to placate colleagues from states with population growth less than the national
rate. Since the number o f seats apportioned would not have to be renewed by passing a
statute, the House would be spared from having the painful debate over which states

113 Ibid., 82.
114 4 6 Stat. 26.

115 Polsby, “The Institutionalization o f The U.S. House o f Representatives,” 145.
116 Nelson W. Polsby, How Congress Evolves: Social Bases o f Institutional Change (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 152.
117 Willoughby, Principles o f Legislative Organization and Administration, 263.
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would lose seats. According to one analysis “the 1929 Act placed the House’s
reapportionment on automatic pilot; and in so doing, provided an administrative answer
to what had been considered a political question.”118 Furthermore, by transferring this
power over to the executive branch there would not be an embarrassing repeat of what
occurred during the 1920s; when failing to pass legislation to reapportion the House
turned out to be a stain on the institution’s reputation.

No Turning Back

Delegating the authority of apportionment to the executive branch relieved the
House from the responsibility of dealing with decennial battles over the size of the
chamber and the political fallout for states that would lose seats due to lagging
population growth. With this precedent firmly established the House members resolved
the tension between legislative efficiency and representation, opting for the former. If
members felt that their ability to effectively represent their constituents had been
undermined they did not feel compelled to take action to augment the status quo. As
shown in Figure 2, the House has remained at 435 seats for almost a century. Only one
time since the enactment of the 1929 Apportionment Act has the Congress seriously
entertained a proposal to augment the statutory limit of 435 House seats. This
reconsideration occurred following the admission of Hawaii and Alaska as the nation’s

118 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 135.
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49th and 50th states.119 With the addition of the two new states in 1958 and 1959
Congress temporarily increased the House to 437 members until the next census.120
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Figure 2 Changes in the Size of the U.S. House 1787-2000

With more states increasing the denominator in future rounds of apportionment,
some states would lose representation with Alaska and Hawaii entitled to three
combined seats after the next census was taken. This scenario created an opening for
representatives who wanted to push for a more significant enlargement of the House.
Congressional Quarterly noted, “In 1961 various proposals were made to increase the

permanent size o f the House, ranging from additions of three members to 34 members.
Speaker Sam Rayburn, however, opposed any increases, contending that the House was
119 Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve Outgrown,” 186.
120 Section 9 o f PL 85-508 and Section 8 o f PL 86-3 authorizing the admittance o f Alaska and Hawaii
mandated a return to the 435 membership level if no legislative action was taken to make the temporary
increase permanent.
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already too large for efficient operation.”

171

.

,

SI

Once again leadership resistance to a

larger House resurfaced as even a relatively deferential Speaker like Rayburn thought
his task to build coalitions for successful governance was hindered by the scale of the
membership that was already in place.
During the hearings on these various proposals the impulse for enhancing
representation by increasing the House was voiced as well. Members from states that
were going to lose seats in the latest reapportionment unless the House was enlarged
dominated the roster of witnesses. The testimony concentrated on the historical
precedent of adding more seats to the House any time a new state was admitted and that
failing to so in this case would be unfair to states that were losing representation in the
body. Rep. Frank Chelf of Kentucky protested the impact of the 435-seat limit on
representation, remarking, “With our population explosion, if we keep adding tens of
thousands of constituents to an individual Member of Congress... will have...
practically no time in which to visit or mingle with his people, which is most important.
Through no fault of his own a Member would become unavailable and inaccessible,
which is just the reverse of what the Founding Fathers envisioned when they drafted our
Constitution.”

17 7

Rep. Jamie Whitten of Mississippi insisted that enlarged

congressional districts had forced a colossal increase in staff to compensate for the
additional workload that had accompanied the massive expansion of the federal

121 CQ Almanac, vol. 18 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1962), 395.
122 U.S. House, Subcommittee No. 3 o f The House Committee on the Judiciary, Increasing the
Membership o f the House o f Representatives and Redistricting Congressional Districts: Hearings on
H R . 841, 1178, 1183, 1998, 2531, 2704, 2718, 2739, 2768, 2700, 2783, 3012, 3176, 3414, 3725, 3804,
3890,4068, 4609, 6431, 7355, 8075, 848, 8616 andH JRes. 419 Before, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 44,
August 24 and 30, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1964), 34.
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government. Trying to spin the workload argument in favor of increasing the House,
Whitten testified, “Any check of the matter will show there at least 1000 times as many
Federal questions today as there were in 1910.... With the workload of Congress the
Federal questions that come through your office, the way the Federal Government
touches the people in your district and mine, it has gotten to where an additional number
o f Members to help spread the load would be sound.”123 Chelf responded to the
detractors of an increase, asking, “If the House is too large and too unwieldy, as our
opponents argue, why is it that we 435 Members of the House are always through with
our work, difficult as it may be, at the end of a given session, and often have to wait on
the other body to finish their work?” He also noted that “the British House of
Commons has 612 members, but it also has a distinguished record of achievement,
despite its size.”124
However, in spite o f these sentiments and others in favor of boosting
membership levels in the chamber, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emmanuel
Cellar o f New York acquiesced to leadership pressure and worked strenuously to defeat
any o f these measures.

1

Rayburn would pass away late in 1961 and Rep. John

McCormack would replace him as Speaker. This transition altered the landscape for the
legislative process as McCormack’s home state of Massachusetts was slated to lose a
seat if the House was not increased. So early in 1962 he lent his support to a proposal to
permanently lift the membership to 438, to offset the number of seats that Alaska and

123 Ibid. 87-88.
124 Ibid., 33.
125 CQ Almanac, vol. 18, 395.
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•

Hawaii would now be entitled to have.

1 'yft

Thus, this movement for an extremely

modest increase was driven by political expediency rather than by any change in
outlook on the legislative operation or the quality of representation of the institution.
The bill came to the House floor via an open rule allowing all germane amendments.
Rep. James Trimble of Arkansas seized this opportunity and offered an amendment to
permanently increase the House to 467 members so that no state would lose seats during
the latest round of reapportionment.127 This move triggered the recurring tradeoff
questions o f legislative size during the debate over the amendment. Rep. Stan Tupper
of Maine issued an impassioned plea for an increase:
In short the basic question today is this: To what extent shall we against the background
o f reapportionment, permit the voice o f each and every one o f our American citizens to
be heard? The problem for us to resolve here today becomes eminently clear when it is
realized that as our American population increased, the influence o f each element o f the
population decreases or increases in proportion to the size o f the US Congress. As the
size o f Congress increases, so does the representation o f each individual in the
American society. Conversely as the size decreases, so diminishes the individual’s
control over the affairs o f his government.128

Rep. Charles Hoeven of Iowa summed up the feeling of the majority however,
when he asserted that any movement toward expansion of the House would lead to “an
unwieldy body that cannot operate properly.” Rep. Perkins Bass of New Hampshire
elaborated on this theme, noting, “Students of good government argue that the present
membership of the House is too large for efficient government.” It was his contention
that “every enlargement tends to make legislative procedures more unwieldy. We are

126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., 396.
128 Congressional Record, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, March 15, 1962, 3736.
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faced with the prospect that the House of Representatives will become a formless
mass of people, hampered in its constitutional role to enact laws for this Nation.”

1 9Q

The House rejected the Trimble Amendment 51-142. The underlying bill also
collapsed when another amendment passed to require statewide, at-large elections for
states awarded new seats who did not redistrict before the 1962 elections. Once the
members of the House got word of this provision the bill was removed from
consideration and no further action on the matter was taken.130 According to
Congressional Quarterly, “The failure of House expansion bills in 1961 and 1962 ...

actually created a new precedent for not increasing the House, even when new states
join the Union.”

1T1

If members could not even agree to a modest increase in the House

under these circumstances, what conditions could foster an environment hospitable to
change?
The renewed efforts to secure a voting member of the U.S. House for the
District of Columbia further illustrates the collective institutional will to avoid tinkering
with the size of the institution. Rep. Tom Davis of Virginia pushed for legislation in the
108th Congress and again in the 109th Congress to temporarily increase the House by
two seats, awarding one to Washington, D.C., and the other to Utah, which just lost out
on a fourth seat in the 2000 reapportionment process.

1T9

Originally, the Davis proposal

129 Ibid., 3735.
130 CQ Almanac, vol. 18, 396. The Pennsylvania delegation was instrumental in killing the amended
version o f HR 10264 because it was perceived that the amendment would force at large elections in the
state.
131 Ibid., 395.
132 For background on the proposal see Spencer Hu, “House Bill Would Give District the Vote,”
Washington Post, June 23, 2004, B l. Bills introduced in the 108th and 109th Congresses include: HR

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61

specifically called for the House to return to 435 members after the next census is
■I -3-5

taken.

Rep. Davis intentionally drafted the legislation to adhere to the precedent

established by the House when Hawaii and Alaska were admitted to the Union that any
increase in the membership be only a temporary measure. Later in the 109th Congress
Rep. Davis reversed his position and augmented his proposal to permanently increase
the House to 437 members after representatives from slow-growing states expressed
concern that the new House seat for Washington, D.C., would come at their expense.134
Considering the modest nature of this increase, even if it is enacted, the Davis proposal
does not constitute a fundamental shift away from institutional maintenance toward
greater representation on a broader scale by dramatically reducing the ratio of citizens
per representatives.
One member who has shown an interest in re-evaluating the size of the House in
a comprehensive manner is Rep. Alcee Hastings of Florida. In recent years he has
repeatedly introduced legislation that would “establish a commission to make
recommendations on the appropriate size of membership of the House of
Representatives.”135 This commission would be comprised of members appointed by
the president and House leadership but would only be advisory in nature. Any
4640, District o f Columbia Fairness in Representation Act, 108th Congress; HR 2043, District o f
Columbia Fairness in Representation Act, 109th Congress.
133 U.S. House, Government Reform Committee, Hearing on Common Sense Justice fo r the Nation's
Capital: An Examination o f Proposals to Give D.C. Residents Direct Representation, 108th Congress, 2nd
S essio n , June 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 , http: //rc form .house, g o v / G ovR eform / H earings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=15697. See opening statement o f Chairman Tom Davis.
134 Lori Montgomery and Elissa Silverman, “Plan to Give D.C. a Vote in Congress Advances,”
Washington Post, May 11, 2006, A01.
135 HR 415, Congress 2006 Commission Act, 108th Congress; HR 1989, Congress 2008 Commission Act,
109th Congress.
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recommendation it would put forward would require statutory approval by the
Congress. Rep. Hastings annunciated similar themes heard in previous debates over the
consequences o f not increasing the size of the House commensurate with the
population:
When I was first elected in 19 9 2 ,1 represented roughly 589,000 South Floridians. Today, each
o f us now represents nearly 663,000 or 12.5 percent more people than 10 years ago. In 1982,
each Member o f the House represented about 534,000 and in 1972, the number was a mere
482,000 or 38 percent fewer people than today. This means that we represent well over 100,000
more people today than did our predecessors—and some Members still serving today—20 years
ago. Frankly, at some point Members in this body are going to have to accept reality and begin
asking, "A s Representatives, are we as effective today as the Representatives o f the 1970s when
they had fewer people to represent?"136

Apparently very few of his House colleagues openly share the concern
expressed by Rep. Hastings that the quality of representation afforded constituents may
have suffered as House districts encompass thousands of additional citizens compared
tli

to just a few decades ago. During the 109 Congress, only one other member signed on
as a cosponsor o f this legislation. Considering the bill merely created a commission to
study House enlargement, the lack o f interest exhibited by his colleagues suggests bleak
prospects for any proposal to adjust the size of the House to make it more representative
any time in the foreseeable future. The interest expressed by Hastings in halting the
growth o f constituency size may also be linked to fears among some African American
representatives that in the future it will become progressively more challenging to draw
minority-majority districts that facilitate the descriptive representation of the nation’s
•

m inority population m Congress.

1T7

136 Congressional Record, 108th Congress, 1st Session, January 28, 2003, E81.
137 Margo Anderson, “Growth o f US Population Calls for Larger House o f Representatives” Population
Today, 28 (2000): 1-4. Though some African-American members o f the House favor reforms like
cumulative voting or multimember districts that may be coupled with a proposal to expand the size o f the
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Conclusion

As this historical review has shown, the appropriate size of the U.S. House once
provoked spirited debate among legislators at various temporal reference points in the
nation’s history. In the context o f a growing population, what number will achieve
optimal representation and legislative efficiency? This conundrum perplexed the
delegates at the Constitutional Convention through the early 1900s. For the most part,
greater deference was given to the need to check the growth in average constituency
size rather than the size o f the House itself. When the House reached the 435-seat
threshold the membership felt further increases would hinder its legislative operations,
and concern over the ratio o f citizens per representative was put aside. If the House
could not fulfill its obligation to enact legislation in a timely manner while still
providing opportunity for reasoned debate then collective representation would suffer
impairment. By capping the House at 435 seats, members of the House were aiming to
protect the ability o f the House to collectively represent the citizenry even as
representation on the district level became less of a concern. Continuing with decennial
increases in the House was perceived by representatives as inimical to the body’s
capacity to legislate even if an enlarged constituency ratio made representation at the
district level a steeper challenge.
The research question explored in the remaining chapters of this work is not
how legislative size impacts efficiency. Rather, it is the representational component of

House o f Representatives, the Congressional Black Caucus has taken no official position on an increase.
The highest ranking African-American member in the U.S. House, Jim Clybum o f South Carolina, has
expressed support for an enlargement o f the body to reduce constituency size.
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the legislative trade-off that will be scrutinized. The size of the House has not varied
over the past century but the ratio of constituents per House district has. Although
critics of the 435-seat cap such as Rep. Hastings complain that the growth in
constituency size it has created has undermined the representational relationship
between members o f the House and their constituents, there is scant empirical
verification of this premise. The arguments of House enlargement advocates
throughout history have stressed that constituency population matters in what type of
representation citizens receive. On its face this claim would not seem controversial.
Still, even if there is some impact, the dynamics o f the relationship requires greater
clarity. Just how has representation at the district level been destabilized if at all? Have
constituents had access to their representatives constricted by House districts composed
o f over 600,000 people? Are representatives less responsive in the area o f policy
representation? These criticisms and others are persistently levied against failing to
elevate the size of the House congruent with the growth in the population, from the
Anti-Federalists to the present. Subsequent chapters will attempt to provide empirical
insight to what extent these claims are indeed valid.
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CHAPTER 3
THREE COMMON CRITIQUES OF THE 435-SEAT LIMIT

Introduction

There are three common complaints lodged by opponents of the 435 seat limit
that has been imposed on the size the U.S. House. First, it has created a situation where
the size o f House district constituencies are out of line with legislatures in other
advanced democracies. Second, the size of the House is not at a level commensurate
with the population of this country by historical and international standards. Third, the
impact has created a situation where every ten years representatives from the states
growing at a pace behind national population trends lose their seats in the House.1 The
previous chapter touched on some of the issues in the textual analysis of debates
pertaining to the size of the U.S. House. Chapter 3 attempts to quantify some of these
developments in more concrete terms. It begins to look at the question of just how
much representation has been sacrificed over the past century. A collection of
1 James Glassman, “Let’s Build a Bigger House: Why Shouldn’t the Number o f Congressmen Grow with
the Population,” W ashington P o st, June 17, 1990, D2; Charles A. Kromkowski and John A. Kromkowski
“Why 435? A Question o f Political Arithmetic,” Polity 24 (1991): 129-145; Christopher St. John Yates,
“A House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve Outgrown? An Argument for Increasing the Size o f the House
o f Representatives,” Columbia Journal o f Law and Social Problems 25 (1992): 157-196; De Wayne L.
Lucas and Michael D. McDonald, “Is It Time to Increase the Size o f the House o f Representatives,”
American Review o f Politics 21 (2000): 367-381; Margo Anderson, “Growth o f US Population Calls for
Larger House o f Representatives,” Population Today,28 (2000): 1-4; Arend Lijphart, “Reforming the
House: Three Moderately Radical Proposals,” in The US House o f Representatives: Reform or Rebuild,
eds. Joseph Zimmerman and Wilma Rule (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2000), 135-140.
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empirical measures are brought to bear to capture the dimensions of the
representational tradeoff central to disputes revolving around legislative size. In doing
so the prevailing views on the aforementioned concerns are sifted through to re
evaluate the ramifications of freezing the House at 435 members emphasized in
previous scholarship.

District Constituency Population Size

The most glaring effect o f freezing the size of U.S. House has been the steep
rise in the average number of persons each member represents.2 Table 2 displays the
apportionment population, the size of the House and the ratio of persons per
representative from the nation’s founding to the present. It reveals that each member of
the House represents on average 646,000 people following the 2000 census as
compared with approximately 210,000 in 1910, the decade when 435 seats were first
apportioned. Figure 3 illustrates this rise in more dramatic terms. The sharp upward
swing in the average constituency size rose by about 170,000 persons from 1790 to
1910, in contrast to 430,000 between the years 1910-2000.

2 Glassman, “Let’s Build a Bigger House”; Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 131; Yates, “A
House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve Outgrown,” 181; Lucas and McDonald, “Is It Time to Increase the
Size o f the House o f Representatives,” 372; Bryan W. Brickner, Article the First o f the Bill o f Rights
(United States: Lulu.com, 2006), 100.
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Table 2 Average U.S. House District Population Size from 1789-2000
Number o f
Apportionment
Year
Population
Districts

Persons per
Representative

2000

281,422,177

435

646,498

1990

249,022,783

435

572,466

1980

225,867,174

435

519,235

1970

204,053,025

435

469,087

1960

178,559,217

435

410,481

1950

149,895,183

435

344,587

1940

131,006,184

435

301,164

1930

122,093,455

435

280,675

1920

106,021,537*

' 435

243,728

1910

91,603,772

435

210,583

1900

74,562,608

386

193,167

1890

61,908,906

356

173,901

1880

49,371,340

325

151,912

1870

38,115,641

292

130,533

1860

29,550,038

241

122,614

1850

21,766,691

234

93,020

1840

15,908,376

223

71,338

1830

11,930,987

240

49,712

1820

8,972,396

213

42,124

1810

6,854,231

181

37,689

1800

4,879,820

141

34,609

1790

3,615,823

105

34,436

65
1789
Source: US Census Bureau.
*No reapportionment legislation was passed by Congress for the 1920s.
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Figure 3 Average Population per Representative for the U.S. House from 1790-2000
Source: US Census Bureau.

The interpretation of this figure must take into account that House districts did
not have to meet the one person/one vote standard prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Wesberry v. Sanders that mandated this principle be adhered to in the
redistricting process.3 Nonetheless, this stark climb in the mean House district size is
remarkable. Simply put, the typical representative serves substantially greater numbers
of constituents than would have been envisioned at the nation’s founding. Montana’s
lone member of the U.S. House currently represents over 900,000 people. This number
is approximately thirty times more people than the minimum population ratio included
in the U.S. Constitution.

3 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Future population projections by the U.S. Census Bureau indicate district
population size will only continue to drift higher if the House is not enlarged.4 By 2010
the ratio of citizens per representative is estimated to go to slightly above 710,000. In
2020 the corresponding figure is likely to be 772,000 and by 2030 the average House
district population will reach 836,000 (Figure 4). The latter figure eclipses the number
o f citizens currently represented by 12 senators in 6 states. When 2030 arrives
Montana’s U.S. Representative in the House will serve about 1,045,000 people and
Delaware’s sole House member around 1,013,000 constituents. Rhode Island is
projected to lose one of its seats by 2030 and its at-large House member will represent
nearly 1,153,000 people.5

2020
C e n s u s Y ear

Figure 3 Project Ratio o f Citizens per Representative for the U.S. House 2010-2030
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Interim Projections o f the Total Population fo r the
United States and States: A p r il 1, 2 0 0 0 to J u ly I, 2 0 3 0 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
2005), Table A -1.

4 U.S. Census Bureau, Interim Projections o f the Total Population fo r the United States and States: April
1, 2000 to July /, 2030 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005), Table A -l.
5 Vincent B. Thompson, “Projecting Reapportionment,” Indiana Business Review 40 (2005): 4-6.
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District magnitude is crystallized even further when the U.S. House is
examined through a comparative prism. As previous studies have documented, the U.S.
boasts some of the most heavily populated lower house districts in the developed
world.6 However, these scholars have examined the U.S. House in the context only of
other Western nations. The sample used for all cross-national comparative analyses
undertaken for this chapter is based on a more systematic method of selection. The
criteria include all electoral democracies rated as free according to Freedom House’s
2006 rankings with a bicameral national legislative structure and a population of more
than 250,000 people. This analysis allows for a more comprehensive comparison by
including nations like India in the sample often left out of studies focusing on advanced
Western nations. In addition, it avoids the complication of drawing invalid inferences
from the alternative organizational dynamics that exist for unicameral national
assemblies.9

6 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 137; Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve
Outgrown,” 187-190; Lucas and McDonald, “Is It Time to Increase the Size o f the House o f
Representatives,” 375.
7 Freedom House, Freedom in World 2006, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdfyChaits2006.pdf.
accessed June 2 3 , 2 0 0 6 .

8 Population estimates are based on 1999 or 2000 figures taken from Arthur Banks, Thomas C. Muller
and William R. Overstreet, eds., Political Handbook o f the World 2000-2002 (Binghamton, NY: CSA
Publications, 2003).
9 George Tsbelis and Janel Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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Table 3 lists the size o f the lower house, the population estimate,10 and the
average persons per representative for each of the respective countries. It reveals that
the U.S. House is an outlier in terms of this measure, about 500,000 above the mean of
this sample. Yet, by no means is it the most pronounced. India, the world’s most
populous democracy, also has the distinction of having the largest ratio of persons per
representative of any lower house among the democratic governments selected for this
study. The ratio for the lower house of the Indian Parliament is one representative for
almost two million persons, about three times higher than the U.S. House. Critics of
the House correctly point out that the U.S. deviates from international norms on this
scale of representation. Nevertheless, when the dimensions of this measure are
compared in the framework set out by the criteria of this study, the U.S. does not appear
as unrepresentative as has been portrayed in other research.
Even when scrutiny is applied to state legislatures in the U.S., the average
constituency size for the House is at a level lower than what is found in the upper
legislative chambers in California and Texas respectively. Texas state senators
represent about 695,000 people while the average Senate district population in
California is roughly 847,000. The latter number is “over 200,000 more constituents
than U.S. representatives, and even more constituents than U.S. senators from Alaska,
Delaware, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming represent.”11

10 The year 2000 is selected in order to serve as a common baseline for the last apportionment population
figure calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau.
11 Peverill Squire and Keith E. Hamm, 101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures and the Future o f
Legislative Studies (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press: 2005), 55.
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Table 3 Population per Representative in Comparative Perspective________________________ ______
Number
Persons
per
of Representatives
Country
Population
in Lower House
Representative
18,934,000
Australia
150
126,227
Austria
8,110,000
183
44,317
Bahamas
299,000
7,475
40
9,536
Barbados
267,000
28
Belgium
10,185,000
150
67,900
Botswana
1,596,000
44
36,273
Brazil
171,853,000
513
334,996
29,819,000
99,067
Canada
301
15,278,000
127,317
Chile
120
Czech Republic
10,322,000
51,600
200
Dominican Republic
8,333,000
150
55,553
El Salvador
5,696,500
83
68,633
France
58,520,688
577
101,422
Germany
82,799,000
613
135,072
India
1,884,432
1,027,015,247
545
Ireland
3,745,000
166
22,560
57,716,000
Italy
630
91,613
42,867
Jamaica
2,572,000
60
Japan
126,691,000
480
263,940
Lesotho
2,195,000
80
27,436
Luxembourg
433,000
60
7,217
197,384
Mexico
98,692,000
500
1,799,000
72
Namibia
24,986
105,880
Netherlands
15,882,000
150
26,952
Norway
4,447,000
165
Poland
38,702,000
460
84,135
Romania
64,994
22,423,000
345
77,304
Serbia-Montenegro
10,668,000
138
400
109,255
South Africa
43,583,573
Spain
112,626
39,419,000
350
Switzerland
7,127,000
200
35,635
58,789,194
United Kingdom
646
91,005
646,498
United States
281,422,177
435
Uruguay
3,271,000
99
33,040
Mean

63,694,110

268

147,297

Source: Arthur Banks, Thomas C Muller and William R. Overstreet, eds., Political Handbook o f the World 2000-2002
(Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, 2003).
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Obviously the responsibilities and obligations of legislators in these states
vary from what is expected of U.S. House members, but they do not have resources and
staff to meet the needs o f their constituents available for federal representatives.

12

If

lawmakers in Texas and California represent districts above the average population
threshold of U.S. House districts, then is the task that much more unmanageable for
members of the nation’s lower House? Put in this light the U.S. House does not seem
as grievous a violator of legislative constituency population size norms.
Apart from the examples just cited, the overall picture of House district
constituency size is one that has been driven dramatically upward since the 435 limit
was established, an escalation that will continue on a scale far exceeding the ratio
contemplated in the formative years of the U.S. House. It is also on the outer edge of
the range o f district population for nations with bicameral assemblies as well. A fair
examination of the U.S. House constituency size generally supports the proposition of
researchers who have pointed to its deviation from international norms. But this fact
alone does not mean representation has been undermined to the extent the critics
maintain. The impact on the quality of representation for American citizens is reserved
for future chapters.

Determinants of Legislative Size

District constituency size is a product of a jurisdiction’s population and the
number of seats in its legislature. Commentaries critical of the decision to restrict the
12 For instance, Texas state senators are not full-time legislators as are members o f the U.S. House o f
Representatives.
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size of the U.S. House to 435 members also claim it has brought the institution
outside of international legislative standards.13 What factors shape the number of seats
that comprise the legislative institution itself? The particular political circumstances of
each nation place qualifications on the comparability o f legislatures across countries.14
Notwithstanding these limitations, the determinants of numerical legislative size have
been empirically explored in prior literature on this topic. Not surprisingly, population
is positively correlated with national assembly size.15 Lower houses tend to be larger in
the most populous countries.16 A concomitant linkage between the magnitude of
population and upper house size has been uncovered as well.17 This relationship has
also been confirmed at the state legislative level,

18

although one recent study by Squire

and Hamm on the total number of members serving lower and upper houses of state
legislative chambers demonstrates that the linkage to population may not to be as robust
at the sub-national level.19

13 Glassman, “Let’s Build a Bigger House”; Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 136; Yates, “A
House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve Outgrown,” 181; Lucas and McDonald, “Is It Time to Increase the
Size of the House o f Representatives,” 372.
14 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 136.
15 Rein Taagepera, “The Size o f National Assemblies,” Social Science Research 1 (1972): 385-401;
Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1973); George J. Stigler, “The Sizes o f Legislatures,” Journal o f Legal Studies 5 (1976): 17-34; Rein
Taagepera and Mathew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants o f Electoral
Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Rein Taagepera and Steven Recchia, “The Size
o f Second Chambers and European Assemblies,” European Journal o f Political Research 41 (2002):
165-185.

16 J. Dennis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire, Encyclopedia o f World Political Systems, vol. 1 (Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 79.
17 Taagepera and Recchia, “The Size o f Second Chambers and European Assemblies,” 165.
18 Stigler, “The Sizes o f Legislatures.”
19 Squire and Hamm, 101 Chambers, 48.
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An empirical pattern repeatedly observed as a determinant of legislative size
is what is known as the cube root law of national assembly size. 20 According to this
theory the number of seats in the lower house of a country’s legislature tends to
approximate the cubic root of the population, represented here by the following
1 /" J

equation: Lower House Seats = Population . Taageperra and Shugart elaborate on this
model of assembly size in greater detail. The model assumes that a legislator’s most
burdensome task is communication and “that two types of communication predominate:
(1) communication with constituents, whose views are to be taken into account and to
whom decisions have to be explained, and (2) communication with other
representatives and monitoring communications among them, so as to have sufficient
information about what is going on and to participate in decision making.”

21

Legislators’ time is spent trying to balance channels of communication flowing to and
from their constituents and within the body itself.
The cube root law projects that the optimal assembly size is determined on the
basis o f a number of seats relative to the ratio of citizens per district that will
accommodate these competing demands. Legislatures are not designed to expand in a
limitless fashion or in direct proportion to the population because to do so would
undermine the capacity o f the body to legislate effectively. Hence, as Dahl and Tufte
explain, “The size of parliaments increases with the population of a country, but at a

20 Taagepera, “The Size o f National Assemblies”; Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes.
21 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, 179.
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Conversely, if the average number of constituents in the district

reaches a certain point, the legislator will be overworked and the communicative
linkage mechanism will be potentially undermined.
For the first century of the nation’s history the U.S. House conformed rather
well to this law.

However, as illustrated by Table 4, following the imposition of the

435-seat limitation the House has consistently drifted farther away from this empirical
regularity. The difference never surpassed 68 seats and was coming closer to
conformance with the cube root law in the five decades immediately prior to the 1920s.
In 1910 when 435 House seats were first apportioned, the difference between the actual
number of seats and the projected number of seats was 16. Every decade since there has
been a steady uptick in this figure. The most recent calculation registered a value of
-220 following the 2000 census. Thus, the size of the House stopped growing in a
manner that would optimize communication between citizens and legislators as
assumed by the cube root law. Once again the contours of this relationship can be
brought into clearer focus in the comparative context.

22 Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy, 80.
23 For further evidence see Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, 175; Lucas and McDonald, “Is It
Time to Increase the Size o f the House o f Representatives,” 372; Anderson, “Growth o f US Population
Calls for Larger House o f Representatives,” 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 4 Projected Seats in the U.S. House from Cube
Root Law of National Assembly Size from 1790-2000

Year
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000

Number o f
Seats Apportioned
105
141
181
213
240
223
234
241
292
325
356
386
435
435
435
435
435
435
435
435
435
435

Seats Projected
from Cube
Root Law
153
170
187
208
229
252
279
309
337
367
396
421
451
473
496
508
531
563
589
609
629
655

Difference
-48
-29
-6
5
11
-29
-35
-68
-45
-42
-40
-35
-16
-38
-61
-73
-96
-128
-154
-174
-194
-220

Source: DeWayne L. Lucas and Michael D. McDonald. “Is it Time to Increase the Size of the House of Representatives?”
American Review o f Politics 2\ (2000): 367-381, Table 1.
Note: The projected seats from the cube root law is the cube root o f the population rounded.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

Table 5 displays the projected number of seats from the cube root rule and the
actual size of the lower houses of the 36 country sample included this chapter. The
U.S. House has the second highest negative difference on this measure behind India.
Once again the world’s largest democracy spares the U.S. House from the distinction of
being the largest outlier from international legislative norms. The mean difference for
the sample is 14.49, corroborating the cube root prediction even though the standard
deviation is quite pronounced (132.21). On this indicator of representation the U.S.
House has declined steadily since the beginning of the twentieth century.
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Table 5 Projected Num ber o f Seats in the Lower House from Cube Root Law for 36 Countries
Projection from
Actual Number o f
Cube Root Law
Seats in Lower House
Difference
Country
150
Australia
267
-117
183
201
Austria
-18
40
67
Bahamas
-27
64
Barbados
28
-36
Belgium
150
217
-67
117
Botswana
44
-73
Brazil
513
556
-43
Canada
301
310
-9
Chile
120
248
-128
200
218
Czech Republic
-18
150
203
-53
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
83
179
-96
577
France
388
189
Germany
613
436
177
India
1009
-464
545
166
155
Ireland
11
244
Italy
630
386
137
Jamaica
60
-77
Japan
502
480
-22
80
Lesotho
130
-50
76
60
Luxembourg
-16
500
462
Mexico
38
Namibia
72
122
-50
Netherlands
150
251
-101
164
Norway
165
1
Poland
460
338
122
282
345
Romania
63
138
220
-82
Serbia-Montenegro
400
South Africa
352
48
Spain
340
350
10
200
8
192
Switzerland
646
257
United Kingdom
389
United States
Uruguay

435
99

655
148

Mean
Standard Deviation

-220
-49
-14.19
132.21

Source: Arthur Banks, Thomas C. Muller and William R. Overstreet, eds., Political Handbook o f the World 20002002,(Binghamton, New York: CSA Publications, 2003).
Notes’. The projected number o f seats from the cube root law is the cube root o f the population rounded.
Statistics were calculated by the author.
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When population is the sole focal point for analyzing the context of lower
house size, other influential variables might be ignored. Population alone cannot
explain variance in assembly size. Even the originators of the model concede the “cube
root law is not completely proved theoretically” in spite of its sound empirical
foundation.24 A jurisdiction’s geographic size has been linked to assembly size, albeit
weakly.

9S

.

,

.

More advanced societies with higher literacy rates and stronger economies

have citizens who are more likely to contact their legislators, necessitating additional
seats in the legislature.26 Nations growing at a rapid rate may lag in initiating upward
adjustments in the number of seats in the legislature.27 The numerical composition of
the upper house and the lower house in a bicameral chamber also appear to positively
•

correlate with one another, reflecting a society’s bias toward greater institutional size.
Building on this past research the next section of this chapter formulates a model of
lower house assembly size in order to gain added leverage on the representative
character of the U.S. House.

24 Taagepera and Shugart, S e a ts a n d Votes, 181.

25 Stigler, “The Sizes o f Legislatures,” 21-23.
26 Taagepera, “The Size o f National Assemblies”; Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, 111.
27 Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy, 83.
28 Taagepera and Recchia, “The Size o f Second Chambers and European Assemblies.”
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Multivariate Model Predicting National Assembly Size

It is customary when employing a regression model to predict national assembly
size to utilize the natural log of population because of the positively skewed distribution
evinced for this independent variable. The same approach is taken here. Population
growth is usually operationalized by the growth rate over a period of two decades. This
model includes the average annual growth rate from 1975 to 2000 for the 36 countries
in the sample.29 Geographic size is measured as the log transformation o f the land area
of the country in square kilometers. To account for a country’s developmental status,
literacy rate and per capita GDP measured in thousands are incorporated into the final
model specification.30 The final independent variable included in this model is the
number of upper house seats in the country’s bicameral legislature. The dependent
variable is the total number o f seats in the nation’s lower house. Table 6 summarizes
the results of two models, the first with population (log) as the lone predictor variable
and the second introducing the other independent variables. Model 1 is able to account
for about 71.4% of the variation in lower house size. The incorporation of the other
predictor variables noticeably improve the fit of the model (Adj. R2= .804). The
impact of population (log) remains highly significant (p < .001). The number of upper
house seats is also positively related to the dependent variable (p < .001).

29

Data compiled from United Nations Department o f Economic and Social Affairs, World Population
Prospects: The 2002 Revision, vol. 3, http:// www.un.oru/ esa- population/ publications/ wpp2002/
WPP2002 VOL 3.pdf, accessed: May 26, 2006, Table 1.5.
30 Data compiled from: The World Fact Book 2006, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/Tactbook/,
accessed May 26, 2006.
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Table 6 Regression Model Predicting Lower House
Size in 36 Countries
Independent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Population (Log)

90.794***
(9.651)

78.953***
(18.751)

Geographic Size (log)

-7.072
(13.788)

Literacy Rate

4.375
(3.517)

Per Capita GDP
(in thousands)

-.180
(1.536)

Population Growth

33.012
(42.783)

Upper House Size

.651***
(.159)

Constant

-1448.794
(472.467)

Adj. R2

.714

.805

N

36

36

Notes: Dependent variable is the number seats in each country’s lower house.
Population growth is calculated from the years 1975-2000 compiled from
the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World
Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, Volume III: Analytical Report,
Table 1.5.
All other data compiled from: Arthur Banks, Thomas C Muller and
William R. Overstreet, eds., Political Handbook o f the World 2000-2002,
(Binghamton, New York: CSA Publications, 2003).
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A 100-seat increase in the size of the upper house leads to about 65 more
seats in the lower, holding all the other variables constant. None of the other variables
in Model 2 achieve statistical significance. Inserting the values of the U.S. into the
regression equation from Model 2 generates a prediction of 527 seats for the U.S.
House. The nation’s lower house still appears to be smaller than projected in the
international context. However, the difference does not reach the same level as the
projection generated by the cube root law of national assembly size. This finding
indicates that an increase in the size of the house deviates from the composition of
assemblies in other parts o f the world, though not dramatically. It would only take a
92-seat increase to bring the House in line with international norms, less than half the
215-seat increase prominent comparative scholars have advocated.

T1

Representation and the States

Members of the U.S. House not only serve their districts but are representatives
o f their states as well. Though not as thoroughly scrutinized as other aspects of the
apportionment process, the effects of the 43 5-seat cap on the states has also been cited
as a justification for increasing the size of the House.32 Chapter 2 showed that
preserving representation for a House member’s state during the process of
apportionment was an important component in debates over the size of the institution.

31 Lijphart, “Reforming the House,” 135-140.
32 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 137; Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve
Outgrown,” 161; Brickner, Article the First o f the Bill o f Rights, 110-113.
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No doubt many representatives protested the loss of seats by their states because they
feared it could redound negatively to their own careers. Nevertheless, the fact that
states would lose clout with fewer seats and that members have to represent a wider
diversity of interest also led to the drive to avoid seeing a state’s delegation in the
House pared back. Supporters of increasing the size of the U.S. House have noted that
since it was capped at 435 members, states losing seats in the House is a much more
frequent occurrence. In the first twelve rounds of reapportionment that occurred from
1790 to 1910 an average o f 4.2 states lost seats in each round over this period. The
corresponding average for the eight rounds of reapportionments from 1930-2000 is 12
states.33
Due to a variety o f factors, some states grow faster than others, and to
accommodate this growth they must get additional seats in the House. Since the cap of
435 seats has not been raised, those gains must come at the expense of other states.
This reality has led to a pronounced shift in the regional distributional allocation of
seats. Since 1910, the first decade with the 435-seat limit, the West and the South have
been steadily gaining seats while the less rapid growing percentages of the Midwest and
Northeast blocs o f states are dwindling (Table 7). Over this period as these regions
have grown at a more rapid pace, the Southern and Western states now combine to
constitute almost 58% o f the seats in the House as opposed to 38.9% in 1910.

33 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 138, Table IV. Calculations through 2000 were updated
by the author.
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Table 7 Regional Changes in the Number of House Seats Apportioned by Decade
Decade

N ortheast

South

Midwest

West

143 (32.9%)
1910
136(31.3%)
33 (7.6%)
123 (28.3%)
1920*
33 (7.6%)
123 (28.3%)
136 (31.3%)
143 (32.9%)
1930
133 (30.6%)
43 (9.8%)
122 (28.0%)
137 (31.5%)
1940
131 (30.1%)
120 (27.7%)
135 (31.0%)
49(11.3% )
1950
115 (26.4%)
134 (30.8%)
129 (29.7%)
59(13.6% )
1960
108 (24.8%)
133 (30.6%)
125 (28.7%)
69(15.9% )
1970
104 (23.9%)
134 (30.8%)
121 (27.8%)
76(17.5% )
1980
95 (21.8%)
142 (32.6%)
113 (25.9%)
85(19.5% )
1990
88 (20.2%)
105 (24.1%)
149 (34.3%)
93 (21.3%)
2000
154 (35.4%)
100 (22.9%)
98 (22.5%)
83(19.1% )
2010
79(18.2%)
101 (23.2%)
160 (36.7%)
95 (21.8%)
2020
74(17.0% )
164(37.7%)
91 (20.9%)
106 (24.4%)
2030
88 (20.2%)
68 (15.6%)
171 (39.3%)
109 (25.1%)
Source: Numbers for 1910-2000 taken from the U.S. Census Bureau. Numbers for 2010-2030 projections taken
from: Vincent B. Thompson, “Projecting Reapportionment,” Indiana Business Review 40 (2005): 4-6.
*No reapportionment legislation was passed by Congress for the 1920s.
Notes: Number in parentheses is the region’s percentage of seats in the U.S. House.
Northeastern states include: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
Southern states include: Delaware, Maryland Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas.
Midwestern states include: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas.
Western states include: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada,
Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska and Hawaii.

On the other hand, the Northeastern states have taken a hit in the size of their
delegations. During the 435-seat era these states have lost 40 seats, going from 28.3%
to 19.1% o f the total membership of the House. The Midwest region has undergone a
similar loss, dropping from 143 seats in 1910 to 100 in 2000. Relying on U.S. Census
Bureau estimates of state population for 2010, 2020, and 2030, economic analyst
Vincent Thompson of the Indiana Business Research Center has issued projections of
seats for the states in the oncoming decades (Table 8).34 The future appears even
bleaker for the Midwestern and Northeastern House delegations. If current trends
continue by 2030 states from the Northeast will only be allocated 68 seats and the
Midwest will have 88.
34 Thompson, “Projecting Reapportionment,” 4-6. Vincent Thompson generously shared his data with the
author.
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Table 8 Number of Seats in the U.S. House by State 1910-2030
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

10

10

9

9

7
1
11
3
5
1
4
12

7
1
11
4
5
1
4
12

7
1
20
4
6
1
5
10

7
2
23
4
6
1
6
10

2
27
13
10
8
11
8
4
6
16
13
10
8
16
2
6
1
2
12
1

2
27
12
10
8
11
8
4
6
16
13
10
8
16
2
6
1
2
12
1

2
27
11
9
7
9
8
3
6
15
17
9
7
13
2
5
1
2
14
1

2
26
11
8
6
9
8
3
6
14
17
9
7
13
2
4
1
2
14
2

(continued on following page)

9
1
6
2
30
4
6
1
8
10
1
2
25
11
8
6
8
8
3
7
14
18
9
6
11
2
4
1
2
14
2

8
1
4
3
38
4
6
1
12
10
2
2
24
11
7
5
7
8
2
8
12
19
8
5
10
2
3
1
2
15
2

1970

1980

7

7

1

1990

2000

7

1

4
4
43
4
6

4
5
45
5
6

1

7

1

4
6
52
6
6

1

2010
6

1
4
8
53
7
5

1

2020
6

1
4
9
54
7
5

6

1
4
11
55
7
5

1

1
19
10

23
11

25
13

27
14

32
14

34
14

2
2

2
2

2
2

2
2

2
2

2
2

2
2

24
10
6
5
7
8

22
10
6
5
7
8

20
10
5
4
6
7

19
9
5
4
6
7

18
9
4
4
6
6

17
9
4
4
6
5

16
8
4
4
6
5

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

8
12
18
8
5
10

8
11
18
8
5
9

8
10
15
8
4
9
1
3
3

8
9
15
8
4
8

8
9
14
8
4
8

8
9
13
8
4
8

2

2

3
1

3
2

2

2

2

15
2

14
3

13
3

1

4
5
56
7
4

15
10

8
10
16
8
5
9
1
3
2

1

2030

1

1

1

1

3
4

2
4

2
5

2

2

2

2

13
3

13
3

12
3

12
3
oo
ON

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 8 Continued
1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

43
10
3
22
8
3
36
2
7
10
18
2
2
10
5
6
11
1

45
11
2
24
9
3
34
2
6
9
21
2
1
9
6
6
10
1

45
12
2
23
8
4
33
2
6
10
21
2
1
9
6
6
10
1

43
12
2
23
6
4
30
2
6
9
22
2
1
10
7
6
10
1

41
11
2
24
6
4
27
2
6
9
23
2
1
10
7
5
10
1

39
11
1
23
6
4
25
2
6
8
24
2
1
10
7
4
9
1

34
11
1
21
6
5
23
2
6
9
27
3
1
10
8
4
9
1

31
12
1
19
6
5
21
2
6
9
30
2
1
11
9
3
9
1

29
13
1.
18
5
5
19
2
6
9
32
3
1
11
9
3
8
1

27
13
1
16
5
5
18
2
6
9
35
4
1
11
9
3
8
1

25
14
1
15
5
6
16
2
6
9
37
4
1
12
10
2
8
1

23
14
1
14
5
6
15
1
6
9
40
4
1
12
10
2
7
1

43
10
3
22
8
3
36
2
7
10
18
2
2
10
5
6
11
1

Notes: Compiled from U.S. Census Data.
Numbers for 2010-2030 projections taken from: Vincent B. Thompson “Projecting Reapportionment,” Indiana Business Review 40 (2005): 4-6.
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Conversely the South and West will be apportioned 171 and 109 seats
respectively accounting for 64.4% of the seats in the House. If the House had expanded
beyond 435 members, the shift in the distribution of seats would have occurred anyway,
but the actual loss o f seats is remarkable because of the 435-seat cap. The examination
of these trends when the state serves as the primary unit of analysis affords further
insight into the effects of maintaining the 435-seat limit for the House (Table 8). Take a
state like New York for instance. In 1910 it sent 43 representatives to the U.S. House.
In 2000 that number had fallen to 29 and by 2030 it will most likely plummet to 23.
The authors of the Almanac o f American Politics note that “reapportionment is carnage
time for New York.” 1 Pennsylvania’s history tells a similar story. In 1910 it received
an allocation o f 36 seats in the House. The number dropped down to 19 after 2000. For
the decade of the 2030s the Pennsylvania delegation will be trimmed to 15 members.
These seats have been transferred to Southern and Western growth engines like Florida
and California. The presence of members from California in the House has gone from
11 to 53 over the period from 1910-2000. By 2030 California will send 56 members to
the U.S. House. After the 1910 census Florida was apportioned four seats in the House;
the states allocation o f seats rose to 25 in the present decade. In the decade of the 2030s
the number of seats is projected go to 34.One might be prompted to respond to these
figures by noting that fewer seats for the Northeast and the Midwest is a manifestation
o f slower population growth than the rest of the county. H ow ever, as supporters o f
enlarging the House point out, these states have experienced a rise in population size, if

1 Michael Barone and Richard E Cohen, Almanac o f American Politics 2004 (Washington, D.C.:
National Journal Group, 2003), 1090.
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not at the same clip as the national rate of growth.36 Automatically reapportioning
435 House seats after every census as some states’ populations rise at a more alacritous
rate than others creates a significant representational tradeoff.
Table 9 sheds additional light on this premise. It contains the percentage change
in population for all of the 48 states that were a part of the Union since 1910,
confirming a uniformly positive trend. It also displays the change in the number of
seats for each of the states, the percentage change in number of seats, and the difference
in representation (percentage change in seats - the percentage change in population)
between the years 1910-2000. For instance, the New York delegation has fallen by 14
seats over this duration, meaning the state has lost 33% of its representation in the
House. Meanwhile, New York’s population has gone up by 108% in the past 90 years
so its difference in representation over this time span is -141. Conversely, the state of
Florida has experienced exponential population growth over this time frame to the tune
o f 2024%. However, it has only gained 21 seats, a 525% increase, which results in a
difference in representation o f almost -1500% during this period. In fact the most
pronounced difference in representation occurs in states where the population has risen
at the fastest rate.

-in

36 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 139; Brickner, Article the First o f the Bill o f Rights, 110.
37 Part o f this discrepancy is due to the method o f calculating apportionment used by the U.S. Census, but
it is revealing nonetheless.
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Table 9 Change in U. S. House Representation by State Since 1910

State

Percentage
Change in
Population

Alabama
108
Arizona
2411
Arkansas
70
California
1325
Colorado
438
Connecticut
205
Delaware
287
Florida
2024
Georgia
214
Idaho
297
Illinois
120
Indiana
125
Iowa
32
Kansas
59
Kentucky
77
Louisiana
63
Maine
72
Maryland
309
Massachusetts
89
Michigan
194
Minnesota
137
Mississippi
58
Missouri
70
Montana
140
Nebraska
44
Nevada
2341
New Hampshire
187
New Jersey
232
New Mexico
456
New York
108
North Carolina
365
North Dakota
11
Ohio
138
Oklahoma
108
Oregon
409
Pennsylvania
60
Rhode Island
93
South Carolina
165
South Dakota
29
Tennessee
160
Texas
435
Utah
498
Vermont
71
Virginia
243
Washington
416
West Virginia
48
Wisconsin
130
Wyoming
238
Notes: Compiled by the author from US Census data.
Difference in representation = percentage change in

Change
in Number
of Seats
-3
7
-3
42
3
0
0
21
1
0
-8
-4
-6
-4
5
-1
-2
2
6
2
-2
-4
-7
-1
-3
2
0
1
2
-14
3
-2
-4
-3
2
-17
-1
-1
-1
-1
14
1
-1
1
4
-3
-3
0

Percentage
Change in
Number of Seats
-30
700
-43
382
75
0
0
525
8
0
-33
-31
-45
-50
-45
-13
-50
33
-38
15
-20
-50
-44
-50
-50
200
0
8
200
-33
30
-67
-18
-38
67
-47
-33
-14
-66
-10
78
50
-50
10
80
-50
-27
0

number of seats - the percentage change in population.
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Difference in
Representation
-138
-1711
-113
-943
-363
-205
-287
-1499
-206
-297
-153
-156
-77
-109
-122
-76
-122
-276
-127
-179
-157
-108
-114
-190
-94
-2141
-187
-224
-256
-141
-335
-78
-156
-146
-342
-107
-126
-179
-95
-170
-357
-448
-121
-233
-336
-98
-157
-238
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Calculating this measure at the national level quantifies to some degree how
much representation has been sacrificed for the entire population during the 435-seat
era. The U.S. population has grown approximately 207% since 1910 meaning the
national difference in representation is 207. This measure of representation is
somewhat crude, but nevertheless it does provide some indication that the ceiling on the
number of House seats apportioned does not just deprive the low-growth states of
representation as conventional wisdom would suggest.
On an absolute basis, Midwestern and Northeastern states in the Rust Belt have
taken the biggest hit due to the 435-seat limit. However, the loss of representation
relative to population growth is greatest for the fastest growing states. Members of
Congress in the Northeast and Midwest are surely aware that in successive rounds of
reapportionment they will see their numbers continue to dwindle. Representatives who
are out of jobs because o f seats moving from one state to another may feel this pain
more directly. Nevertheless, representatives from rapidly growing states may be
gaining seats, but they are losing representation as well. On the other side of the
equation, at what point will lawmakers see a problem with a state like New York
sending fewer than 20 representatives to the U.S. House? Such an outcome will most
likely come to fruition sometime in the middle of the present century.
Every state has a unique collection o f geographic, ethnic, and political
constituencies and they will only continue to diversify as the demographics of the
nation undergo a fundamental transformation. The states with the top rates of

38 Stephen Ohlemacher, “Growing Population Shifts Political Power,” Associated Press, December 22,
2005.
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population expansion like Texas and Florida are some of the most racially and
ethnically diverse. According to year 2000 census data, in the 10 fastest growing states
since the 435-seat figure was imposed, the average non-White Hispanic population is
about 34%. To accommodate descriptive representation for underrepresented groups,
adding a few seats in the high-growth states at the expense of others may not be
enough.39

Conclusion

This chapter investigated three areas of representation that have been most
visibly impacted by the 435-seat limitation for the U.S. House of Representatives.
These are the domains most thoroughly scrutinized by scholars who have dealt with the
historical and comparative implications of this decision. Chapter 3 has expanded on the
earlier research by offering some nuanced perspectives on constituency size, size of the
U.S. House in the international context, and the effects on the states. There is now a
clearer empirical foundation going forward into the next chapters exploring the
representational tradeoff in effect since 1910.
First, the ratio o f persons per district has expanded to levels unforeseen by the
founders o f the United States. Unless action is taken by the U.S. Congress to boost the
size of the House, district populations will soar to unprecedented heights. Future
projections o f the U.S. population show this trend will continue and by 2030 the
average House member will represent over 800,000 citizens, and for some this figure

39 Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 141.
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will go to well over a million in states with a single at-large seat. U.S. House districts
are also ranked among the most heavily populated in the world for electoral
democracies with bicameral national assemblies. Yet the U.S. does not top the list or
even come close to the lower house o f the Indian Parliament which has a ratio of
citizens per representative nearly three times that for the U.S. House. Even within the
U.S. there are legislators at the state level in California and Texas elected from districts
more populous than what most House members now confront. Thus, while
representation may be hindered in U.S. House districts there are legislative chambers in
the world and in the U.S. where the representational linkage may be under more intense
pressure.
The actual size of the U.S. House does appear to be smaller than one would
anticipate based on empirical patterns of assembly size throughout the world. Whereas
population is a reliable predictor of the number of seats that comprise a national
assembly size, it is not the sole indicator. Each nation has a set of unique political
dynamics that shape institutional size distinctive from population. India’s lower house
has not kept up with its population growth just as other national assemblies are more
numerous than one would expect based on population alone. A political culture
favorably predisposed to large political institutions is influential in determining
legislative size. After accounting for a number of different factors that may be linked to
lower house size, the U.S. House is constituted of fewer seats than would be predicted
from an international comparative. Nonetheless, it would require only an upward
adjustment of just over 90 seats to comply with international norms.
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Finally, there has been a glaring cost to representation when states are the unit
of analysis. The prevailing view is that slow-growing states have experienced the brunt
o f no longer linking the size of the U.S. House to population growth. That is the case
when one looks at which states have lost seats in absolute terms. However, the
Southern and Western states have also been deprived of representation relative to their
population growth. These diversity-laden states would have also missed out on
additional representatives in the House because of the 435-seat limit. The crux of the
case advanced in this chapter is that it is too narrow to suggest that states exhibiting
slowest growth are suffering from the present 435-seat figure, as all states regardless of
population growth are being shortchanged to some extent. It is perhaps in this area
where the consequence o f maintaining the status quo on the size of the U.S. House is
most detrimental to representation.
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CHAPTER4

THE GROWTH OF U.S. HOUSE DISTRICT POPULATIONS: A BLESSING
FOR INCUMBENTS OR A DOSE OF ADDITIONAL COMPETITION?

Introduction

The subject of U.S. House elections has not lacked for attention among
American political scientists. Scholars of congressional elections have intently studied
the enormous success of incumbents in the post-WWII era and the reasons behind it.
Elections matter because they provide the means by which constituents can hold
politicians accountable for their actions in government. The impact of constituency size
on electoral outcomes has also captured the interest of students of elections at all levels
o f government in the United States. Nevertheless, in spite of the steep rise in the
average number o f citizens in House districts over the past century, for various reasons
no comprehensive systematic analysis has been undertaken on whether district
population size makes a difference in House elections. This chapter fills this vacuum
by formulating and testing empirical models of whether constituency size has any
bearing on the margin of victory for House incumbents and their probability of defeat.
Many critics castigate members of the U.S. House of Representatives as insulated from
electoral sanction because of uncompetitive districts and being out of touch with their
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constituents.1 The results presented in this chapter help to illuminate the extent to
which, if any, the escalation of House district populations has affected the minimal level
o f competition that has become a signature feature of the electoral process in the House.

The Dominance of House Incumbents and Its Causes

One o f the most prominent trends documented in the scholarship of American
political science is the dominance of incumbents in U.S. House elections during the
post-WWII era. Over this period better than 90% of incumbent House members have
sought re-election and greater than 90% of them have emerged victorious.2 In the early
1970s, political scientists not only took notice of these increasing success rates but also
of the fact that incumbents were expanding the margins by which they defeated the
opposition.3 Though some scholars remained skeptical that incumbents were as safe as
conventional wisdom suggested,4 in the past few cycles there are very few House
campaigns that are not lopsided affairs.
Several explanations were posited as to why the advantage of incumbents
jumped so dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century and has persisted in
successive years. One proposition was that representatives were engaging in strategic
1 Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope, Culture War? The Myth o f a Polarized
America (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005).
2 Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics o f Congressional Elections, 6th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2004).
3 David R. Mayhew, “Congressional Elections: The Case o f the Vanishing Marginals,” Polity 6 (1974):
295-317.
4 Gary C. Jacobson, “The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition to the US House o f
Representatives 1952-82,” American Journal o f Political Science 31 (1987): 126-141.
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abandonment of their House seat with greater frequency than in the past, retiring
before they would suffer certain defeat in the next election.5 Many studies identified
redistricting that occurred in the wake of the reapportionment revolution o f the 1960s as
the principal culprit.6 Observers o f contemporary elections have also blamed
gerrymandering as a primary contributor to the lock House incumbents have on reelection. The allegation that redistricting was responsible for the rise of victory
margins in the late 1960s was sharply questioned by some scholars.8 Additional studies
suggest the lack of turnover o f more recent vintage is attributable to the migrations of
like minded partisans that have made congressional districts more politically
homogeneous.9 Other scholars pointed to the de-alignment of the electorate in the
1970s as a factor, since voters were beginning to substitute the cue of incumbency for
that of partisanship.10 However, this phenomenon may have been temporary, as

5 Gary W. Cox and Jonathan N. Katz, Elbridge G erry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences o f the
Reapportionment Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
6 Edward R. Tufte, “The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems,” American
Political Science Review 67 (1973): 540-554; Cox and Katz, Elbridge G erry’s Salamander.
7 Michael P. McDonald, “Drawing the Line on Competition,” PS: Political Science and Politics 34
(2006): 91-95.
8 John A. Ferejohn, “On the Decline o f Competition in Congressional Elections,” American Political
Science Review 71 (1977): 166-176.
9 Bruce Oppenheimer, “Deep Red and Blue Congressional Districts: The Causes and Consequences o f
Declining Party Competitiveness,” in Congress Reconsidered, 8th ed., eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Brace
O ppenheim er (W ashington, D C : C Q P ress, 2 0 0 5 ), 135-159; A lan A bram ow itz, Brad A lexander, and

Matthew Gunning, “Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline o f Competition in U.S. House
Elections,” Journal o f Politics 68 (2006): 75-88; Alan Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, and Matthew
Gunning, “D on’t Blame Redistricting for Uncompetitive Elections,” PS: Political Science and Politics 29
(2006): 87-90.
10 Ferejohn, “On the Decline o f Competition in Congressional Elections”; Water D. Burnham, “Insulation
and Responsiveness in Congressional Elections,” Political Science Quarterly 90 (1975): 411-435.
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partisan voting in congressional elections is in the process of a noticeable resurgence
in the past two decades.11
Another explanation rested on the growth in resources available for incumbents,
such as the franking privilege, to advertise themselves to voters at unprecedented
levels.

17

One study failed to validate this theory, finding no increase in voter

recognition o f incumbents between 1958 and 1970, nor did the edge in name
•

recognition enjoyed by incumbents over challengers surge over this period.

1^

Moms

Fiorina picked up on the resources argument and claimed that due to the increase in the
size of government in the 1960s members of Congress assumed the role of ombudsmen
who won re-election by helping their constituents navigate the bureaucracy and
securing distributive benefits that they could emphasize to voters rather than focusing
on more controversial policy issues.14 Subsequent tests of the resources explanation
have been inconclusive at best. When it concerns additional time spent in the district,
there is no evidence that it benefits incumbents.15 Johannes and McAdams found that
citizens’ perceptions o f constituency service by their member of Congress had little

11 Larry M. Bartels, “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996,” American Journal o f Political
Science 44 (2000): 35-50; Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Political Parties Matter: Realignment and the Return o f
Partisan Voting (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).
12 David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).
13 Ferejohn, “On the Decline o f Competition in Congressional Elections,” 174.
14 Morris P. Fiorina, “The Case o f the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It,” American Political
Science Review 71 (1977): 177-181.
15 Glenn R. Parker and Suzanne L. Parker, “The Correlates and Effects o f Attention to District by House
Members,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 10 (1985): 223-242.
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impact on voting decisions, but other scholars conclude that it does.

As far as

distributions o f spending programs to district constituencies are concerned, the link to
improved electoral success there is weak too, with some studies only finding support for
this relationship for the vote shares of Democratic incumbents but not Republican
incumbents18 and others failing to substantiate it for individual vote choice.19 Even so,
the growth in the disparity of campaign spending between incumbents and their
challengers does appear to have played a role in fortifying the position of U.S. House
members.20

Constituency Size and the Advantage of Incumbents

All o f these factors may have contributed to the virtually invulnerable position
most incumbent U.S. representatives now experience, although the partisan slant of
most districts now predominates more than in the 1970s and 1980s 21 This trend toward

16 John R. Johannes and John C. McAdams, “The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework
Policy Compatibility or Something Else? An Examination o f the 1978 Election,” American Journal o f
Political Science 25 (1981): 513-542.
17 David W. Romero, “The Case o f Missing Reciprocal Influence: Incumbent Reputation and the Vote,”
Journal o f Politics 58 (1996): 1198-1207.
18 R. Michael Alvarez and Jason L. Saving, “Deficits, Democrats, and Distributive Benefits:
Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel in the 1980s,” Political Research Quarterly 50 (1997): 809831.
19 Paul G. F eldm an and Jam es Jundrow, “C on gression al E lectio n s and L ocal Federal Sp en d in g,”

American Journal o f Political Science 28 (1984): 147-163; Janet Box-Stefensmeier, David C. Kimball,
Scott Meinke, and Katherine Tate, “The Effects o f Political Representation o f the Electoral Advantages
o f House Incumbents,” Political Research Quarterly 56 (2003): 259-270.
20 Alan I. Abramowitz, “Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline o f Competition in U.S. House
Elections,” Journal o f Politics 53 (1991): 34-56.
21 Oppenheimer, “Deep Red and Blue Congressional Districts,” 140.
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greater incumbent electoral security in the House has coincided with the growth in
the ratio of population per district.22 Yet, only one study to date has investigated
whether these two phenomena are related. Historian Lex Renda asserts that incumbents
have benefited from the increase in the mean population size of House districts. In his
study of the last 37 midterm elections since 1854 Renda finds a correlation of .730
between the success rate of incumbents seeking re-election and the population ratio of
House districts. He speculates that enlarged district constituencies have made
dislodging incumbents more difficult for their challengers.23 However, he does not test
a multivariate model to substantiate this claim, which means the jury is still out on
whether constituency size has been a boon to incumbent House members and a burden
for the candidates challenging them.
Renda’s assertion runs counter to what other research has found on the
magnitude of population and competition in Senate elections. Overall, incumbent
senators, who in most cases represent more citizens than their House counterparts, have
been re-elected at lower rates in the post-WWII era.24 Furthermore, a collection of
studies on the performance of senators has uncovered a negative relationship between
state population and incumbent vote shares.25 The consensus view emanating from this

22 Peverill Squire and Keith E. Hamm, 101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislature and the Future o f
Legislative Studies (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2005).
23 L ex R enda, “T he End o f M idterm D eclin e? C o n gression al E lection s in H istorical P ersp ectiv e,” S o c ia l

Science History 27 (2003): 139-164.
24 Jacobson, Politics o f Congressional Elections, 24-25.
25 John R. Hibbing and Sarah Brandes, “State Population and the Electoral Success o f U.S. Senators,”
American Journal o f Political Science 27 (1983): 808-819; Alan I. Abramowitz, “Explaining Senate
Outcomes,” American Political Science Review 82 (1988): 385-403; Alan I. Abramowitz and Jeffrey
Segal, Senate Elections (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press, 1992); Frances Lee and Brace I.
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scholarship is that the heavily populated states tend to be the most diverse and create
less favorable conditions for incumbents seeking re-election as compared to senators in
the least populated states in the country. Hibbing and Brandes estimated the vote shares
o f incumbent senators seeking re-election as a function of the number of House districts
within a state after controlling for party competition within the state. Their results
revealed a difference of approximately 9 points between senators running in the largest
and smallest states in terms of population.26 Abramowitz and Segal produced similar
findings in their model predicting incumbent senators’ vote shares in the 48 contiguous
states from 1974 to 1986. It showed that senators in states with the population of
Wyoming would win by about 3 percentage points more than a Senator in states the size
o f California, all else equal.27 The most comprehensive study of this relationship
looked at all contested Senate races from 1914 and 1996 and found that margins of
victory were highest in the states with the smallest populations.28 In spite of this
evidence, not all political scientists are convinced that state constituency size is
negatively associated with senators’ electoral security. While conceding that regression
analysis does demonstrate that higher population levels lead to closer races for
incumbent senators, other studies lend scant empirical support to the proposition that
this variable actually has a discemable effect on senators’ probability of defeat. Hence,

Oppenheimer, “Senate Apportionment: Competitiveness and Partisan Advantage,” Legislative Studies
Quarterly 2 2 (1 9 9 7 ): 3-24; Frances L ee and B ruce I. O ppenheim er, Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal
Consequences o f Equal Representation (Chicago, IL: University o f Chicago Press, 1999), 93-95.
26 Hibbing and Brandes, “State Population and the Electoral Success o f U.S. Senators,” 808-819.
27 Abramowitz and Segal, Senate Elections, 110-111.
28 Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate, 93-95.
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even if a larger constituency costs senators a few points in their margin of victory,
overall, variance in population levels has limited predictive power in estimating which
incumbents are the most likely to lose re-election.

90

For state and municipal elections the verdict is mixed on whether constituency
size and incumbent security are related. In races for the state legislature in 49 states for
1992 and 1994, one study found that the probability of victory for incumbents was a
negative function o f district constituency population, controlling for other relevant
factors.30 Another evaluation of state legislative races in 14 states for 1996 and 1998
reported that incumbents received a higher percentage of the votes in smaller districts.

91

In contrast, research on county and city elections has revealed a weak or nonexistent
association between population and electoral competitiveness.32 An analysis of races for
the Board o f Supervisors in counties in California from 1996-2002 uncovered evidence
that the number o f citizens in the district increased both the percentage of votes received
by incumbents as well as their probability of victory.33
Despite an ample amount of research on this topic for U.S. Senate races and the
less voluminous collection o f studies at the state and local levels, there has been no
29 Jonathan Krasno, Challengers, Competition and Reelection: Comparing Senate and House Elections
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 39-46; Mark C. Westlye, Senate Elections and Campaign
Intensity (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1991), 153-157.
30 John Carey, Richard Niemi, and Lynda Powell, “Incumbency and the Probability o f Reelection in State
Legislative Elections,” Journal o f Politics 62 (2000): 671-700.
31 R obert E. H ogan, “C hallenger E m ergence, Incum bent S u ccess and E lectoral A cco u n ta b ility in State

Legislative Elections,” Journal o f Politics 66 (2004): 1283-1303.
32 Gordon S. Black, “Conflict in the Community: A Theory o f the Effects o f Community Size,” American
Political Science Review 68 (1974): 1245-1261; Timothy Bledsoe, Careers in City Politics: The Case fo r
Urban Democracy (Pittsburgh, PA: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
33 Edward L. Lascher, “Constituency Size and Incumbent Safety: A Reexamination,” Political Research
Quarterly 58 (2005): 269-278.
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multivariate analysis o f how district constituency size influences races for the U.S.
House of Representatives. Drawing reasonable inferences on the nature of this
relationship for House contests based on the contradictory evidence produced in the
studies just referenced is a questionable proposition. One of the problems of
extrapolating from some o f the previous studies is that they rely on population estimates
that can be outdated in the ten-year intervals between when the census is taken. This
concern is of particular relevance to House races because even though the population
deviations between congressional districts must be minimized when a new round of
reapportionment takes place, massive shifts in the size of congressional districts can
occur within this ten-year time frame. For instance, in Nevada’s 2nd Congressional
District, the population grew an astounding 76.8% from 1990 to 2000, going from
600,791 persons in 1990 to 1,062,153 in 2000. Conversely, over the same time frame in
fh

Maryland’s 7 Congressional District the population dropped 9.7%, going from
597,660 in 1990 to 539,439 in 2000.34 These cases are illustrative of the peril of
utilizing census estimates o f House district constituency size the farther in time the
election cycle is from the year the census was taken. This obstacle may be overcome in
state or county-wide races because the U.S. Census Bureau provides estimates on
annual basis for these jurisdictions, but these estimates are not supplied for House
districts in the same fashion. However, there are elections when the most accurate
estimates of House district population are known, and that occurs in the year the census
was taken. Therefore, this chapter will conduct the first multivariate test of how district
population impacts electoral outcomes in U.S. House races utilizing district population
34 Brian Nutting and H. Amy Stem eds., CQ's Politics in America 2002, the 107th Congress (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2001).
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figures from the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. This strategy permits an
evaluation of how these variables interact with the greatest level of precision that can be
achieved given the limitations of the data.
There are three hypotheses that will be tested in the remainder of this chapter:
(1) the competition hypothesis , as district population increases an incumbent’s margin
of victory decreases', (2) the safety hypothesis, as district population increases the
margin of victory for an incumbent increases', or (3) there is no relation relationship
between the two variables. The same set of hypotheses will be tested for the probability
of victory for the incumbent House member: (1) as district population increases the
probability an incumbent will win re-election decreases (2) as district population
increases the probability an incumbent will win increases; or (3) there is no relationship

between these variables. While the design executed in this study cannot definitively
answer the question of whether allowing the House to remain fixed at 435 members and
the resultant expansion of House district populations has made elections more or less
competitive, it will shed some light on it. Examining this relationship over four election
years with accurate population figures will allow for the most reliable empirical test that
has been undertaken to date.

The Relationship Between District Population and Electoral Competition

In order to estimate the relationship between district population size and
electoral competitiveness in House elections, a multivariate model must be formulated
that controls for the other factors that shape outcomes in these races. As was previously
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noted, what makes studying this question for House elections a thorny issue is that
accurate estimates of district populations are only available once a decade from the U.S.
Census Bureau. As the decade unfolds, shifting migration patterns cause House district
population figures to fluctuate rather dramatically. However, in the first year of the
decade there are precise estimates of population levels within congressional districts.
The present analysis looks at this relationship at four points in time, the election years
1970,1980, 1990, and 2000. If either of the competing hypotheses regarding electoral
outcomes is to be strongly confirmed the relationship should hold in each cycle
individually and when data for each o f these cycles is pooled in a comprehensive model
controlling for other variables. Dummy variables for specific election years are added
into these models as well. For ease of substantive interpretation, district population
throughout this chapter is coded in 100,000s.
Since the incumbency advantage has drawn the bulk of attention in
congressional elections scholarship over the past generation and because races
involving incumbent House members supply a wealth of information to rule out the
possibility that any linkage between constituency size and electoral competition is
spurious, this analysis excludes open-seat races. Two dependent variables are utilized:
(1) the incumbent’s margin of victory measured by subtracting the challenger’s
percentage o f the two-party vote from the incumbent’s percentage of the two-party vote
and (2) a dichotomous measure of whether the incumbent won re-election or was
defeated.
A member of the House can win re-election with a substantial margin based on
the personal and institutional benefits of being an incumbent, but some members win re
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election simply because of the favorable distribution of partisanship within the
district.35 Districts heavily concentrated with individuals of the same party affiliation as
the incumbent member of Congress ensure a higher degree of electoral safety. In
contrast, when partisan loyalties are more evenly split within a district or slanted against
the incumbent, a more hotly contested race is likely. District partisanship can be
measured by the presidential vote received by the candidate of the incumbent’s party in
the election, although short-term forces such as an incumbent president’s popularity or
the challenger’s weakness as a candidate in a particular election may not accurately
reflect the normal partisan distribution. To control for any short-term bias, the measure
o f district partisanship used here is calculated by subtracting the percentage of the twoparty vote received by the presidential candidate o f the incumbent’s party in the entire
nation from the margin in the district. A similar measure o f the normal partisan vote
has been employed in other studies of U.S. House elections.36
The number of incumbents for whom the partisan landscape in their district is
unfavorable has been on the decline over the past two decades, meaning the personal
value of incumbency may be less influential than in years past.37 Nevertheless,
incumbents still gain some electoral edge simply by virtue of the fact that they are a

35 John R. Alford and David W. Brady, “Personal and Partisan Advantage in U.S. Congressional
Elections, 1846-1990,” in Congress Reconsidered, 5th ed., eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce
O ppenheim er (W ashington, DC: C on gression al Q uarterly Press, 1993), 146-147.

36 Abramowitz, “Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline o f Competition in U.S. House
Elections”; Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning, “Incumbency Redistricting, and the Decline o f
Competition in U.S. House Elections”; Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning, “Don’t Blame Redistricting
for Uncompetitive Elections.”
370ppenheimer, “Deep Red and Blue Congressional Districts,” 140.
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Moreover, since part of the study covers

elections when congressional districts were routinely won by a House candidate of one
party and a presidential candidate of the other party, it is essential to measure the
incumbent’s personal incumbency advantage. The personal vote is the previous margin
o f victory achieved by the House incumbent in the last election. Incumbents who did
not face a major-party opponent in the previous election were not included in the
analysis. This formulation of the personal vote has been used in previous studies of the
incumbency advantage.39
Another facet of the incumbent’s record that has been shown to affect the
number of votes received is the level of extremism in their roll call voting. Members
with more extreme voting records tend to lose support within their district.40 The policy
extremism exhibited by the representative will be estimated by the absolute value of
that member’s first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score in the previous Congress.41 A
representative’s seniority in the House may also matter, but the direction is less certain.
It could be that the enhanced power and prestige that come along with extended House
service improves the odds for re-election or it might lead to the perception that the
incumbent is devoting too much time to responsibilities in Washington D.C. and is

38 Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections,”
in Congress Reconsidered, 8th ed., eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.:
CQ Press, 2005), 87.
39 A bram ow itz, “Incum bency, C am paign Spending, and the D eclin e o f C om p etition in U .S . H ouse

Elections.”
40 Bandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady and John F. Cogan, “Out o f Step, Out o f Office: Electoral
Accountability and House Members’ Voting,” American Political Science Review 96 (2002): 127-140.
41 Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History o f Roll Call Voting
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Data downloaded from: http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm.
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losing touch with the constituency. One empirical investigation of this question
found that tenure was once associated with higher re-election rates and margins of
victory while observing that seniority has diminished power as a predictor of electoral
performance as compared to the mid-twentieth century.42 To control for whatever
seniority effects may be operating in House elections, the number of terms served by
the representative will be included as an explanatory variable in each of the models.
One aspect o f tenure that is not a mystery is that a member in his or her initial attempt
to win re-election benefits from a sophomore surge.43 The sophomore surge is
measured by a dummy variable coded 1 for an incumbent running for re-election for the
first time and 0 otherwise.
National political forces can also shape the electoral environment to the
advantage or detriment o f the House member seeking re-election 44 Most o f the
elections covered in this cycle produced a political climate unfavorable to incumbents
of one of the two major parties. In the midst of Ronald Reagan’s decisive victory over
President Jimmy Carter in 1980, several Democratic incumbents in this cycle suffered
from their ties to a deeply unpopular president. To account for this development, both
the pooled and separate 1980 models include a dummy variable coded 1 for Democratic
incumbents in 1980 and 0 otherwise to capture the effects of the pronounced anti-

42 John R. Hibbing, Congressional Careers: Contours o f Life in the Modern U.S. House o f
R e p rese n ta tiv es (C hapel H ill, N C : U n iv ersity o f N orth Carolina Press, 1991).

43 Albert D. Cover and David Mayhew, “Congressional Dynamics and the Decline o f Competitive
Congressional Elections” in Congress Reconsidered, 2nd ed., eds. Lawrence Dodd and Brace I.
Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), 70.
44 Edward R. Tufte, “Determinants o f Midterm Elections,” American Political Science Review 69 (1975):
812-826.
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Democratic trend o f this election. Despite recent exceptions in 1998 and 2002, the
president’s party typically loses seats in the U.S. House in a midterm election as
occurred in 1970 and 1990.45 To control for the effects of midterm loss, Republican
incumbents running in 1970 and 1990 will be coded 1 and 0 otherwise in these models.
There was no discernible edge for incumbents of either party in 2000 as very few seats
changed hands, so incumbent party effects are not modeled for this year in the pooled or
separate analyses.
Other district-level forces also dictate how the incumbent will do come election
time. One o f the most pivotal is the quality of the candidate challenging the incumbent.
Politically experienced challengers pose a more formidable obstacle to re-election than
do political neophytes.46 Although challenger quality can be operationalized in a
multitude of ways,47 the most frequently used is a dichotomous measure of whether the
challenger has held any previous elective office. Thus, congressional elections scholar
Gary Jacobson’s post-WWII House election database was relied on to estimate the
effect of the candidate challenging the incumbent where challengers with prior elective
office are coded 1 and 0 otherwise.

4o

45

James E. Campbell, “The Revised Theory o f Surge and Decline,” American Journal o f Political
Science 31 (1987): 956-978.
46 Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980);
Gary C. Jacobson, “Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics o f U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986,”
American Political Science Review 83 (1989): 773-793; Abramowitz, “Incumbency, Campaign Spending,
and the Decline o f Competition in U.S. House Elections”; Emily Van Dunk, “Challenger Quality in State
Legislative Elections” Political Research Quarterly 50 (1997): 793-807.
47 For a more detailed discussion.of challenger quality see Peverill Squire and Eric R. A. N. Smith, “A
Further Examination o f Challengers Quality in Senate Elections,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 21
(1996): 235-248.
48 The data on challenger quality was generously shared with the author by Gary Jacobson.
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A further controversy raised in the literature on congressional elections is the
nature of the relationship between campaign spending and an incumbent’s share of the
vote. There is broad agreement that the amount spent by a challenger is negatively
related to an incumbent’s vote share and probability of victory.49 However, whether
incumbents’ spending enhances their electoral performance evokes a contentious
debate. Some scholars suggest that House incumbents’ vote shares are not affected or
in some cases actually negatively associated with their level of spending.50 Other
research using an instrumental variables approach finds that additional spending does
increase the percentage o f the vote a sitting officeholder receives.51
Of course any time incumbent and challenger spending is analyzed there is a
problem of reciprocal causation. The most endangered incumbents are forced to spend
the most money, and thus it is a complex exercise to decipher just how much they
benefit from extra campaign spending. In addition, challengers expected to perform the
best tend to raise the most money which may inflate the importance of this variable.
The models presented in this chapter do not attempt to resolve this dispute around how
to properly estimate the effects of campaign spending in House elections, since that
variable is not of central interest in this study. To account for the likelihood that
spending by both a challenger and an incumbent is likely to be subject to diminishing
49 Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics o f Congressional Elections, 6th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2004).
50 Gary C. Jacobson, M o n ey in C o n g re ssio n a l E lections', Gary C. Jacobson, The Effects o f Campaign
Spending in Congressional Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments,” American Journal o f Political
Science 34 (1990): 334-362.

51 Donald P. Green and Jonathan Krasno, “Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the
Effects o f Campaign Spending in House Elections,” American Journal o f Political Science 32 (1988):
884-907; Donald P. Green and Jonathan Krasno, “Rebuttal to Jacobson’s New Evidence for Old
Arguments,” American Journal o f Political Science 34 (1990): 363-372.
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returns, squared transformations of these variables are incorporated into the various
models presented in this chapter.52 Spending effects can only be evaluated for the 1980,
1990, and 2000 elections because the campaign finance disclosure laws in operation
today did not exist in 1970. To control for inflation and the extra cost associated with
running in a more populous district, campaign spending is measured on a per capita
basis in year 2000 dollars. While this list may not exhaust the potential variables that
help predict the outcomes of elections involving incumbents, it does provide a powerful
set of multivariate controls to test whether House district constituency size is a
contributor to incumbent security, is a hindrance, or merely has a negligible impact.
Before presenting the multivariate analysis it might be instructive to look at the
performance of incumbents across the range of district population on the two dependent
variables of interest in this chapter (Table 10). From these data it does appear that
smaller House districts aid incumbents. In districts below 400,000 in population the
average margin of victory is 41.5 points compared to 30.3 points in districts comprised
of 600,000-699,999 citizens and 25.2 in districts with more than 700,000 people. The
same is not the case for the percentage of incumbents defeated across this range. Table
10 shows minuscule variation in the probability an incumbent will be defeated at
different levels o f district population. Based on these preliminary numbers, incumbents
win by reduced margins in larger House districts, but district population size does not
appear to influence the re-election rate of incumbents.

52 This approach provided a better empirical fit than alternative transformations.
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Table 10 Average M argin of Victory and Percentage of
Incumbents Defeated by Level of District Population
District Population

Average Margin
of Victory

Percentage
Defeated

400,000 or fewer

41.5

3.1

400,000-499,999

31.3

6 .1

500,000-599,999

30.5

5.0

600,000-699,999

30.3

4.3

700,000 or greater
25.2
4.2
Notes: This analysis excludes incumbent candidates without major opposition.
Results include the 1970,1980,1990, and 2000 U.S. House Elections.

Models Testing the Relationship between District Population and Margin of Victory

Table 11 displays the results for the pooled regression models predicting
incumbent victory margins. Model 1 includes the results for the 1970,1980,1990 and
2000 elections. Several of the traditional independent variables have the anticipated
effects in predicting the performance of an incumbent U.S. House member against a
respective challenger. Those incumbents receiving strong support in previous elections
tend to retain that support in the subsequent election. Members in districts packed with
their fellow partisans also tend to outperform their colleagues where the partisan
complexion of the district is more balanced. Freshmen running in their first reelection
experience the sophomore surge that has been previously documented.
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Table 11 Im pact o f District Population Size on the Victory
M argins o f Incumbent House Members: Pooled Analysis
Independent Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Challenger Quality

-5.086***
(.940)

-2.434*
( 1 .0 0 2 )

-2.347*
(1.181)

Challenger Spending
(Per Capita)

-18.029***
(1.895)

-14.284***
(1.767)

Challenger Spending Squared
(Per Capita)

2.757***
(.303)

(.453)

Democratic Incumbent in 1980

1 999

***

-10.303***

-7.167***

(1.719)

(1.432)

District Partisanship

401***
(.055)

.473***
(.059)

.409***
(.077)

D istrict Population
(in 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 s)

-1.430**
(.493)

-1.642***
(.513)

-2.685***
(.614)

Freshman

7.127***
(1.307)

7.483***
(1.276)

7.207***
(1.591)

Ideological Extremism

-9.844***
(2.731)

-11.026***
(2.971)

-10.076*
(3.988)

Incumbent Spending
(Per Capita)

1.017
(.930)

1.088
(1.052)

Incumbent Spending Squared
(Per Capita)

-.152#
(.084)

-.157#
(.087)

Incumbents in 1980

-1.969
(1.718)

Incumbents in 1990

-10.158***
(1.574)

-7.228***
(1.628)

Incumbents in 2000

-3.964**
(1.495)

.182
(1.448)

Previous Margin of Victory

.617***
(.029)

(•034)

.459***
(.041)

434

***

8.185***
(1.209)

Republican Incumbent in 1970

-14.305***
(1.405)

Republican Incumbent in 1990

-10.158***
(1.574)

-5.270***
(1.513)

-4.681**
(1.529)

Seniority

-.233*
(.109)

-. 2 1 0 #
(.114)

-.175
(.131)

Constant

30.111***
(2.713)

37.459***
(3.233)

34.113***
(4.383)

Adj. R2

.573

.692

.695

N
1175
859
555
# p < .1 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Notes'. Dependent variable is the incumbent House member’s margin of victory.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Model 1 includes the results for the 1970,1980,1990 and 2000 elections, Model 2 includes the results for the 1980,1990, and
2000 elections, and Model 3 includes the results for the 1990 and 2000 elections.
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More ideologically extreme members have their margins of victory reduced.
Democratic incumbents running in 1980 suffered at the hands of a national tide running
against their party’s fortunes while Republican incumbents in the off-year elections of
1970 and 1990 saw their margins of victory trimmed. Quality challengers also inject
additional competition into a race involving a sitting incumbent. Seniority has a
significant negative impact on how an incumbent fairs in this sample.
Turning to the variable of most interest to this study, the results signify that
population is negatively linked to margin of victory by incumbents. Controlling for all
the other variables in Model 1, incumbents lose about 1.4 points off their margin of
victory for each additional 100,000 constituents in their district (p < .004). So the
typical incumbent in a district o f 500,000 people would see his or her margin of victory
cut by 7 points while an average incumbent in a district of a million people would lose
about 14 points. This number is not insubstantial considering the mean difference
between the incumbent’s share of the vote and the challenger’s share of the vote is
about 31 points in this sample. This finding lends support to the hypothesis that
elections contested in more populous jurisdictions invite greater competition.
The results in Model 2 buttress this conclusion. It introduces the campaign
spending variables for the elections held in 1980, 1990, and 2000. This model shows
that per capita challenger spending reduces the incumbent’s vote margin, although the
effect fades at higher levels of spending. The resources devoted to the campaign by the
incumbent member of the House produces insignificant change in the outcome of the
race. The size of the coefficient for district population actually increases in this
specification (-1.642) and remains highly significant (p < .001). Even after spending is
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accounted for in this specification, incumbents win by 1.6 points less for every
100,000 citizens in the district. Model 3 displays an even stronger relationship when
the results are just limited to 1990 and 2000, as the magnitude of district population
exerts the most powerful effect. The size of the coefficient climbs to -2.28 when this
smaller subset of cases is analyzed (p < .001).
To assess the robustness of this relationship across election cycles, individual
models were tested for each individual election year. Table 12 contains the results of
each of these models. This individual analysis reveals inconsistent findings. In the 1990
and 2000 elections district population had a significant negative effect on margin of
victory at least at the .01 level. However, for 1970, district population has no
significant impact and in 1980 the coefficient for this variable is insignificant and
incorrectly signed. These discrepant results can possibly be attributable to the national
Republican tide, especially in 1980, that may have lessened other peripheral influences
like district population more than in the less volatile elections of 1990 and 2000.
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Table 12 Impact o f District Population Size on the
Victory Margins of Incumbent House M embers by Election
Independent Variable

1970

1980

1990

2000

Challenger Quality

-3.706*
(1.644)

-2.280
(1.724)

-2.755
(2.182)

-1.847
(1.163)

Challenger Spending
(Per Capita)

-28.970***
(3.725)

-31.941***
(6.536)

-12.393***
(1.680)

Challenger Spending Squared
(Per Capita)

6.048***
(1.395)

13.756***
(3.506)

1.626***
(.39)8

Democratic Incumbent in 1980

-5.447***
(1.420)

District Partisanship

.233*
(. 1 1 1 )

.584***
(.087)

.135
(.125)

.617***
(.078)

D istrict Population
(in 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 s)

-A ll
(.864)

.096
(.836)

-3.398***
(.908)

-1.776**
(.659)

Freshman

2.840
(2.790)

7.094***
(1.996)

9.668***
(2.822)

3.701***
(1.205)

Ideological Extremism

-6.117
(4.608)

-12.217**
(4.184)

-8.129
(6.047)

-9.178**
(3.503)

Incumbent Spending
(Per Capita)

.039
(2.148)

.981
(2 .0 1 0 )

(1.107)

Incumbent Spending Squared
(Per Capita)

.189
(.265)

-.181
(.148)

(.096)

.381***
(.056)

.459***
(.064)

.428***
(.049)

Previous Margin of Victory

.615***
(.059)

Republican Incumbent in 1970

-14.172***
(1.4361)

.8 8 8

-.111

-4.514**
(1.490)

Republican Incumbent in 1990

Seniority

-.379#
(.194)

-.284
(.217)

-.366#
(.2 0 1 )

.126
(.149)

Constant

26.333***
(4.382)

32.194
(5.552)

41.744***
(6.514)

33.815***
(4.713)

Adj. R2

.508

.718

.522

.856

275

280

N
316
304
# p < .1 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Notes-. Dependent variable is the incumbent House member’s margin of victory.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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On the whole, the chief evidentiary implication emanating from these
results is that allowing House districts to continue to grow serves as a moderately
positive stimulus for the competitiveness of elections. Ceteris paribus, an incumbent
member of the U.S. House is worse off with thousands of extra constituents come
election time. One must be cautious in drawing this inference based on the limited
numbers of election cycles in this sample. Plus the inconsistency of the effect across
election cycles suggests the relationship is a secondary factor in predicting House
election outcomes. Nonetheless, the evidence presented here does suggest that surging
district populations are a marginally positive influence on the level of electoral
competition in U.S. House elections.

The Relationship Between District Population and Probability of Defeat

The previous section examined the connection between constituency size and
incumbent performance in House elections when tested in the context of margin of
victory. However, simply because sitting members win by less in the most populated
districts does not mean they are more prone to actually lose their seats because of this
factor. Ultimately, if district population is going to meaningfully sway outcomes in
House elections this relationship must manifest itself when the outcome is measured as
a dichotomy, in this case whether the incumbent was re-elected. The next section of
this chapter presents the results of models investigating this relationship when the
dependent variable is operationalized in a dichotomous fashion, coded 0 if the
incumbent House member won re-election and 1 if the member was unsuccessful in the
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attempt for re-election. In most cases the typical course of action would be to
employ logistic regression when there is a binary dependent variable. However, in the
present analysis, because an incumbent being defeated is such an infrequent event
(approximately five percent in this sample), a rare events logit model is utilized for this
analysis. As prior research has documented, traditional logit models may be subject to
bias and can underpredict rare events.
Table 13 lists the results of models estimating the probability that an incumbent
will lose re-election. Model 1 includes the results from 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. It
shows that facing a quality challenger, ideological extremism on roll call votes, running
as a Democratic incumbent in the Reagan landslide of 1980 and as a Republican in
1970, and longer tenure increased the probability of defeat. Conversely, higher
previous victory margins and a more favorable partisan district makeup reduced the
likelihood that incumbents would lose their seats in Congress. O f greatest relevance to
the present study is that district population had no significant effect on whether an
incumbent U.S. House member would suffer a loss in the general election.
Model 2 excludes 1970 and reintroduces the campaign spending variables.
Challenger spending increases the probability of defeat, although the effects are
reversed at higher levels of spending. The significance levels for some of the variables
in the model change when comparing Models 1 and 2, but the story for district
population is the same, as the effect for this variable remains insignificant.

53 Michael Tomz, Gary King, and Lanche Zeng, “Relogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression,” Journal o f
Statistical Software 8 (2003): 138-163. Traditional logit analysis yielded substantively similar results.
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Table 13 Rare Events Logit Models Predicting the
Chances o f Defeat for Incumbent U.S. House Members
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

914**

.726#
(.417)

1.146#
(.635)

Challenger Spending
(Per Capita)

2.445***
(.461)

3.205***
(.732)

Challenger Spending Squared
(Per Capita)

-.260**
(.089)

(.108)

Independent Variables
Challenger Quality

(.300)

_ 3 5 9 ***

Democratic Incumbent in 1980

1.813*
(.782)

1.558
(1.049)

District Partisanship

-.036#
(.0 2 0 )

-.028
(.029)

.033
(.041)

D istrict Population
(in 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 s)

.023
(.170)

.130
(.185)

-.055
(.314)

Freshman

-.953#
(.493)

-1.060
(.732)

-1.725
(1.069)

Ideological Extremism

2 .1 2 1 *

.380
(1.322)

-1.045
(1.697)

Incumbent Spending
(Per Capita)

-.377
(.431)

-.765#
(.449)

Incumbent Spending Squared
(Per Capita)

.036
(.040)

.07#4
(.039)

(.825)

Incumbents in 1980

.466
(.887)

Incumbents in 1990

.803
(.661)

.617
(1.160)

.1 1 0

(.721)

-1.206
(1.178)

-2.362*
( 1 .0 1 0 )

Previous Margin of Victory

-.068***
(.014)

-.023
(.018)

-.032
(.027)

Republican Incumbent in 1970

1.414*
(.630)

Republican Incumbent in 1990

1.007
(.640)

.617
(.051)

.974
(.823)

Seniority

.085*
(.040)

.078
(.051)

.041
(.093)

Constant

-3.840***
(1.126)

-5.704***
(1.451)

-2.799#
(1.527)

Incumbents in 2000

N
859
555
1175
# p < .1 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Notes'. Estimates are rare events logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable is whether the sitting incumbent member of the U.S. House was
defeated coded 1 for members who lost and 0 otherwise.
Model 1 includes the results for the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 elections, Model 2 includes the results for the 1980, 1990,
and 2000 elections, and Model 3 includes the results for the 1990 and 2000 elections.
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Model 3 limits the analysis to 1990 and 2000 and reaffirms support for the null
hypothesis. If an incumbent representative is toppled by a challenger at the polls, the
population o f the district is an inconsequential part of this dynamic. An enlarged
constituency may cost a few extra points for the incumbent come election time, but its
magnitude in House elections is not enough to ultimately tip the balance in favor of the
challenger after traditional electoral factors are accounted for.

Conclusion

The findings presented in this chapter reinforce the validity of the results
produced in earlier studies establishing a negative linkage between constituency
population and the margin of victory incumbent politicians achieve over their
challengers.54 The chapter’s major contribution is to corroborate that this relationship
exists in elections for the U.S. House. In a pooled regression analysis of four elections
where current census estimates of district population levels were available, an increment
of 100,000 citizens cost incumbents seeking re-election to the U.S. House 1.4 points off
their margin of victory. Considering the mean House district population has climbed
from 469,087 in 1970 to 646,498 in 2000, this figure is not inconsequential. Though
incumbents have additional votes to spare in most contests for the House, this
development is one countervailing trend in modem congressional elections that
54 Hibbing and Brandes, “State Population and the Electoral Success o f U.S. Senators”; Abramowitz,
“Explaining Senate Outcomes”; Abramowitz and Segal, Senate Elections', Lee and Oppenheimer, “Senate
Apportionment”; Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate, 93-95; Carey, Niemi and Powell,
“Incumbency and the Probability o f Reelection in State Legislative Elections”; Hogan, “Challenger
Emergence, Incumbent Success and Electoral Accountability in State Legislative Elections.”
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introduce competition into the process. Still, other forces, such as residential
migration patterns where individuals choose to live in closer proximity to like-minded
partisans, creating more politically homogeneous districts; gerrymanders that protect
incumbents; the lack o f quality challengers with adequate financial resources to
compete with incumbents; and the substantial institutional advantages that members of
the House can bring to bear to enhance their reputation with their constituents to ward
off potential competitors, all overwhelm the disadvantage of running in a larger
constituency. The advantages that have accrued to incumbents in these other areas over
the time frame investigated in this chapter have superceded the costs of running in more
heavily populated districts for members of the U.S. House.
The paradox o f rising constituency population levels and less competitive House
elections can be understood with clarity when the other principal finding of this chapter
is focused upon. A more bountiful number of constituents may shave a few points off
their margins of victory but it does not raise the odds of representatives losing their
seats in Congress. This observation supports previous research demonstrating the lack
of consequence state population has for the likelihood an incumbent Senator will win
reelection.55 State constituencies have expanded yet Senate elections have become a bit
less competitive, so it is reasonable to find a congruent development for the House as
well. In answering the questions that serve as the title of this chapter, the upsurge in the
ratio of population per representative of the U.S. House may not be a blessing for
incumbents, although it is only a marginal dose of additional competition.

55 Krasno, Challengers, Competition and Reelection, 39-46; Westlye, Senate Elections and Campaign
Intensity, 153-157.
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Elections are the lifeblood o f representative democracy. The electoral
process is essential for translating citizen preferences into public policy outputs.
Incumbents forced to wage a competitive battle to retain their office may be more
highly motivated to respect the wishes of their constituents than if they confront a
certain path to victory.56 Therefore, advocates of more competitive elections as crucial
in improving responsiveness to the public can find something positive in maintaining
the 435-seat limit for the U.S. House. Had district populations not expanded as they
have, House elections may be even more devoid of competition than they already are.
Districts would be smaller and could encompass less heterogeneous political territory.
Safe Democratic bastions like San Francisco, New York City, and Chicago would send
additional members to the House, as would staunch Republican areas such as suburban
Houston and other conservative areas of the country, not exactly the outcome the critics
of uncompetitive congressional elections would find appealing. In spite of its
propensity to reduce victory margins, for the impact of district population levels to be
felt to an extent that would severely hamper the re-election chances of incumbent
members of the U.S. House, the magnitude of growth in constituency size must
continue for decades to come.

56 Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” American Political
Science Review 57 (1963): 45-56, although a number o f studies raise serious questions about whether
competitive elections actually lead legislators to be more responsive to the median voter. See: Morris P
Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Call and Constituencies (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1974); James H.
Kuklinski, “District Competitiveness and Legislative Roll-Call Behavior: A Reassessment o f the
Marginality Hypothesis, ” American Journal o f Political Science 21 (1977): 627-638; Girish Gulatti,
“Revisiting the Link Between Electoral Competition and Policy Extremism in the U.S. Congress,”
American Politics Research 32 (2004): 495-530.
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CHAPTER 5
OUT OF REACH, OUT OF TOUCH OR STILL CONNECTED?

Introduction

The mantra from critics of the rise in the mean House district population size is
that it leads to a less intimate relationship between the representative and the
constituent.1 Beginning with the Anti-Federalists, the argument has been that it creates
a situation where members are more likely to lose touch with people in their district.
According to one former House member, “If we keep adding tens of thousands of
constituents to an individual Member of Congress.... through no fault of his own a
Member would become unavailable and inaccessible, which is just the reverse of what
the Founding Fathers envisioned when they drafted our Constitution.”2 As detailed in
Chapter 3, comparative legislative scholars insist that the current ratio of population per
representative creates an overly burdensome number of communication channels that

1 One observer complained after the 1990 census that “a member cannot be close to, much less adequately
represent, 572,000 people.” See Christopher St. John Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve
Outgrown? An Argument for Increasing the Size o f the House o f Representatives,” Columbia Journal o f
Law and Social Problems 25: (1992): 179.
2 Testimony o f Rep. Frank Chelf: U.S. House, Subcommittee No. 3 of The House Committee on the
Judiciary, Increasing the Membership o f the House o f Representatives and Redistricting Congressional
Districts: Hearings on H R. 841, 1178, 1183, 1998, 2531, 2704, 2718, 2739, 2768, 2700, 2783, 3012,
3176, 3414, 3725, 3804, 3890,4068, 4609, 6431, 7355, 8075, 848, 8616 and HJRes. 419 Before, 87th
Congress, 1st Session 44 August 24 and 30, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1964), 34.
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interferes with the average House member’s ability to interact with his/her
constituents.3 Some have gone as far as to propose boosting the number of seats in the
U.S. House to 650 to mitigate these effects.4 Yet in spite of these claims, there has yet
to be empirical substantiation that the increase in constituency population size has
interfered with the representational linkage in the U.S. House of Representatives.5
The objective of this chapter is to investigate whether variance in House district
population levels carries any ramifications for the quality of representation the populace
receives from its national legislators. Relying on survey data from the American
National Election Study (ANES) and the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES),
this chapter employs a series of multivariate models testing whether citizen contact with
House members, perceptions of how helpful and how well the House member stays in
touch with the district, and overall job approval are negative functions of constituency
population size. Answering these questions will lend empirical clarity to the normative
debate over the wisdom of increasing the size of the House to offset population growth.
Confirmation of a negative relationship extends support to the idea that a more
representative House requires taking action to prevent the average number of persons in
each congressional district from continuing its upward spiral.

3 Rein Taagepera and Mathew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants o f
Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
4 Arend Lijphart, “Reforming the House: Three Moderately Radical Proposals,” in The US House o f
Representatives: Reform or Rebuild, eds. Joseph Zimmerman and Wilma Rule (Westport, CT: Praeger
Publishing 2000): 135-140.
5 Peverill Squire and Keith Hamm, 101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures and the Future o f
Legislative Studies (Columbus, OH: The Ohio University Press, 2005): 55-58.
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Constituency Population Size and its Relationship to Contact and Approval

Empirical inquiry into the relationship between constituency population size and
contact with legislators has concentrated on the U.S. Senate and state legislatures. For
the U.S. Senate there has been consistent validation of the proposition that citizens in
larger states are less likely to report having contact with their senator than their
counterparts in smaller states.6 Based on data compiled from the ANES Senate study a
number of works have shown that a higher state population level serves as a barrier for
access to senators. Not only do citizens have less frequent contact with their incumbent
senator in the most populous states, this research also verifies that they are less likely to
initiate contact as well. The connection with perceptions of helpfulness is equivocal,
•y

with some studies reporting that large-state senators are viewed as less helpful while
others find no link at all.

Q

At the state legislative level the evidence also reveals a similar dynamic
regarding contact. One survey of respondents in seven states found that district
constituency size reduced the probability that a citizen had contact with a state
legislator. The effect was even more significant than the degree of professionalism of

6 John R. Hibbing and John R. Alford, “Constituency Population and Representation in the U.S. Senate,”
L e g isla tiv e S tu d ie s Q u a rterly 15 (1990): 581-598; Jonathan Krasno, Challengers, Competition and

Reelection: Comparing Senate and House Elections (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994);
Frances Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences o f Equal
Representation (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1999).
7 Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate, 64-65.
8 Hibbing and Alford, “Constituency Population and Representation in the U.S. Senate,” 585; Krasno,
Challengers, Competition and Reelection, 50-51.
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the state legislature.9 Even though legislators representing more citizens have a
difficult task in remaining accessible, they do not report devoting extra time to this
activity. A 1995 survey of state legislators failed to establish any significant connection
between district constituency population size and time spent keeping in touch with the
citizenry.10 In 2002 a replication of this state legislative questionnaire produced a
similar nonfinding.11
The causal connection between constituency population level and approval
ratings for politicians is not as conclusive. Generally, U.S. House members, who on
average represent fewer constituents than U.S. Senators, tend to receive higher job
approval ratings.12 Both Krasno’s and Hibbing and Alford’s examinations of the ANES
Senate election study came up with a null finding on whether the magnitude of a state’s
population and senate approval ratings were related.13 Contrary to this earlier research,
Lee and Oppenheimer employing an extended analysis of data from the 1988-1992
ANES Senate study, estimate that senators from California receive a job approval rating
20 points lower than their colleagues in the least populated states.14 An alternative

9 Peverill Squire, “Professionalization and Public Opinion o f State Legislatures,” Journal o f Politics 55
(1993): 479-491.
10 John M. Carey, Richard Niemi, and Lynda Powell, Term Limits in the State Legislatures (Ann Arbor,
MI: University o f Michigan Press, 2000), 53.
11 John M. Carey, Richard Niemi, Lynda Powell, and Gary F. Moncrief, “The Effects o f Term Limits on
State Legislatures: A N ew Survey o f the 50 States,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 31 (2006): 105-134.
12 Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics o f Congressional Elections, 6th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2004).
13 Hibbing and Alford, “Constituency Population and Representation in the U.S. Senate”; Krasno,
Challengers, Competition and Reelection.
14 Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate, 64; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, “The Effect o f State
Population on Senator-Constituency Linkages,” American Journal o f Political Science 40 (1996): 12801299.
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approach using polls from the Mason-Dixon Company also indicated senatorial
approval is a negative function of population size after controlling for other variables.15
At the state legislative level, district constituency population has little discernible
relationship to the job performance of the legislature as an institution.16 State
population has not been a consistent predictor of gubernatorial popularity, having
varying effects depending on the model specification used in particular studies.17
However, little work has been undertaken to determine whether constituency
size matters for House members’ approval ratings or contact with constituents.18 It is
logical to presume that a similar pattern exists in the House, but it still must be
empirically borne out. The magnitude o f population variance for House districts differs
markedly from both state legislative districts across the country and at the state level.
The nature and requirements of the job responsibilities do not mirror those of U.S.
senators or state legislators. Therefore, asserting that the nature and strength of the
relationship uncovered in the research on these other institutions is automatically the
same for the House is conjecture. To get a full understanding o f the implications of
constituency size for representation in the U.S. House it is critical to rely on survey data
that elicits attitudes toward members of this institution.

15 Sarah Binder, Forrest Maltzman and Lee Siegelman, “Accounting for Senators’ Home-State
Reputations: Why Do Constituents Love a Bill Cohen So Much More Than an A1 D ’Amato,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 23 (1998): 545-560.
16 Squire, “Professionalization and Public Opinion o f State Legislatures.”
17 Jeffrey E. Cohen and James D. King, “Relative Unemployment and Gubernatorial Popularity,” Journal
o f Politics 66 (2004): 1267-1282; James D. King and Jeffrey E. Cohen, “What Determines a Governor’s
Popularity,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 5 (2005): 225-247.
18 Squire and Hamm, 101 Chambers, 55-58.
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Models Testing the Relationship Between District Population and Contact and
Approval

Evaluating the interaction of district population levels, contact and approval runs
into the reality that precise estimates of population are only available once a decade.
Notwithstanding this limitation, the relationship can be tested relying on a series of
questions about members of the House the ANES asked respondents in 1980, 1990 and
2000. Pooling the data from these surveys can help to determine whether constituency
population size has any influence on access to or perceptions of House incumbents. As
was the case in previous chapters district population estimates are taken from the U.S.
Census Bureau measured in 100,000s.
To assess citizen-representative contact, this chapter will rely on responses from
two ANES questions. The first investigates the link during the context of the campaign
asking respondents whether they have had any contact with candidates for the U.S.
House including actually meeting the candidate, attendance at a meeting with a
candidate, contact with a staff member, received a mailing from the candidate, read
about the candidate in the newspaper, heard the candidate on the radio, or saw the
candidate on television. The second question asks whether citizens initiate contact with
their House member. It asks, Have you or anyone in your household ever contacted the
representative or anyone in his/her office? While about 70% of respondents said they
had some form of contact with their representative in the years this question was asked,
less than a third actually reported being inspired enough to contact their representative
of their own volition. Including both questions in the analysis can parse out whether the
population size of the House district interferes with vertical communication between the
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citizen and the legislator both in cases when the member provided the stimulus for
contact and when the constituent decided to make the effort. Unfortunately, the NES did
not include these survey items in 2000, so the analysis in this chapter is confined to
responses in the 1980 and 1990 surveys.
There are four questions used to tap attitudes toward House members: (1) If you
had a problem that your current representative could do something about, do you think
he/she would be very helpful, somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or does it depend? (2)
How good of a job would you say your representative does of keeping in touch with the
people in your district; very good, fairly good, fairly poor, or poor? (3) In general, do
you strongly approve, approve not strongly, disapprove not strongly, or disapprove
strongly of the way your representative has been handling his/her job? (4) Using the
feeling thermometer, how would you rate your current representative?
Collectively, these questions gauge to what extent an enlarged House district
population impacts how representatives are perceived by the people they serve. There
may be more contact with citizens in less populated districts but it does not necessarily
follow that House members are evaluated any more favorably because of it. The
approval and feeling thermometer questions were asked in each of the three elections
under study. The question dealing with helpfulness was only asked in 1980 and 1990;
the item probing whether the incumbent House member stays in touch was included as a
part of the 1990 and 2000 studies.
A variety of other factors have been shown to predict variance in attitudes
toward members of Congress and several of these variables are controlled for to rule out
spuriousness. Scholars have repeatedly demonstrated that partisanship is a primary
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determinant of political behavior.19 One would expect that individuals will be more
likely to have contact with and approve of their member of Congress if they share the
same party affiliation. In this chapter, shared partisanship is coded 1 for respondents
who profess the same party identification as their representative and 0 otherwise.
Descriptive representation can also influence political efficacy and support for
one’s representative.20 Constituents who share demographic characteristics with their
legislator may feel more connected to and express a greater level of support for them.
Two central components of descriptive representation well documented by the political
science literature are race and gender. When there is racial incongruity between a
citizen and his/her member of Congress there tends to be a reduced likelihood that
individuals will express higher levels of support and trust for and attempt to contact his
or her representative in government.

'y i

To account for racial identity, respondents who

share the same race as their representative are coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. Gender has
also been shown to play a more mixed role in the likelihood of citizen contact with and
level of approval toward House incumbents. The sex of the candidate alone does not
have a significant effect on whether constituents have contact with a member of

19 Angus Campbell, Phillip W. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist and Eric Schickler, Partisan
Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities o f Voters, (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2002).
20 Jane Mansbridge, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent
Yes,” Journal o f Politics 61 (1999): 628-657.
21 Claudine Gay, “Spirals o f Trust? The Effect o f Descriptive Representation on the Relationship
Between Citizens and Their Government,” American Journal o f Political Science 46 (2002): 717-732;
Janet M. Box-Stefensmeier, David C. Kimball, Scott R. Meinke and Katherine Tate, “The Effects o f
Political Representation on the Electoral Advantages o f House Incumbents,” Political Research
Quarterly 56 (2003):259-270; Katherine Tate, Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their
Representatives in the U.S. Congress (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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However, there is evidence that sex congruence may positively impact

the evaluations and vote choice for incumbents.23 To control for sex effects on the
dependent variables used in this chapter, a dummy variable is created coded 1 for
persons represented by someone of the same sex and 0 otherwise.
Certain characteristics of the respondent’s House member could cause variation
in the accessibility and approval measures. Fenno distinguishes members of Congress
based on the expansionist and protectionist stages of their careers.24 In the former, they
must work harder to cultivate support in the district before they can began to start
investing more time pursuing policy objectives and power within the institution. When
the representative’s career in Washington, D.C., advances such as when he/she assumes
a party or committee leadership position, there is inevitably less time available for the
member to devote to meeting with constituents back home. This development may
reinforce perceptions that a representative has lost touch with the district. On the other
hand, a longer tenure in Congress increases visibility and voter familiarity within the
district.25 Multiple independent variables are incorporated in this analysis to represent
the impact of institutional status. Separate dummy variables are created coded 1 for
respondents represented by a standing committee chair or ranking member and

22 Robert Darcy, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark, Women, Elections, and Representation, 2nd ed. (Lincoln,
NE: University o f Nebraska Press, 1994): 84-85.
23 Box-Stefensmeier, Kimball, Meinke, and Tate, “The Effects o f Political Representation on the
Electoral Advantages o f House Incumbents”; Jennifer L. Lawless, “Politics o f Presence? Congresswomen
and Symbolic Representation,” Political Research Quarterly 57 (2004): 81-99.
24 Richard Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1978).
25 John R. Hibbing, Congressional Careers: Contours o f Life in the U.S. House o f Representatives
(Chapel Hill, NC: University o f North Carolina Press), Chapter 5.
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respondents represented by elected party leaders in the House and 0 otherwise.
Seniority is measured by the number of terms served by the respondent’s
member of the House. A dummy variable indicating freshman status is introduced since
first-year members are particularly mindful of the need to spend time working to
acquire support in their district because they are not as well known as more senior
colleagues. Campaign spending cuts in many ways as it may increase awareness of an
incumbent’s activities, but the most endangered incumbents are also forced to spend the
most money. To control for spending effects, inflation-adjusted spending is included in
this analysis coded in 100,000s.
Finally, several demographic variables are likely to shape whether citizens have
contact with their representative, especially if it is initiated by the citizen. Age,
education and income are strong correlates of political participation and efficacy.26
Higher levels of interest in politics also predict the willingness of citizens to engage in
the political process.27 This variable is measured in this chapter through the ANES
question asking respondents how closely they followed the campaign. All of these
variables are included in the models exploring constituent-representative contact,
perceptions of whether the incumbent stays in touch and is helpful. When modeling
approval, respondents’ attitudes toward the U.S. Congress as an institution may color
how they feel about their own member o f the House, even if these two variables are

26 Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in
American Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
27 Box- Stefensmeier, Kimball, Meinke and Tate, “The Effects o f Political Representation on the
Electoral Advantages o f House Incumbents,” 263.
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only modestly related.

Thus, strength of approval toward Congress is entered into

the various models estimating approval as well.
Based on the prior research conducted on the impact of constituency population
size, several hypotheses ought to be confirmed in this chapter even after these
multivariate controls are introduced. (1) As district population increases citizens will be
less likely to report having contact with their House member. (2) As district population
increases citizens are less likely to initiate contact with their House member. (3) As
district population increases citizens will be more likely to believe their House member
does not do an adequate job o f staying in touch with the district. (4) As district
population increases it will be less likely that citizens will perceive their House member
as able to assist them if they need help with a problem. (5) As district population
increases the probability of citizens expressing disapproval o f their representative will
increase. (6) As district population increases citizens will give less favorable
evaluations of their representative.

Congressional Contact with Constituents

Table 14 displays the results of a logit model estimating the effect of district
population on constituents’ contact with their incumbent U.S. House member running
for re-election in 1980 and 1990. It shows that, consistent with prior research,
constituency population size is negatively related to citizen interaction with the

28 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995); Robert H. Durr, John Gilmour and Christina Wolbrecht, “Explaining
Congressional Approval,” American Journal o f Political Science 41 (1997): 175-207.
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incumbent. The coefficient is in the expected direction and is statistically
significant (p < .012). Older, more highly educated, wealthier, and politically
interested citizens are also more likely to report having had contact with their
representative. The same is true for citizens who share the same race and party
affiliation as their House member, but not so for sex. Focusing on the membership
characteristic variables discloses that citizens represented by elected party leaders are
less likely to have had contact. While respondents represented by committee chairs,
and ranking members, and members who spent additional campaign funds experienced
at greater likelihood of contact, though each o f the coefficients is only significant at the
.10 level.
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Table 14 Logistic Regression M odel of Constituent
Contact with Incumbent House M ember
Independent Variable
Coefficient
District Population
(in 100,000s)

Robust S.E.

-.143*

.057

Age

.015***

.003

Education

083***

.021

Income

.026**

.009

Political Interest

.515***

.073

Same Sex

.096

.100

Same Party

.307**

.104

Same Race

409***

.122

Committee Leader

.517#

.276

Freshman

.010

.174

Incumbent’s Previous Vote Share

-.003

.004

Incumbent’s Spending
(in 100,000s)

.050#

.027

Party Leader

-1.076#

.609

Seniority

.031

.020

Constant

-1.384**

.526

Pseudo R2

0.0758

Log-likelihood

-1305.451

N

2738

Respondent Characteristics

M ember Characteristics

# p < .1 * p < .0 5 ** p < .01 * * * p < .001

Notes'. Dependent variable is whether respondents had contact with their
incumbent member of the U.S. House coded 1 for yes and 0 for no.
Data are from the 1980 and 1990 American National Election Studies.
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In order to evaluate the substantive impact of district population across the
range of values in this sample, predicted probabilities of respondents’ contact with their
House members were calculated holding all the other independent variables in the
model at their appropriate means, medians and modes.29 Figure 5 plots these
probabilities graphically. For an individual living in a district comprised of
approximately 350,000 citizens, the minimum value in the sample has a predicted
probability of about .83 for some form of contact. The predicted probability at the
maximum constituency size, about 880,000, is .69, a difference of 14 percentage points.
This effect is higher than the differential for racial and party congruence, about 7 and 5
percentage points respectively. In other words, the difference between a citizen having
contact with the incumbent House member in the most heavily and least heavily
populated congressional districts is greater than the difference between a citizen
represented by a member of the same race versus the opposite race and someone of the
same party versus the opposite party.

29 This approach is utilized for all o f the predicted probabilities cited in this chapter. Probabilities
calculated using CLARIFY. See Gary King, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg, “Making the Most o f
Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation,” American Journal o f Political Science
44 (2000): 347-361.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

It is striking to find that variance in district population magnitude influences
the chance of contact on a level comparable to these variables so integral to
representation. This finding extends support to critics of the escalation in the size of
House district populations who charge this development will weaken the connection
between citizen and representative. Moreover, it is consistent with studies showing
citizens in the least populous states have a greater likelihood of reporting some form of
contact with their U.S. senator.
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Figure 5 Probability o f Contact with Incumbent House M ember by Level of District Population

30 Hibbing and Alford, “Constituency Population and Representation in the U.S. Senate”; Krasno,
Challengers, Competition and Reelection; Oppenheimer, “The Effect o f State Population on SenatorConstituency Linkages”; Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate.
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The previous section operationalized the dependent variable as whether the
citizens had any form of contact with their representative. Table 15 breaks down which
forms of contact are most affected by constituency size expanding. All of the
coefficients for district population in these models are negative. However, they are not
significant at the .10 level for the dependent variables predicting meeting a staff
member, attending a meeting with the incumbent, or receiving mail. Far and away the
strength o f the relationship is most pronounced for whether an incumbent has personally
met his/her member o f the U.S. House (p < .002). Logic would dictate that as the scale
of district population increases the chance that an incumbent would get to meet a
constituent in the district is lessened.31 This hypothesis is borne out from the results
exhibited in Table 15.

31 Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1973), 87.
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Table 15 Logistic Regression Model Predicting Various
Forms o f Contact with Incumbent House M ember
Independent
Variable

Met in
Person

Attended
Meeting

Talked
to Staff

Received
Mail

D istrict Population

-.240**
(.078)

-.066
(.080)

-.143
(.090)

(.004)

.0 1 2 **
(.004)

.009#

Saw on
T.V.

Read
About

Heard on
Radio

-.065
(.059)

-.131*
(.057)

-.092#
(.056)

.007
(.004)

.0 2 0 ***
(.003)

.0 1 1 ***
(.003)

-.003
(.003)

-.005#
(.003)

. 1 1 0 ***

.124***

.091***

.135***

.0 2 1

(-.059)**

(.024)

(.027)

(.030)

(.0 2 0 )

.0 2 0

(.019)

(.019)

.009
(.0 1 2 )

.0 1 0

.0 0 1

(.013)

(.014)

.033***
(.009)

.0 2 2 **
(.009)

-.015#
(.009)

-.033***
(.009)

Political Interest

.609***
(.096)

.546***
(.0 1 0 )

.6 8 6 ***
(.116)

.250***
(.069)

.264***
(.066)

.228***
(.067)

.173**
.064

Same Sex

.215#
(.123)

.343**
(.130)

.337*
(.147)

-.282**
(.097)

.124
(.094)

.272**
(.094)

.207*
.091

Same Party

.217#
(. 1 2 1 )

.496***
(.129)

.409**
(.149)

.145
(.098)

.082
(.095)

.2 2 0 *
(.094)

.104
(.092)

Same Race

.327#
(.186)

355#
(.193)

.654**
(.252)

.487***
(.128)

.2 1 0

(.129)

.135

-.256*
(130)

.640*
(.255)

-.0265
(.272)

.449
(.275)

.153
(.203)

.418#
(.226)

.639**
(.204)

(.214)

Freshman

-.642**
(.223)

-.335
(.243)

-.676*
(.281)

-.436**
.167

.086
(.162)

-.049
(.162)

-.070
(.158)

Incumbent’s Previous
Vote Share

.005
(.004)

.004
(.005)

.004
(.005)

- .0 1 2

(.003)

.0 1 0 **
(.003)

-.003
.003

.0 1 0 **
(.003)

Incumbent’s Spending
(in 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 s)

.0 1 0

(.033)

-.056
(.037)

-.050
(.041)

-.053*
(.025)

.041
(.026)

.029
.024

j 2 9 ***
(.026)

.631
(.695)

.740
(.853)

' .292
(1.227)

2 .1 1 2 #

.935
(.770)

1.080
.681

1.154
1.044

-.037#
(.0 2 1 )

.032
(.0 2 1 )

.013
(.023)

- .0 1 0

-.0 0 0

(.017)

(.017)

.006
.017

-.009
.016

Constant

-3.751***
(.682)

-5.722***
(.728)

-5.899***
(.851)

-1 .1 0 1 *
(.539)

-3.226***
(.527)

-.925#
(.508)

1.127*
(.509)

Pseudo R 2

.064

.072

.0823

.067

0.060

.019

.031

Log-likelihood

-898.29

-819.57

-667.74

-1285.12

-1354.80

-1347.25

-1413.94

2159

2159

2159

2159

(in

1 0 0 ,0 0 0

s)

-.115*
(.056)

Respondent
Characteristics

Age

Education

Income

0

j 5 ***

494

***

M em ber
Characteristics

Committee Leader

Party Leader

Seniority

N
2159
2159
2159
#p < .1 * p < .05 ** p< .01 *** p < .001
Note'. Data are from the 1980 and 1990 American National Election Studies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 6 shows that a citizen in the smallest district in the sample has a
predicted probability of about .19 of meeting his or her representative. This probability
dips to about .06 in the most populous district in the sample. The fact that the number of
citizens claiming to have personally met their House member is probably inflated
mandates some perspective when evaluating this finding. Yet, it does illustrate to some
extent that district population size does lessen the ability of legislators to interact on a
one-to-one basis with their constituents. Representatives’ time and energy are limited
and they cannot avail themselves to all who wish to meet them. Having to serve
thousands more constituents may create an impression in the district that officeholders
are not as accessible as they should be, even if they are as dedicated as someone who
serves a less populated district.
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1 0.12
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Figure 6 Probability of a Constituent Personally M eeting with Incumbent House M ember by Level
o f District Population
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Citizens’ Attempts to Contact Their Incumbent House Member

The previous results examined contact initiated by the representative, not by the
constituent. The logit model presented in Table 16 explores whether citizens’ effort to
contact their representatives is a negative function of district population size. After
controlling for other variables, Table 16 indicates that it does. The coefficient for
district population is negatively signed and statistically significant (p < .015). Not only
do citizens claim to have contact less often in heavily populated House districts, they
seem to try to make an overt effort to do so less frequently as well. O f the remaining
variables in the model, age, income, education, and political interest are all positively
related to respondents initiating contact. Racial and partisan congruence are significant
positive predictors as well, though the coefficient for the latter is only significant at the
more generous .10 level. The incumbent’s length of tenure raises the likelihood of
contacting behavior.
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Table 16 Logistic Regression Model of Constituents Who
Attempt to Contact their Incumbent House M ember
Independent Variable
Coefficient
District Population
(in 100,000s)

Robust S.E.

-.163*

.067

Age

0 ii* * *

.003

Education

.071**

.024

Income

.024*

.011

Political Interest

.570***

.084

Same' Sex

.002

.115

Same Party

.189#

.115

Same Race

.439*

.175

Committee Leader

-.001

.243

Freshman

-.470*

.213

Party Leader

.448

.631

Seniority

.063***

.018

Constant

-4.578

.585

Pseudo R2

0.0697

Log-likelihood

-1070.885

N

2795

Respondent Characteristics

Member Characteristics

# p < .l * p < .05 * *< .01 *** p < .001
Notes: Dependent variable is whether respondents attempted to contact their
incumbent House member, coded 1 for yes and 0 for no.
Data are from the 1980 and 1990 American National Election Studies.
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Shifting to the substantive effects of variation in district population, Figure 7
plots the probability of contact across the range of the sample. Ceteris paribus, a
respondent in the least populated district, 350,000 citizens, would have a predicted
probability of .16 versus .08 at the maximum value of 880,000 citizens. Once again this
differential is larger than for a member who happens to be of the same race as his/her
constituent (.12) and someone who is not (.08). While the impact of district population
is substantial it is not a par with seniority. Respondents with a one-term incumbent
have a predicted probability of about .07 of attempting to contact their representative.
Individuals living in the district of a member with the maximum level of seniority in the
sample (18 terms) have an estimated probability of about .26. This differential indicates
that the length of House service of a citizen’s representative matters more than the
magnitude of the population in the district. Notwithstanding this finding, constituency
population size does meaningfully influence the likelihood of an individual taking the
step to reach out to a member of the House. In tandem with the results from the
previous model, the evidence put forward here supplies confirmation that expanding
district populations lessen the channels of communication between representative and
constituent. Citizens in less populated districts are more likely to have had some access
to and sense that their House member is more accessible, as is the case for the U.S.
Senate.32

32 Hibbing and Alford, “Constituency Population and Representation in the U.S. Senate”; Krasno,
Challengers, Competition and Reelection\ Oppenheimer, “The Effect o f State Population on SenatorConstituency Linkages”; Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate.
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Figure 7 Probability of Constituents Attempting to Contact Incumbent House M em ber by Level of
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Perceptions o f How Well House Members Stay in Touch

The data just presented demonstrate how the variability of constituency
population can have an effect on the amount of contact between citizens and their
members o f Congress. Merely because this evidence suggests less contact as the
population in the district rises, it does not automatically follow that this dynamic will
translate into how the member will be perceived by the constituents on other aspects of
job performance. Citizens express a clear preference that their members of Congress
avoid concentrating too much on happenings in Washington and remain connected to

the people in their district.33 In 1990 and 2000 the ANES asked respondents how well
they felt their member of the House stays in touch?

33 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy, 64-66.
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Table 17 includes the results of an ordered probit model testing the extent to
which constituency population size influences perceptions of the incumbent’s ability to
remain in touch with the people of the district. As was the case in the previous results
the coefficient is in the negative direction and highly significant (p < .001). As
predicted by the Anti-Federalists and other critics of a larger House constituency size,
there is a verifiably negative relationship between these two variables. Citizens in less
populated districts feel their members of the House do a superior job of staying in touch
with their constituents. This variable is not the only significant predictor of the “in
touch” rating as age, approval of Congress, political interest, shared partisanship, and
racial identity lead to more favorable perceptions on this measure. Citizens represented
by committee chairs, ranking members, and incumbents winning with a higher
percentage o f the vote in the last election tend to feel their House members are more
effective at staying in touch.
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Table 17 Ordered Probit Model o f How Well Incumbent
House M ember Stays in Touch_______ ________________
Independent Variable
Coefficient

Robust S.E.

-.182***

.030

Age

017***

.002

Approval o f Congress

.125***

.026

Education

-.006

.010

Income

.001

.005

Political Interest

.167***

.038

Same Sex

-.112*

.051

District Population
(in 100,000s)
Respondent Characteristics

Same Party
Same Race

181***

.053

.170**

.067

Committee Leader

.218#

.128

Freshman

-.030

.090

Incumbent’s Previous Vote Share

.004#

.002

Incumbent Spending (in 100,000s)

-.006

.006

Party Leader

.299

.234

Seniority

.001

.009

Threshold 1

-.728

.288

Threshold 2

-.099

.286

Threshold 3

1.357

.287

L o g-lik elih o o d

-2194.351

Pseudo R2

0.0561

M ember Characteristics

1926
#p < . 1 * p < .05 ** < .01 *** p < .001
Notes'. Dependent variable is how good of a job individual respondent feel
the incumbent House member does keeping in touch with people in the
district coded: 4 = Very Good, 3 = Fairly Good, 2 = Fairly Poor, 1 = Poor.
Data are from the 1990 and 2000 American National Election Studies.
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However, district population withstands these other controls and has a
powerful substantive effect as evidenced by the predicted probabilities portrayed in
Figure 8. At the maximum level of district population, 1.06 million in this sample, the
probability of a respondent giving the incumbent a rating of very good is .05 versus .31
at the minimum level of district population, about 395,000. The probabilities are almost
a mirror in the opposite direction for respondents who describe their member as doing a
poor job. There is a .06 predicted probability in the largest House district and a .33 in
the least populated district. This 27 percentage point differential for the likelihood of
believing a representative does a poor job staying in touch is startling in its own right.
That it exceeds the 4 and 3 percentage point differentials for the racial and party
congruence variables, respectively, is also noteworthy. These data further corroborate
the claims of scholars who maintain that failing to adjust legislative size to account for
population growth undermines representation.
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Perceptions of House Members’ Helpfulness

One of the key components in evaluating a legislator’s responsiveness is how
well that individual performs in the role of providing service to constituents, also
referred to a service representation.34 People expect their representatives to provide
assistance if they need help dealing with issues like a delayed Social Security check or a
matter of local importance. In 1980 and 1990 the ANES asked respondents how helpful
would their member o f the House be if contacted about some problem. Table 18
presents the results of an ordered probit model estimating the relationship between
perceptions of a House member’s helpfulness and the magnitude of district population.
To repeat a familiar refrain in this chapter, the coefficient for district population is
negative and achieves statistical significance (p < .002). As constituency population
increases, the likelihood the respondent’s representative will be perceived as very
helpful declines. One can conclude from this finding that it is a challenge to provide
service representation as the numerical size of the district rises. Further it supports the
qualitative assertions of House enlargement advocates who argue that increased staff
and perquisites alone are insufficient to prevent a diminution in the quality of
constituency service from the perspective of the citizenry.

34 Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps, “The Puzzle o f Representation: Specifying Components of
Responsiveness,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 2 (1977): 233-255.
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Table 18 Ordered Probit Model o f Constituent Perception
of Incumbent House M em ber’s Helpfulness______________
Independent Variable
Coefficient
Robust S.E.
District Population
(in 100,000s)

-.099**

.031

.014***

.002

Respondent Characteristics
Age

.026

Approval o f Congress
Education

.009

.011

Income

-.003

.005

Political Interest

.224***

.038

Same Sex

-.039

.050

Same Party

224***

.051

Same Race

.084

.069

Committee Leader

.282

.122

Freshman

-.042

.085

Incumbent’s Previous Vote Share

.001

.002

Incumbent Spending (in 100,000s)

-.009

.013

Party Leader

.696*

.350

Seniority

-.004

.009

Threshold 1

-.034

.298

Threshold 2

.067

.298

Threshold 3

1.606

.299

L og-lik elih ood

-2093.317

Pseudo R2

0.051

N

2058

Member Characteristics

* p < .05 ** < .01 *** p < .001
Notes'. Dependent variable is the individual respondent’s perception o f how helpful the
incumbent House member would be, coded 4 = Very Helpful, 3 = Somewhat Helpful, 2 =
Depends, 1 = Not Very Helpful.
Data are from the 1980 and 1990 American National Election Studies.
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Figure 9 shows that although the substantive effects of district population on
perceptions of helpfulness are not as dramatic as for the in touch rating, it is far from
insubstantial. A respondent in the least populated district has a .22 predicted probability
of calling his/her member very helpful. In contrast, at the maximum level it drops to
.10. For the not very helpful category, the probability ranges from .36 for a respondent
in a district of 880,000 people compared to .19 for someone in the minimum district
population level of 350,000. Once again, this effect is greater than the corresponding
differential for party congruence between the representative and the respondent, which
is about a 6-point gap for both the very helpful and for the not very helpful categories,
an additional sliver of empirical evidence lending credence to the idea that allowing the
mean population size o f Flouse district to rise is detrimental to representation.

600,000
District Population

Very Helpful

Somewhat Helpful

Not Very Helpful

|

Figure 9 Probability of Constituents Describing Incumbent House M ember as Helpful by Level o f
District Population
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Approval of House Members

Citizens residing in House districts that encompass a wider sphere of population
have less contact with their representatives, view them as less helpful and are more
likely to see them as out of touch. The next question investigated in this chapter is
whether constituency population size carries any ramifications for the incumbent’s
overall approval. Table 19 provides the results of the model testing the strength of
respondent approval as a function of district population with the appropriate
multivariate controls. It offers confirmation for the hypothesis that House members
representing more populated districts receive lower marks for their overall job
performance. The significance level (p < .032) for the coefficient meets the
conventional level required for rejecting the null hypothesis, although other factors such
as similar partisanship and overall approval of Congress as an institution are more
highly significant predictors. Yet, it does have a greater impact than variables such as
seniority and committee status, according to this analysis.
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Table 19 Ordered Probit M odel of Incumbent
House M em ber’s Job Approval______________
Independent Variable
Coefficient
District Population
(in 100,000s)

Robust S.E.

-.054*

.025

Approval o f Congress

.182***

.022

Same Sex

-.095*

.043

Same Party

.521**

.044

Same Race

.154**

.058

Committee Leader

.147

.113

Freshman

.006

.072

Incumbent Spending
(in 100,000s)

-.007

.005

Party Leader

-.123

.250

Seniority

.002

.008

Threshold 1

-1.235

.172

Threshold 2

-.7563

-.756

Threshold 3

.524

.171

Log-likelihood

-3002.655

Pseudo R2

0.0396

N

2847

Respondent Characteristics

M ember Characteristics

* p < .05 ** < .01 *** p < .001
Notes: Dependent variable is the respondent’s job approval rating for the
incumbent House member, coded 4 = Strongly Approve, 3 = Approve Not
Strongly, 2 = Disapprove Not Strongly, 1 = Disapprove Strongly.
Data are from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 American National Election Studies.
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Turning to Figure 10, the relationship for the four categories of approval
across the span o f district population levels is reported. At the minimum population
value in the sample of 350,000 there is a .41 predicted probability that a respondent will
strongly approve o f his/her representative. At the high end of the range, 1.06 million,
that value declines to .27. For the not strongly disapprove and strongly disapprove
categories, the minimum-maximum differential is 5 and 7 points, respectively. A
respondent who shares the party affiliation of his/her House member has a .57 predicted
probability of expressing strong approval compared to a .36 probability for someone
who does not. These numbers show that constituency population size does not rival
party affiliation in its impact on approval; however, it does reduce the likelihood that
someone will strongly approve of the job the representative is doing.

0 .45

0.4
.35
3

8 0.25
0 2
0.15

0.05

3 5 1 ,997 (Min)

400 ,0 0 0

5 0 0 ,0 0 0

6 0 0 ,0 0 0

7 0 0 ,0 0 0

800 ,0 0 0

9 0 0 ,0 0 0

1,000,000

1,062,153
(M ax)

D istrict P op u lation
S trongly A pprove

Q ...A pprove Not Strongly

—
M
r

D isapprove Not Strongly

w- D isapprove S trongly

j

Figure 10 Probability of Strength of Constituent Approval Toward Incumbent House M em ber by
Level o f District Population
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Table 20 bolsters this conclusion even further. In this analysis an OLS
regression model is employed where the dependent variable is the feeling thermometer
measure of how favorable constituents feel toward their member of the House on a scale
from 0-100. Inspecting the results in Table 20 reveals that for every additional 100,000
constituents in the House district the feeling thermometer rating declines 1.6 points,
holding the other variables in the model constant. Put another way, an upward shift of
about 710,000 citizens, the population range in this sample, would find respondents
rating their member o f the House 11.2 points lower on this scale. It appears that having
to contend with representing more persons in the House district causes members to be
evaluated less warmly than would otherwise be the case. Citizens residing in heavily
populated congressional districts feel perceptibly less favorable toward their incumbent
House member.
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Table 20 Regression Model o f Constituent Feeling
Thermometer Ratings of Incumbent House M embers
Coefficient
Independent Variable
District Population
(in 100,000s)

Robust S.E.

-1.635***

.471

Approval o f Congress

2.613***

.380

Same Sex

-1.066

-1.066

Same Party

10.500***

.762

Same Race

2 77i**

1.039

Committee Leader

4.681*

1.962

Freshman

-2.894*

1.335

Incumbent Spending
(in 100,000s)

-.168#

.093

Party Leader

-3.984

5.139

Seniority

-.112

.141

Constant

63.605

3.145

Adj. R2

.085

Respondent Characteristics

Member Characteristics

N

3118

* p < .05 **< .01 *** p < .0 0 1
Notes' Dependent variable is how warm respondents feel toward their incumbent House
members.
Data are from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 American National Election Studies.
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Thus far this chapter has scrutinized the impact of district population at the
individual level. Because the number of respondents per House district in the ANES is
extremely limited it is next to impossible to draw inferences about whether any
relationships at the individual level hold up in the aggregate. However, the 2000
National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) has over 20,000 respondents who rated
how favorable they were toward their incumbent House member on a scale of 0, very
unfavorable, to 100, very favorable.35 By aggregating these responses by congressional
district where there are at least 40 respondents, any relationship between district
constituency population size and job approval gains added confirmation. Previous
studies have relied on the NAES to investigate issues of representation at the House
district level.36 In this sample there are 184 districts with at least 40 respondents who
answered this question. This analysis supplements the findings already presented and
helps to reduce the possibility that the individual findings are a product of errors
resulting from the sample o f individual cases included in the ANES data.

35 For a more detailed explanation o f this survey, see Daniel Romar, Kate Kenski, Paul Waldman,
Christopher Adasiewicz and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Capturing Campaign Dynamics: The National
Annenberg Election Survey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
36 A similar minimum threshold o f cases is used for aggregation in other studies using the 2000 NAES
data. See Joshua D. Clinton “Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th
House,” Journal o f Politics 68 (2006): 397-410. Clinton also uses survey data from Knowledge
Networks in this study.
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Table 21 gives the results of an OLS model predicting the favorability rating
of the incumbent member of the U.S. House at the district level.37 These data affirm
that negative affect toward the incumbent in more populous districts is not solely an
individual-level phenomenon. After controlling for the other variables in the model
including race, sex, and tenure, an upward shift of 100,000 constituents corresponds
with a 1 point decline in the incumbent’s favorability rating in the district. As the
population size of the district rises, the incumbent is held in lower regard by people in
the district. Having to satisfy an additional number of constituents can make a
representative’s job more difficult and places downward pressure on the House
incumbent’s favorability rating. The caveat has to be offered that this is only a
sampling of House districts from one election year and that these results could be
idiosyncratic. However, considering that the pattern is so consistent throughout the
analysis in this chapter and is consistent with prior studies on senatorial approval, one
->Q

can have some degree of confidence m the strength of this relationship.

37 An errors-in-variables regression model was run in STATA 9 using the eivreg command and it
produced substantively similar results.
j8 Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate, 64-65; Oppenheimer, “The Effect o f State Population on
Senator-Constituency Linkages”; Binder, Maltzman, and Siegelman, “Accounting for Senators’ HomeState Reputations,” 554.
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Table 21 OLS Model o f Incum bent’s Favorability Rating by House District
Independent Variable
Coefficient
S.E.
African-American

-.331

1.933

Committee Leader

-1.065

1.759

District Population (in 100,000s)

-1.097*

.476

Female

-1.574

1.329

Freshman

-2.441#

1.459

Flispanic

-1.183

3.737

Ideological Distance from District

-6.277**

2.311

Party Leader

-4.600

3.181

Seniority

.237

.149

Constant

70.098***

3.348

Adj. R2

.117

N

184

#p < . 10 *p < 05 **p < .01 *** p < .001
Note: Dependent variable is the mean favorability rating of the incumbent member of the House based
on aggregated responses from the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey.
Ideological Distance is the difference between the predicted value of the member’s DW-NOM1NATE
score and the actual value as predicted by the mean self-reported ideology within the district.
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Conclusion

Chapter 5 examined whether district population size hampers the accessibility
and approval o f U.S. House members. The findings unearthed from a collection of
survey items for multiple years indicated that this was indeed the case. Citizens are less
likely to report having contact with and to attempt to contact their House incumbent as
the population in the district escalates. They also have a higher probability of claiming
their member is out of touch with the district and have a greater propensity to believe
their House member would not be helpful if they needed assistance. Finally,
constituents in larger House districts evaluate the performance of their representatives
less favorably and feel less warmly toward them. In some cases these effects rivaled
factors such as racial and partisan congruence in shaping perceptions toward House
members. This evidence comports rather well with earlier research on U.S. senators
and constituency size.
Collectively, the portrait painted here is one of damage to the representational
linkage that has resulted from permitting the mean congressional district size to grow.
It offers additional ammunition to the proponents of enlarging the U.S. House who
insist that it will enhance the quality of representation the U.S. citizenry receives.
Technological advancements, additional staff, and other perquisites of office have
expanded simultaneously with the jump in the ratio of citizens per H ouse district.39
Representatives are not shy about exploiting the institutional advantages of their office

39 For evidence o f this trend see Norman Omstein, Thomas E. Mann and Michael Malbin, Vital Statistics
on Congress, 2001-2002 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2002), Table 5-2.
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and advertising their efforts to the voters.40 The advent of the internet as a staple of
the communications apparatus of House members both on the official government side
and in the campaign may foster a closer relationship with constituents 41 Yet all of
these developments cannot fully militate against the demands that a more populous
district brings, as there has been a downward trend in the ratings citizens give to their
House members on district service and attention.42 Americans want expanded access to
their House members and expect them to maintain a connection to their districts.43 A
larger constituency impinges on the representative’s ability to fulfill this expectation.
Overall, House members remain quite popular with their constituents even if the
institution in which they serve is held in lower regard.44 This reality has not been
fundamentally altered by the surge in constituency size that has materialized over the
decades. The standing of the typical representative is such that he/she can afford a
slight loss in his/her job rating. Most citizens can gain access to a representative in one
way or another and have their problems dealt with in a satisfactory manner. What this
chapter shows is that it becomes progressively more challenging to do so as the number
40 David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1974); Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone o f the Washington Establishment (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1989).
41 For evidence o f this phenomenon, see E. Scott Adler, Chariti E. Gent and Cary B. Overmeyer “The
Home Style Homepage: Legislator Use o f the World Wide Web for Constituency Contact,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 23 (1998): 585-595; Jim VandeHei and Charles Babington, “Technology Sharpens the
Incumbent’s Edge: Redistricting also Complicates Democrats’ Effort to Take Control o f the House,”
Washington Post, June 7, 2006., A l.
42 Jacobson, Politics o f Congressional Elections, 139.
43 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy, 64.
44 Timothy Cook, “Legislature vs. Legislator: A Note on the Paradox o f Congressional Support,”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 4 (1979): 43-52; Glenn R. Parker and Roger H. Davidson, “Why Do
Americans Love Their Congressman So Much More Than Their Congress,” Legislative Studies Quarterly
4(1979): 53-61.
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o f citizens they serve rises and voters appear to notice. Chapter 2 included a quote
from Rep. Alcee Hastings of Florida asking his colleagues whether they could serve as
effectively representing thousands of additional citizens in their districts.45 His fellow
House members may not have openly responded to this query, but their constituents
seemed to have reached a conclusion, and the answer is no.

45 Congressional Record, 108th Congress, 1st Session, January 28, 2003, E81.
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CHAPTER 6
INCREASINGLY DIVERGENT: CONSTITUENCY POPULATION SIZE AND
POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE U.S. HOUSE

Introduction

O f the many forms o f representation an elected official can provide the most
frequently studied by scholars of legislative behavior is policy responsiveness.1 This
representational component draws the bulk of scholarly attention because it is
substantive policy outcomes that have the greatest potential influence on the citizenry.
Other forms of representation are not unimportant, but ultimately it is representatives’
broad decisions about the role of government that touch the widest number of people.
The translation o f citizen preferences into policy outcomes is one of the signature
features that distinguish democratic political systems from other forms of government.2
One unmistakable trend in policy activity at the national level is that the U.S.
Congress has become more ideologically extreme when the outcomes of roll call votes
are examined. The U.S. House has especially become an increasingly polarized
institution in recent decades. A legion of studies has demonstrated that the ideological
differences between the congressional parties have widened and the ideological

1 Heinz Eulau and Paul Karps, “The Puzzle o f Representation: Specifying Components o f
Responsiveness,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 2 (1977): 233-255.
2 V. O. Key, Public Opinion and Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961).
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homogeneity within the parties has strengthened dramatically since the collapse of
the textbook Congress nearly three decades ago.3 Democrats are more consistently
liberal and Republicans are more consistently conservative when roll call votes are
examined using a variety of different measures. Both political scientists and journalists
have derided this polarization as unhealthy for representative government since elites
are more polarized than the mass electorate.4
Rising extremism in the U.S. House has occurred simultaneously with the
growth o f House district constituency populations. Chapter 2 presented arguments from
political theorists and legislators alike that a larger constituency size makes it less likely
representatives will reflect the views of their constituents. This chapter investigates
whether the failure to increase the size of the U.S. House in line with national
population growth has had any bearing on the voting patterns of its members.
Multivariate models are formulated to ascertain the impact of district population size on

3

David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press,
1991); Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History o f Roll Call Voting
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Nolan M. McCarthy, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal,
Income Redistribution and the Realignment o f American Politics (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1997);
Tim Groseclose, Steven D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder, “Comparing Interest Group Scores Across Time
and Chamber: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress,” American Political Science Review 93
(1999): 33-50; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, “D-Nominate after 10 Years: A Comparative
Update to Congress: A Political-Economic History o f Roll Call Voting," Legislative Studies Quarterly 26
(2001): 5-29; Gary C. Jacobson, “Partisan Polarization in Presidential Support: The Electoral
Connection,” Congress and the Presidency 30 (2003): 1-36; Richard Fleischer and John R. Bond, “The
Shrinking Middle in Congress,” British Journal o f Political Science 34 (2004): 429-451; Eric Schickler
and Kathryn Pearson, “The House Leadership in an Era o f Partisan Warfare” in Congress Reconsidered,
8th ed., eds. L aw rence C. D o d d and B ruce I. O ppenheim er (W ashington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005): 207-226;
Nolan M. McCarthy, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance o f Ideology
and Unequal Riches (Boston, MA: MIT Press 2006); Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Ideology
and Congress (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007).
4 Morris Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope, Culture War? The Myth o f a Polarized America
(New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005); Juliet Eilperin, Fight Club Politics, How Partisanship Is
Poisoning the U.S. House o f Representatives (Washington, DC: Rowan and Littlefield, 2006).
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the relationship between constituency opinion and the policy representation House
members provide.

Constituency Size and Policy Representation

The American political system is highly responsive to public opinion.5 Still,
some observers allege that politicians are increasingly willing to ignore popular opinion
in favor o f the preferences of elites.6 Contrary to this view, the most systematic
analyses of aggregate outcomes in the U.S. political system demonstrate that mass
preferences are translated into public policy outcomes. This evidence indicates
politicians are highly responsive and often anticipate the public mood and respond
accordingly. Furthermore, members of the U.S. House tend to be the most sensitive to
changes in public opinion, as they face re-election every two years.7 Even from a
dyadic perspective, members of the U.S. House largely reflect contours of public
opinion in their district.

There is good reason for House members to heed the policy

5 For a thorough review o f literature on the connection between public opinion and policy outcomes, see
Paul Burstein, “The Impact o f Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda,” Political
Research Quarterly 56 (2003): 29-40.
6 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, Politicians D o n ’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the
Loss o f Democratic Control (Chicago, IL: University o f Chicago Press, 2000); Jacob S. Hacker and Paul
Pierson, O ff Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion o f American Democracy (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2005).
7 James A. Stimson, Michael MacKuen and Robert S. Erikson, “Dynamic Representation,” American
Political Science Review 89 (1995): 543-565; Robert S. Erikson, Michael B. MacKuen, and James A.
Stimson, The Macro Polity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
g

Larry M. Bartels, “Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Build
Up,” American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 457-474; Cheryl Lyn Herrera, Richard Herrera, and
Eric R. A. N. Smith, “Public Opinion and Congressional Representation,” Public Opinion Quarterly 56
(1992): 185-205; Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in
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desires of their voters, as several studies have shown that legislators suffer a decline
in electoral support as they deviate farther from the median voter of their district.9
Though most House members provide policy representation in accord with their
constituents’ wishes, political scientists have demonstrated a greater tendency for
congressional candidates to veer toward the extremes in the last three decades.10 This
propensity for candidates to move away from the center has coincided with an
escalation in mean population size of U.S. House districts.
Despite the fact that it may be a highly responsive institution, members of the
House are clearly more polarized than the mass electorate.11 There has been a general
upward trajectory in the number of citizens asserting they dislike the policy positions of
their House incumbent.12 Could the divergence between constituents and
representatives on policy outcomes be in some way influenced by constituency size?
As Chapter 2 described, the Anti-Federalists made the case that as the ratio of
population per representative ascends, the likelihood that a legislator would represent

Congressional Elections,” in Congress Reconsidered, 8th ed., eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I.
Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 100.
9 Alan I. Abramowitz, “Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline o f Competition in U.S. House
Elections” Journal o f Politics 53 (1991): 34-56; Alan I. Abramowitz and Jeffrey Segal, Senate Elections
(Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press, 1992; Stephen Ansolabehere, James Snyder and Charles
Stewart, “Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections,” American Journal o f Political Science 45
(2001): 17-34; Bandice Canes-Wrones, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan, “Out o f Step, Out o f Office:
Electoral Accountability and House Members Voting,” American Political Science Review 96 (2002):
127-140; Erikson and W right “V oters, C andidates, and Issu es in C ongressional E lectio n s.”

10 Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, “Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections.”
11 Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, Culture War?
12 For documentation o f this trend see: Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics o f Congressional Elections, 6th ed.
(New York: Pearson, 2004), 139.
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the views o f the constituency would decline.13 This result materializes because the
connection between citizen and legislator would be less intimate; legislators would
possess the freedom to pursue polices that represented elite interests rather than the
masses. During the course of debates over the institution’s size, some members of the
House predicted that as constituency size drifted upward the ability of constituents to
influence their national legislators would be reduced.14 Even advocates of smaller
legislative chambers concede that as the ratio of persons per district rises the ability of
constituents to exert control over their representatives is diminished.15
These views are congruent with the theoretical expectations delineated by
scholars o f institutional size. This perspective holds that as the scale of population
expands so does the heterogeneity o f a district. As a consequence, the likelihood that
representatives will mirror the views of the citizenry is diminished. Dahl and Tufte
describe this dynamic in greater detail:
Size also creates barriers for representation o f views. The greater homogeneity o f the smaller
community increases the chances that an elected representative will hold the attitudes o f his
constituents— even without any further communication after he has been elected. Any increase
in the number o f constituents makes it more difficult to achieve an accurate match between the
views o f voters and politicians.16

A more heavily populated legislative district imposes an onerous burden on
representatives when monitoring the beliefs and attitudes of their constituents. The

13 Federal Framer, “Letter VII December 31, 1787” in The Essential Antifederalist, 2nd ed., eds. W. B.
Allen and Gordon Lloyd (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2002), 289.
14 S ee the remarks o f R ep. Stan Tupper, Congressional Record, 87th C ongress, 2 nd S essio n , M arch 15,

1962, 3736.
15 William F. Willoughby, Principles o f Legislative Organization and Administration (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1934): 261-262.
16 Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1973), 84-85.
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costs in time and resources that must be devoted to the task inevitably escalate. As
a result, the flow of communication between legislator and citizens is disrupted by the
expanding number of citizens whose views must be ascertained and accommodated.
Ultimately, a larger constituency size makes explanation of policy positions a greater
struggle as well.17 The end result is an increase in the probability that the representative
will deviate from districtwide constituency preferences.
There are empirical grounds for believing the expansion o f the ratio of citizens
per representative may foster detachment from the constituency and thus greater
extremism in policy representation. A 1995 survey of state legislators throughout the
U.S. found that district population size was negatively related to legislators’ willingness
to follow the preferences of their districts.

18

On the other hand, it could force

representatives to modify their voting records to attract a broader segment of voters.
Studies have shown that U.S. House members may alter their voting records to appeal
to a wider cross-section o f the state’s electorate when they have plans to run for the U.S.
Senate.19
The top priority o f most officeholders is to get re-elected to their current
positions.20 To achieve this objective they must balance the need to appeal to the

17 Rein Taagepera and Mathew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1989), 179.
18 John M. Carey, Richard G. Niemi and Linda W. Powell, Term Limits in the State Legislatures (Ann
Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press, 2000), 60.
19 John R. Hibbing, “Ambition in the House: Behavioral Consequences o f Higher Office Goals Among
U.S. Representatives,” American Journal o f Political Science 30 (1986): 651-665.
20 David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1974).
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median voter as well their most loyal supporters.21 In doing so politicians
representing a larger constituency cannot satisfy both demands and often opt to skew
their voting records in favor of their electoral base rather than the center of the
electorate.

Indeed, in some instances House members have been shown to faithfully

represent the views o f sub-constituency preferences within their districts better than
they do the centrist voter.

'y 'i

Therefore, if larger constituency populations are more

politically competitive as has been well chronicled,24 the upward trend in the ratio of
population per representative should create a scenario where House members are farther
away from ideological moderation in their roll call voting behavior. This hypothesis is
formally stated by Dahl and Tufte: “The greater the number of constituents a
representative has [the greater the likelihood there is] divergence in policies between
representative and constituents.”

Based on previous research showing that legislators

representing heterogeneous districts tend to become heavily dependent on their core

21 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory o f Democracy (New York: Harper Brothers, 1957); Gerald C.
Wright, “Policy Voting in the U.S. Senate: Who Is Represented,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 14
(1989): 465-486.
22 Morris P. Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Call and Constituencies (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1974);
Elizabeth R. Gerber and Jeffrey B. Lewis, “Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District
Heterogeneity and Political Representation,” Journal o f Political Economy 112 (2004): 1364-1383.
23 Joshua D. Clinton, “Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House,”
Journal o f Politics 68 (2006): 397-410.
24 John R. Hibbing and Sarah Brandes, “State Population and the Electoral Success o f U.S. Senators,”
A m erica n J o u rn a l o f P o litic a l S cie n c e 2 7 (1 9 8 3 ): 8 0 8 -8 1 9 ; A lan I. A bram ow itz, “E xp lain in g Senate

Outcomes,” American Political Science Review 82 (1988): 385-403; Abramowitz and Segal, Senate
Elections-, Frances Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, “Senate Apportionment: Competitiveness and Partisan
Advantage,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22 (1997): 3-24; Frances Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer,
Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences o f Equal Representation (Chicago: University o f
Chicago Press, 1999): 93-95.
25 Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy, 85.
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supporters this divergence ought to be manifested in a voting record that caters to
the extreme.
This extremism-divergence hypothesis is empirically tested in this chapter with
the individual representative as the unit of analysis in the 92nd, 97th, 102nd, and 107th
Congresses.27 If this hypothesis is correct House members representing more heavily
populated districts ought to compile extreme voting records at odds with what would be
predicted by the ideological composition o f opinion within their district. To
corroborate this expectation, a multivariate model predicting roll call voting behavior
must be specified that demonstrates that representatives serving more populous districts
are less moderate than other members after other variables are controlled for. After
establishing that House members are more extreme when representing larger
constituencies, a second model is formulated to test the hypothesis that members are
more likely to diverge from constituency opinion. Based on the expectations of
previous scholarship, constituency size should be positively related to both extremism
and divergence in roll call outcomes.

Models Predicting Policy Extremism and Divergence

Constituency size alone does not shape outcomes on roll call votes. Otherwise
U.S. senators from the same state would mirror each other on the ideological

26 Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Call and Constituencies', Elizabeth R. Gerber and Jeffrey B. Lewis,
“Beyond the Median.”
27 The corresponding years for each Congress are 92nd Congress (1971-1972), 97th Congress (19811982), 102nd Congress (1991-1992), 103rd Congress (2001-2002).
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continuum. An assortment o f other variables also helps determine why a legislator
may be more likely to amass a voting record divergent from the center. For the most
part, House members tend to reflect the views of their constituents. More liberal
members are elected from highly liberal districts and more conservative members
originate from districts leaning farthest to the right. Moderate members tend to come
from districts where the distribution of public opinion is most balanced.

Nevertheless,

incongruities do exist between members of the U.S. House of Representatives and their
constituents.

29

Ideally survey data estimating public opinion within House districts would be
used to determine the ideological makeup of a representative’s constituency. However,
due to the limited number o f cases in each House district in surveys like the American
National Election Study, getting aggregate estimates of constituency opinion for the
U.S. House is problematic.30 For instance, Miller and Stokes tried to draw inferences
about constituency opinion based on an average sample size of 13 constituents per
district.31 Because it contains a larger number of cases per district, the National
Annenberg Election Survey has been utilized for this purpose in recent studies.

“1-y

28 Erikson and Wright, “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections,” 100; Phillip J.
Arodin and James C. Garrand, “Measuring Constituency Ideology in U.S. House Districts: A Top-Down
Simulation Approach,” Journal o f Politics 65 (2003): 1165-1189.
29 Gerber and Lewis, “Beyond the Median,” 1375-1376.
30 Christopher A ch en , “M easu rin g R epresentation,” A m erica n J o u rn a l o f P o litic a l S cien ce 22 (1978):
475-510; Robert S. Erikson, “Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination o f the
Miller-Stokes Representation Data,” American Journal o f Political Science 22 (1978): 511-535.

31 Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” American Political
Science Review 57 (1963): 45-56.
32 Clinton, “Representation in Congress,” 397-410.
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However, these data are not available for all the time points covered in this study.
Another tactic is to use simulated estimates of district ideology through demographic
data,

although these simulated estimates are also undermined by shortcomings like

unknown errors and measurement assumptions.34
The most frequently used approach to measure ideology for U.S. House
constituencies is to rely on aggregate election returns from the presidential contest at the
district level.

Though it has limitations, the percentage of the two-party presidential

vote serves as a reasonable proxy of the ideological composition o f a House member’s
district. Furthermore, it may be an increasingly more reliable estimate of district
1Z

ideology than it has been in years past.

This method of measuring district preferences

is utilized in the models formulated in this chapter. Specifically, in the first model
predicting roll call extremism, the percentage of the two-party vote received by the
presidential candidate of the incumbent’s party in the previous election serves as the
estimate of district ideological extremism of the district constituency. For the second
model predicting divergence, percentage of the two-party vote received by the
presidential candidate of the Democratic Party in the previous election serves as the

33 Arodin and Garrand, “Measuring Constituency Ideology in U.S. House Districts,” 1165-1189; Erikson
“Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior,” 511-535.
34 Clinton, “Representation in Congress,” 399; Kim Qaile Hill and Patricia A. Hurley, “Dyadic
R epresentation R eappraised,” A m erica n J o u rn a l o f P o litic a l S cien ce 43 (1 9 9 9 ): 1 0 9 -1 3 7 .

35 Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, “Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections,” 17-34; CanesWrones, Brady, and Cogan, “Out o f Step, Out o f Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members
Voting,” 127-140; Erikson and Wright, “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections.”
36 Matthew S. Levendusky, Jeremy C. Pope, and Simon Jackman, “Measuring District Level Preferences
with Implications for the Analysis o f U.S. Elections,” Working Paper, http:// jackman.stanford.edu/
papers/ download.php?i=8.
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estimate of constituency liberalism in the district. A higher percentage of the vote
signifies a more liberal district.
This chapter employs the most widely used measure of roll call voting behavior
in legislative studies, Poole and Rosenthal’s first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores,
as the estimate of legislators’ ideology.37 These scores provide an estimate of a
member’s relative liberalism or conservatism on all nonunanimous roll call votes not
just within one Congress but across time. Poole and Rosenthal introduce strong
evidence that a single left-right dimension .most effectively captures the structure of roll
call voting behavior throughout most of the nation’s history.38 For this study, two
dependent variables are utilized to capture extremism and divergence in representatives’
voting records. The operationalization of the level of extremism in the representative’s
voting record is the absolute value (.00 tol .00) of these scores rather than the liberalconservative (-1.00 to l.00) formulation commonly used. A higher value is indicative of
a more extreme voting record.
To measure divergence, the second dependent variable relies on the traditional
left-right continuum as the estimate of roll call ideology. In this specification
ideological divergence from the constituency is operationalized by taking the absolute
value of the difference between the predicted value and the actual value of the
representative’s first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score. This estimate of the predicted
value is generated from an OLS regression equation predicting the member’s DW-

37 Poole and Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History o f Roll Call Voting. DW-NOMINATE
scores downloaded from: http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm.
38 However, there are periods in U.S. history when divisions within the party coalitions create a second
dimension, like the issue o f race in the middle o f the twentieth century.
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NOMINATE score as a function of the percentage of the two-party vote for the
Democratic presidential candidate in the last election. This measure allows for an
interpretation of how far each House member deviates from the median voter in the
constituency. A higher value signifies the representative is more ideologically distant
from citizen preferences.
Another determinant of roll call voting patterns is electoral marginality. Most
research on the link between these two factors has shown that incumbents who win by a
narrower margin in the previous election tend to be more extreme after controlling for
other factors. Rather than demonstrate moderation, political vulnerability may drive
legislators to deviate farther away from center and toward the extremes due to a greater
need to pursue the support of their most committed political supporters.

TQ

To control

for the electoral context that shapes a member’s voting record, the models incorporate
the share o f the two-party vote obtained by the incumbent in the last election. Other
electoral factors that may be influential are members deciding to leave voluntarily from
the House by either retirement, resignation, or the decision to run for another office.
Representatives not seeking re-election to the House may alter their behavior as a
result.40 Members running for higher office may have a strategic incentive to alter their

39 Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Call and Constituencies; James H. Kuklinski, “District Competitiveness
and Legislative Roll-Call Behavior: A Reassessment o f the Marginality Hypothesis, ” American Journal
o f Political Science 21 (1977): 627-638; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, “Candidate Positioning in
U .S . H ou se E lectio n s” ; G irish Gulatti, “R ev isitin g the L ink B e tw e e n E lectoral C om petition and P o licy

Extremism in the U.S. Congress,” American Politics Research 32 (2004): 495-530. For contrary evidence
on the marginality hypothesis, see John D. Griffin, "Electoral Competition and Democratic
Responsiveness: A Defense o f the Marginality Hypothesis," Journal o f Politics 68 (2006): 911-921.
40 Rebekah Herrick, Michael K. Moore, and John R. Hibbing, “Unfastening the Electoral Connection:
The Behavior o f U.S. Representatives when Reelection Is No Longer a Factor,” Journal o f Politics 56
(1994): 214-227. However, the connection between retirement status and shifts in roll call voting
behavior is quite marginal. See: Lawrence S. Rothenberg and Mitchell S. Sanders, “Severing the
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voting records to appeal to a broader constituency41 One variable in this model
indicates whether the representative resigned during or retired at the end of the
Congress. Another dummy variable, coded 1 if the member sought higher office and 0
otherwise, is also a part of the model.
The South is a unique region of the country and its political distinctiveness has
powerfully shaped coalitions within the House. Despite being elected under the banner
o f the more liberal of the two national parties, Southern Democrats have historically
been more conservative than other members of their party in the House. Though
Southern Democrats gradually began to gravitate closer to the position of the rest of the
Democratic Caucus,42 they still are among the most moderate members in the House.
As more Southerners joined the ranks of the Republican Conference, they have
generally been some of the most conservative members of the House.43 Two dummy
variables are created for the models to account for the moderation of Southern
Democrats and the conservatism of Southern Republicans 44
The sex and race of legislators may play a role in whether legislators vote in a
more extreme fashion. African American members of the House have consistently

Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress,” American Journal o f Political Science 44

(2000): 316-325.
41 H ibbing, “A m b ition in the H o u se,” 6 5 1 -6 6 5 .

42 Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House.
43 McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal, Polarized America.
44 Southern states include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
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compiled some o f the most liberal voting records in Congress,45 sometimes even to
the left of their constituents on issues like welfare reform.46 Hispanic lawmakers have
also been found to be more liberal than their colleagues, though not to the same extent
as members of the Congressional Black Caucus. To capture the effects of these
minority legislators, separate dummy variables are included in the model coded 1 for
African American and Hispanics and 0 otherwise.
Research looking into whether female House members are more liberal than
their colleagues is less conclusive. Some research uncovers greater liberal tendencies
among women in the House, especially on women’s issues.47 Other recent studies have
not found any significant gender differences on the liberal-conservative roll call
continuum after other characteristics are controlled for.48 The role of gender in
predicting roll call outcomes in its own right may be in doubt. However, when
interacting with party, a reasonable expectation is that Republican women are likely to
be more moderate than other members of the House and Democratic women may tend
toward the liberal extreme o f the Democratic Caucus. Therefore, a pair of dummy

45 David Lublin, The Paradox o f Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interest in
Congress (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 69.
46 Katherine Tate, Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S.
Congress (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
47 Barbara C. Burrell, A Woman's Place Is in the House: Campaigning fo r Congress in the Feminist Era
(Ann Arbor, MI: 1994); Arturo Vega and Juanita M. Firestone, “The Effects o f Gender on Congressional
Behavior and the Substantive Representation o f Women,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20 (1995): 213222; Janet Clark, “W o m en at the N ation al L evel: A n U p d ate o n R o ll C all V o tin g B eh a v io r,” in Women

and Elective Office: Past Present and Future, eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 118-129; Michele L. Swers, “Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women’s
Issues Bills than Their Male Colleagues,” Legislative Studies Quarterly (1998): 435-448.
48 McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal, Income Redistribution and the Realignment o f American Politics, 2627; Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and Renato Corbetta, “Gender Turnover and Roll-Call Voting in the U.S.
House o f Representatives,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 (2004): 215-229.
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variables coded 1 for female Republicans and female Democrats and 0 otherwise are
added to the models in this chapter.
Majority party status may dictate how extreme a representative’s voting record
happens to be. The majority party controls the power to set the agenda in the House and
has the capacity to structure the agenda to further the party’s objectives.49 Greater
cohesion in the majority party may translate into more extreme voting records than is
the case for representatives in the minority.50 Partisanship alone may be a factor as
well. Scholars have observed that Republicans in Congress have shifted farther to the
right than Democrats are to the left.51 If this contention has merit, Republicans ought to
have records closer to the ends of the ideological continuum, all else equal. Though
Republicans were in the minority for three o f the four Congresses in this study, the
Democrats’ minority status in the 107th provides enough variation to control for
minority status as well as party. To test the effect of party and minority status, two
dummy variables are formulated: the first with Republicans coded as 1 and 0
otherwise, the second coded 1 for members of the minority party and 0 otherwise.
Institutional factors such as tenure and leadership need to be controlled for as
well. Members who serve as elected party leaders or committee chairs or ranking
members are likely to have voting records farther from the median position in the

49 Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the
U.S. H o u se o f R e p rese n ta tiv es (Cam bridge: C am bridge U n iv ersity Press, 2 0 0 5 ).

50 In recent Congresses the median o f the majority party has been farther toward the extreme than the
minority party median. See Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House-, John H. Aldrich and
David W. Rohde, “The Consequences o f Party Organization in the House: The Role o f Majority and
Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government” in Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in
a Partisan Era, eds. John R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), 64.
51 Hacker and Pierson, O ff Center.
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House.52 This outcome is has only been enhanced by the 1974 reforms subjecting
the election of committee chairs to the entire Democratic conference and the
Republicans’ more forceful attack on the seniority rule upon taking majority control in
the 104th Congress.53 There is evidence that members may become slightly more
moderate as they serve additional terms in the House.54 Tenure effects are measured the
same way as in previous chapters, with variables for the number of terms served by the
representative and a dummy variable indicating freshman status. Consistent with prior
chapters the key independent variable in this analysis is district population measured in
100,000s. Finally, a set of dummy variables representing individual Congresses are
adopted for the pooled models.

Relationship Between District Population and Extremism

The first model investigates what factors predict whether legislators will be
positioned farther toward the ends of the ideological spectrum in the House. The results
found in Table 22 show that several of the variables have the anticipated effects on roll

52 Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House; Aldrich and Rhode, “The Consequences o f Party
Organization in the House,” 64; Bernard Groffman, William Koetze and Anthony J. McGann,
“Congressional Leadership 1965-1996: A New Look at the Extremism Versus Centrality Debate,”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 27 (2002): 87-105; Eric Heberlig, Marc Hetherington, and Bruce Larson,
“The Price o f L eadership: C am paign M o n ey and the P olarization o f C ongressional Parties,” J o u rn a l o f

Politics 68 (2006): 992-1005.
53 John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, “Congressional Committees in Partisan Era” in Congress
Reconsidered, 8th ed., eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press,
2005), 249-270.
54 John R. Hibbing, Congressional Careers: Contours o f Life in the M odem U.S. House o f
Representatives, (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f North Carolina Press, 1991).
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call extremism. House members from more liberal or conservative districts, African
American members, Southern Republicans, and members of the 107th Congress exhibit
more extreme voting patterns. Conversely, Republicans, female Republicans, members
of the minority party, members garnering a greater share of the two-party vote in the
last election, and Southern Democrats tend to vote in a moderate fashion. There is no
statistically significant relationship for the variables representing Hispanic members,
female Democrats, committee chairs or ranking members, party leaders, more senior
members and members, retiring or running for higher office.
Focusing on the principal variable of interest in this study, the coefficient for
district population signifies that House members representing larger constituencies tend
to be more extreme (p < .001). Controlling for the other variables in the model, a
100,000 increase in district population corresponds with a shift of .02 units in the
absolute value o f DW-Nominate scores. To interpret this statistic another way, a
member representing 100,000 additional citizens is about 2 percent more extreme,
ceteris paribus. This figure is not an insubstantial contribution to extremism in roll call
voting. Interpreting the standardized coefficients in Table 6-1, it is apparent that
district ideology has the strongest effect on the dependent variable. A one standard
deviation increase in presidential vote results in a jump of .391 standard deviation units
in the representative’s folded DW-NOMINATE score. The comparable estimate for a
standard deviation increase in district population is an increase of. 115 standard
deviation units in the folded DW-NOMINATE score.
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Table 22 Impact of District Population on Ideological
Extremism for the 92"d, 97th, 102nd, and 107lh Congresses
Independent Variable
B
Beta

S.E.

African-American

.107***

.134

.018

Committee Leader

.004

.006

.013

District Population

.020***

.120

.004

Female Democrat

-.006

-.008

.017

Female Republican

-.096***

-.080

.023

Freshman

.014

.028

.011

Hispanic

.034

.029

.023

Minority Party

-.060***

-.167

.008

Previous Vote Share

-.001***

-.087

.000

Party Leader

.021

.017

.023

Presidential Vote

.006***

.391

.000

Ran for Higher Office

-.008

-.008

.020

Republican

-.030***

-.083

.010

Retired

-.021

-.030

.013

Seniority

.001

.016

.001

Southern Democrat

-.143***

-.306

.010

Southern Republican

.043***

.078

.012

107™ Congress

.035***

.086

.010

102ntl Congress

-.018#

.045

.011

97th Congress

-.015

.010

Constant

-.006

Adj. R2

.392

(in 100,000s)

. .010
.036

1750
N
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p < .10
Notes: Dependent Variable is the absolute value of each member’s first
dimension DW-NOMINATE score for the 108th Congress.
Entries are unstandarized regression coefficients (B), and standardized
regression coefficients (Beta).
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When House members vote in a more extreme fashion it is because it
reflects the preferences o f their district. However, after the other variables in this model
are accounted for, constituency population size appears to lead to less centrist outcomes.
Rather than producing moderation, thousands of more constituents in the House district
leads to the election o f members prone to gravitating toward the edges of the ideological
continuum.
Table 23 includes the results for the individual Congresses. The data reveal that
district population achieves statistical significance in the 97th, 102nd, and 107th at least
the .05 level. However, in the 92nd Congress there appears to be no significant
relationship between these variables. For every 100,000 constituents in the district the
absolute value o f the DW-NOMINATE score for the House member increases .022
units in the 97th Congress, .028 units in the 102nd, and .024 units in the 107th Congress.
As a point of comparison, the ideological makeup of the district as measured by the
presidential vote is highly significant in each Congress. Though not as robust as the
association with other variables, the key finding emanating from these data is that
district population is positively linked to members compiling extreme voting records.
Rather than producing moderation, thousands of more constituents in the House district
leads to the election of members who tend to position themselves farther toward the end
of the ideological continuum.
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Table 23 Impact of District Population on Ideological Extremism by Congress
97th
Independent Variable
92nd
102nd

1j9**

107 th

.139***
(.035)

.013
(.031)

-.027
(.029)

-.012
(.023)

.003
(.024)

(.009)

.022*
(.009)

.028***
(.009)

.024**
(.009)

Female Democrat

-.056
(.048)

-.041
(.045)

.019
(.032)

.023
(.024)

Female Republican

-.094
(.103)

-.064
(.047)

.150***
(.047)

-.085**
(.033)

Freshman

.014
(.023)

.034
(.021)

.010
(.023)

-.003
(.022)

.130*
(.066)

.087
(.055)

.045
(.042)

-.048
(.034)

African-American

.133**
(.049)

(.044)

.026
(.030)

District Population

.011

(in 100,000s)

Committee Leader

Fiispanic

.000

-.001

(.001)

(.001)

-.001*
(.000)

-.001*
(.001)

-.016
(.061)

.053
(.050)

.002
(.042)

.026
(.041)

Presidential Vote

.006***
(.001)

.006***
(.001)

.006***
(.001)

.008***
(.001)

Ran for Higher Office

.085
(.053)

-.020

-.051
(.038)

-.001

(.039)

Republican

- 107***
(.018)

-.128***
(.020)

-.040*
(.018)

.048**
(.017)

Retired

-.027
(.029)

-.013
(.036)

-.031
(.019)

-.006
(.030)

.000

.003
(.268)

.003
(.002)

-.001

-.188***
(.021)

.103***
(.020)

-.063**
(.024)

(.029)

.076**
(.026)

.046#
(.025)

(.019)

Constant

.041
(.076)

-.013
(.071)

-.059
(.067)

-.123#
(.070)

Adj. R2

.346

.340

.391

.344

Previous Vote Share

Party Leader

Seniority

(.002)
Southern Democrat

.196***
(.023)

Southern Republican

-.021

437
436
N
436
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p < .10
Notes: Dependent variable is the absolute value of each member’s first-dimension DWNOMINATE score for the 108th Congress.
Parameter estimates are unstandarized regression coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses.

(.036)

(.002)

.020

441
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Relationship between District Population and Ideological Divergence

The previous models showed that in line with expectations members serving a
larger constituency are more extreme. This section of the chapter presents the results of
models exploring whether there is a link between ideological distance of representatives
and their constituents due to constituency size. The results in Table 24 show that
several o f the variables have significant effects on roll call divergence. Southern
Democrats, female Democrats, female Republicans, Hispanic members, and members
of the minority party are more responsive to constituency opinion. Conversely,
fh

Southern Republicans and members of the 107 Congress are more likely to diverge
from their constituents’ views. There is no statistically significant relationship for
African American members, Republicans, committee chairs or ranking members, party
leaders, more senior members, or members retiring or running for higher office.
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Table 24 Impact of District Population on Ideological
Divergence for the 92 nd, 97th, 1021"1and 107“*Congresses
Independent Variable
B
Beta

S.E.

African-American

-.023

-.032

.017

Committee Leader

.010

.018

.014

D istrict Population

.013**

.082

.005

Female Democrat

-.042*

-.054

.018

Female Republican

-.057*

-.051

-.025

Freshman

.011

.028

.011

Hispanic

-.042#

-.039

.024

Minority Party

- 094***

-.285

.009

Previous Vote Share

-.003***

-.250

.000

Party Leader

.025

.022

.025

Ran for Higher Office

-.003

-.003

.022

Republican

.001

.003

.010

Retired

-.014

-.023

.014

Seniority

-.001

.001

-.027

Southern Democrat

-.042***

-.098

.011

Southern Republican

.022#

.043

.013

107th Congress

.048***

.126

.013

102"d Congress

.011

.028

.011

97th Congress

.009

.024

.010

Constant

.405***

Adj. R2

.169

(in 100,000s)

.031

N
1750
* * * p < .0 0 1 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p < .10
Notes: Dependent variable is the degree to which the incumbent House
member’s voting record diverges from constituency preferences.
Entries are unstandarized regression coefficients (B) and standardized
regression coefficients (Beta).
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Concentrating on the main variable of interest in this study, the coefficient
for district population signifies that House members representing larger constituencies
tend to be more ideologically distant from their constituents (p < .007). Controlling for
the other variables in the model, a 100,000 increase in district population corresponds
with a shift of .013 units in the degree of divergence from the constituency opinion. To
interpret this statistic another way, a member representing 100,000 additional citizens is
about 1.3% more divergent, ceteris paribus. A standard deviation shift above the mean
in the number of constituents would raise the ideological distance by about .082
standard deviation units. This figure is not an insubstantial contribution to House
members’ level o f ideological divergence from their constituents. After the other
variables in this model are accounted for, constituency population size appears to lead
to less responsive outcomes. This result supports the divergence hypothesis advanced
by the Anti-Federalists and institutional scholars.
Table 25 includes the results for each individual Congress. Here the relationship
is not quite as robust when the sample size is reduced. The data reveal that the
coefficient for district population is in the expected negative direction for each
Congress, but only achieves statistical significance in the 97th and 102nd at least at the
.05 level. For the 92nd and 107th Congresses there is no significant relationship between
these variables. For every additional 100,000 constituents in the district, the ideological
distance from the district for the House member increases .018 units in the 97th
Congress and .019 units in the 102nd.
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Table 25 Impact o f District Population on Ideological Divergence by Congress
Independent Variable
92nd
97th
102nd
African-American

-.002

107th

.022

(.052)

-.047
(.036)

-.081**
(.029)

(.029)

Committee Leader

.071*
(.035)

-.008
(.028)

-.003
(.024)

-.009
(.027)

D istrict Population
(in 100,000s)

.007
(.001)

.018*
(.009)

.019*
(.009)

(.010)

Female Democrat

-.038
(.055)

-.045
(.044)

-.022
(.033)

-.055*
(.026)

-.157
(.119)

.021
(.045)

-.088#
(.048)

-.057
(.036)

Freshman

.032
(.027)

-.032
(.020)

.048*
(.024)

-.030
(.024)

Hispanic

-.051
(.076)

-.034
(.053)

-.059
(.042)

-.024
(.037)

Previous Vote Share

-.001
(.001)

-.004***
(.000)

-.002***
(.000)

-.003***
(.001)

Party Leader

-.098
(.070)

.086*
(.048)

.062
(.043)

-.009
(.044)

Ran for Higher Office

.079
(.061)

.009
(.038)

-.048
(.039)

-.017
(.040)

Republican

-.046*
(.020)

_179***
(.017)

-.081***
(.017)

.124***
(.019)

-.050
(.033)

-.025
(.034)

.001
(.020)

-.005
(.034)

-.003
(.003)

-.003
(.002)

.001

-.000

(.002)

(.002)

-.020

-.133***
(.021)

-.016
(.019)

-.029
(.024)

(.033)

.124***
(.025)

.005
(.025)

-.024
(.021)

Constant

.309***
(.074)

.503***
(.061)

.331***
(.062)

.386***
(.071)

Adj. R2

.030

.303

.155

.249

Female Republican

Retired

Seniority

Southern Democrat

(.026)
Southern Republican

.012

N
436
437
436
***p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p < .10
Notes: Dependent variable is the degree to which the incumbent House member’s voting record
diverges from constituency preferences.
Parameter estimates are unstandarized regression coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses.

.011

442
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As a point o f comparison, the coefficient for the party in the minority is
highly significant in each of the model specifications for the individual Congresses.
While not evincing the stability and consistency of other variables in the model district
population does manifest an effect in two of the four models displayed in Table 25.
Given the magnitude of the effect in the pooled model it is not terribly surprising that
the coefficient for this variable is not significant in the smaller samples for individual
Congresses. Constituency population size is not the sole reason why members might
vote in this fashion, but it does appear that members are a bit less responsive to the
median voter as the population of the district rises. District population does provide
more explanatory power in predicting divergence in the House than institutional forces,
such as leadership and committee status and seniority. Altogether, these models offer
modest empirical weight to the notion that the ideological distance between
representative and constituency is widened as the scale of district population expands.

Conclusion

Chapter 6 has explored whether constituency population size has any
discemable impact on policy representation for the U.S. House of Representatives. The
findings uncovered in this chapter suggest that it does. The magnitude of the population
in the average House member’s district is not the strongest factor in predicting the
degree o f responsiveness evident in the representative’s voting record, but it is
meaningful nonetheless. The presence of a considerable number of additional citizens
in the district has the effect of gently nudging the member toward the extreme. The
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result is representatives who are more ideologically distant from the district’s
median voter. House district constituency size appears to have modestly exacerbated
the polarization in the House rather than acting as a moderating influence on House
members’ roll call behavior. This research effort lends some evidentiary basis for
observers who have expressed dismay at the trend toward rising elite polarization to
have reason for concern. As population in the district rises, national representatives
have a greater incentive to appeal to members of their political base who are becoming
increasingly extreme.55 If the average House district population continues to expand,
the prospect for greater divergence between constituency preferences and policy
responsiveness will be heightened. Enlarging the U.S. House of Representatives could
serve as a modest antidote to the polarization that has gripped this institution in recent
years and bring House members closer into alignment with the views of their
constituents.
The responsiveness o f elected officials to centrist opinion is a conditional
phenomenon and fluctuates according to temporal trends.56 The proclivity of House
members to display moderating tendencies can vary regardless of the ratio of
constituents per congressional district. In fact Congress was as polarized in the late 19th
and early 20 centuries when House districts contained far fewer citizens. Many other
factors have combined to drive the extremism exhibited by House members in

55 Gary C. Jacobson, “Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection” in Polarized
Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era, eds. Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleischer
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), 9-30; Kyle L. Saunders and Alan I. Abramowitz, “Ideological
Realignment and Active Partisans in the Electorate,” American Politics Research 32 (2004): 285-309.
56 Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians D o n ’t Pander, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, “Candidate
Positioning in U.S. House Elections.”
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contemporary Congresses. Such forces include redistricting plans consciously
designed to group like-minded partisans into the same districts, the change in the
nomination process of congressional candidates that has driven politicians away from
centrist voters toward satisfying the wishes of political activists who demand
ideological purity, and the ideological realignment of the U.S. electorate.57 Therefore,
the impact o f constituency size should not be overstated. Nevertheless, the population
levels o f Congressional districts should be mentioned as a part the equation explaining
what factors are driving elite and mass preferences farther apart.
Overall, the association between constituency size and policy divergence is
modestly positive. The greater the size of the district’s population the less likely
representatives are to reflect opinions of the median voter. In smaller, ideologically
cohesive constituencies it is easier for legislators to satisfy the policy desires of the
citizenry. The growth in House district populations seems to have increased the
distance between representative and constituents in the area of policy representation as
democratic theorists and numerous legislators predicted.58 This empirical reality is
another consequence of maintaining the 435-seat limit on the size of the U.S. House
while the population expands. This is one more domain where representation has been
undermined by the decision to discontinue further enlargements of the House.

57 Fleischer and John R. Bond, “The Shrinking Middle in Congress,” 446-450; Fiorina, Abrams, and
Pope, Culture War, Chapter 8.
58 Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy, 84-85.
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CHAPTER 7

THE PEOPLE’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE SIZE OF THE PEOPLE’S HOUSE

Introduction

The previous chapters dissected the effects of the representational tradeoff that
have emerged from the 435-seat limit and the subsequent growth in the ratio of citizens
per House district. The evidence uncovered indicated there have been some measurable
costs to representation. Advocates of enlarging the House can cite these findings in the
areas of policy responsiveness, service representation, and citizens’ attitudes toward
their representatives to bolster their claims that an increase in the institution’s size
would improve the overall quality of representation its members provide.
Notwithstanding these effects, it is unclear whether the U.S. public would favor an
enlargement of the House, the ultimate barometer of whether lawmakers are responsive
to the wishes o f their constituents on this matter. Public attitudes toward numerous
aspects of American political institutions are limited in scope. Institutional size is a
domain that has especially been ignored by survey researchers. Moreover, there has
been a complete absence of survey data probing attitudes about the size of the U.S.
House and the number o f persons per congressional district.
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Chapter 7 fills this void by presenting the responses to questions on these
topics from a national survey administered by Knowledge Networks of 1,020
Americans. These three survey items deal with various components of the debate
surrounding whether to add to the number of seats allocated for the U.S. House. The
first question probes whether the U.S public is willing to accept an increase in the size
of the House to offset the growth in constituency size in order to improve the quality of
representation, even it means a less efficient legislative process. A second question
asks whether the public would support increasing the size of the House to prevent states
from losing representation in the House. A third question deals with descriptive
representation by asking citizens if they would support enlarging the size of the House
to increase the number of opportunities that women and minorities would have to be
elected to the institution. The responses educed from these questions can give some
measure of how the American people feel about the size of the people’s House. These
findings will offer unprecedented insight into public attitudes toward a critical aspect of
the representational character of the institution in the national government closest to the
citizens. This chapter makes strides toward answering the fundamental question of
whether an alteration in the number of seats would improve perceptions of the U.S.
House o f Representatives or would further damage the reputation of the institution.

Expectations Regarding Public Attitudes Toward the Size of the House

Although it may enhance representation, there is sound reason to believe that an
upward adjustment in the size of the U.S. House might draw opposition from a majority
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o f the U.S. public. Of the three branches of government, the U.S. Congress is
consistently viewed the least favorably.1 Approval of Congress fluctuates along with
factors such as the economy, scandal, and other political events, but typically it gets low
marks from the U.S. public. While individual members of Congress are generally
perceived positively by their constituents, there is a great deal of consternation about the
collective membership o f the body as a whole.3 Richard Fenno discovered in his
observation of U.S. House members in their districts during the 1970s that they
routinely derided the institution in which they served as a tactic to gain support among
their constituents.4
Dissatisfaction with the nature of the political process is a primary driver of the
low regard most politicians are held in by the public.5 American citizens think their
representatives in Washington are compensated at an exorbitant level, have an
1 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy: Public Attitudes Toward
American Political Institutions (New York: Cambridge University, 1995); John R. Hibbing, “Images o f
Congress,” in Institutions o f American Democracy: The Legislative Branch, eds. Paul J. Quirk and Sarah
A. Binder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 461-490; John R. Hibbing and Christopher W.
Larimer, “What the American Public Wants Congress to Be,” in Congress Reconsidered, 8th ed., eds.
Lawrence Dodd and Brace Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 55-77.
2 Samuel C. Patterson and Gregory A. Caldiera, “Standing Up for Congress: Variations in Public Esteem
Since the 1960s,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 15 (1990): 25-47; Robert H. Durr, John Gilmour, and
Christina Wolbrecht, “Explaining Congressional Approval,” American Journal o f Political Science 41
(1997): 175-207; Hibbing and Larimer, “What the American Public Wants Congress to Be,” 57.
3 Glenn R. Parker and Roger H. Davidson, “Why Do Americans Love their Congressmen So Much More
Than Their Congress,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4 (1979); 52-61; Timothy Cook, “Legislature vs.
Legislator: A Note on the Paradox o f Congressional Support,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4 (1979): 4352.
4 Richard Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1978). For
evidence that this tactic is not as widespread as previously thought, see Daniel Lipinski, Congressional
Communication: Content and Consequences (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press, 2004).
5 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy: Americans ’ Beliefs About How
Government Should Work (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); John R. Hibbing and James T.
Smith, “Is It the Middle That Is Frustrated? Americans’ Ideological Positions and Government Trust,”
American Politics Research 32 (2004): 652-678.
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overabundance o f staff persons at their disposal and are principally concerned about
their own self-interest and the concerns of well-connected special interest groups.6
Despite a surge in good feeling toward all political actors in the wake of the 9-11-01
attacks, many Americans harbor a strong sense of distrust toward the political system at
n

the national level. Most of the public dislike the contentious nature of political debate
that goes on in Congress as well as what is perceived as the sacrificing of principles that
occurs when compromise is reached to pass legislation.8
Asking the public to get behind an increase in the number of politicians whom
they hold in low regard does not seem like it would meet with a positive response.
Even advocates o f the idea admit that the rallying cry “enlarge the House” is unlikely to
invoke broad support.9 At the state level the most recent instance of voters expressing
their will on the issue o f legislature size confirms this proposition. In 1994 as a
response to a spate o f scandals in state government, Rhode Island voters approved an
initiative that reduced both houses of the Rhode Island legislature.10 It is not far-fetched
to think that a sizable portion o f the populace might favor a reduction in the size of the
U.S. House of Representatives.

6 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy; David C. Kimball and Samuel C. Patterson,
“Living Up to Expectations: Public Attitudes Toward Congress,” Journal o f Politics 59 (1997): 701-728.
7 Marc J. Hetherington, Why Political Trust Matters and the Demise o f American Liberalism (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton U n iv ersity Press, 2 0 0 5 ).

8 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy, Hibbing and Larimer, “What the American Public
Wants Congress to B e,” 55-77.
9 Michael Merrill and Sean Wilentz, “The Big House an Alternative to Term Limits,” New Republic
November 16, 1992, 16.
10 Alan Ehrenhalt, “Rightsizing the Legislature,” Governing, July 2001, 6-8.
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Despite the antipathy that most Americans feel toward members of
Congress, they do evaluate the institutions separately from the politicians who serve in
them.11 Therefore, if framed as a way to strengthen the institution and make it more
responsive, Americans might not be so hostile to the idea of enlargement. Furthermore,
there is a desire among the public to have more access to their representatives and for
those representatives to do a better job staying in touch with their districts. They crave
more attention from and want to see that their representatives in Washington put forth a
concerted effort to make themselves visible to the constituents in their district.

1

If

couched as a way to improve representation, support could be found for lifting the 435seat limit. Thus, it is not out of the question that Americans might rally behind a
proposal to enlarge the House.
The numerical composition of seats for the House is not likely to be a salient
issue for most citizens. Many Americans may be indifferent on a question like this one
involving institutional structure. The level of political knowledge displayed by the
average U.S. citizen is extraordinarily weak. Very few can even recall basic facts about
civic institutions and processes. For instance, only thirty percent of people even know
the length of term a House member serves.13 Still, public attitudes toward the
functioning o f democratic institutions can stir a passionate response. There are strong
feelings among many in the public that changes to the political process ought not
11 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy; Kimball and Patterson, “Living Up to
Expectations,” 701-728.
12 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy.
13 For a more thorough review o f the average citizen’s lack o f political knowledge, see Michael X. Deli
Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1996).
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reward special interests or enrich politicians.14 If Americans perceived that any
proposed increased in the size of the House was being pushed to serve the needs of
politicians, there could be an intense backlash. On the other hand, if convinced that
such a move would enhance representation and bring House members closer to the
people there could be openness toward the idea.
One of the key reasons to gather systematic data on this issue is to better
understand public reaction to raising the 435-seat ceiling on the size of the House. It
could have positive consequences for the representational linkage between
representative and citizen, but if the public opposed this policy shift, it could actually
further undermine Americans’ trust in government. Most proponents of a larger House
fail to account for public opinion on the matter of national legislative size. They tout
the potential benefits for representation but there is little consideration of whether the
citizens being represented would actually have a favorable impression of this policy
direction. O f course public opinion is not always reasoned and should not necessarily
be followed in all instances. An increase in the size of the U.S. House may be a wise
policy decision in spite of what the public thinks. Conversely, if a majority of the
public were to endorse raising the 435-seat cap then such a result would lend even
greater support to advocates of an increase to enhance representation. To do so would
ultimately fulfill the will o f the people and demonstrate policy responsiveness. As
Hibbing and Theiss-Moore point out, “The very nature of institutions and the processes

14 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy; John R. Hibbing, “How to Make Congress Popular,”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 27 (2002): 219-244.
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they are seen to embody affect the way citizens feel about their political system.”15
There are very few subjects more fundamental to the character of an institution than its
numerical size. If this policy course is one that either undermines or uplifts Americans’
faith in the Congress or the broader political system, it would be useful information for
policymakers and academics to have at their disposal in order to grasp the full
ramifications of an enlargement of the House.

Questions Utilized for This Study

In undertaking an effort to empirically investigate attitudes toward the size of
the U.S House and its impact on the mean congressional district population size, there
are no benchmark survey questions from which to take guidance. Therefore, this study
will chart new territory in assessing public opinion on this aspect of institutional size.
Ideally an extensive battery o f questions would be utilized to fully probe the complete
dimensions of public perceptions on this matter. However, unlimited resources were
not available for this purpose, so only a handful of survey questions can be
administered. Nevertheless, the survey conducted by the organization Knowledge
Networks can tap into public sentiment on the basic research questions at the heart of
this study. These questions deal with the tradeoff between representation and
governance, the loss of representation for the states, and descriptive representation for
minorities and women in the House.

15 Hibbing and Theiss-Moore, Congress as Public Enemy, 25.
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Prior to a delineation of the rationale for the choice of questions, a brief
explanation o f the survey methodology employed by Knowledge Networks is in order.
Knowledge Networks creates a panel using probability sampling techniques. Recruited
by random-digit dialing over the telephone, the Knowledge Networks panel is the only
online consumer panel that represents those who do not have Internet access as well as
those who do. Knowledge Networks supplies Internet technology to the roughly 30%
of panel members who do not have internet access at home. Research by Stanford
University and others has shown that Knowledge Networks panel data are often more
reliable than findings from other research companies using traditional survey
techniques.16 Survey results gathered by Knowledge Networks have been used in a
number of political science studies in recent years.17 Thus one can have confidence that
the results reported here are an accurate estimate of public opinion on this topic. From
September 13 to September 19, 2006, Knowledge Networks administered the survey to
1,425 of its members. The results presented in this chapter are based on responses from
the 1,020 panel members who completed the survey, representing a 71.6% response

16 Jon A. Krosnik and Lin Chait Chang, “A Comparison o f the Random Digit Dialing Telephone Survey
Methodology with Internet Survey Methodology as Implemented by Knowledge Networks and Harris
Interactive,” Stanford University, http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/OSUpaper.pdf.
17 Recent studies using Knowledge Networks data include Jennifer L. Lawless, “Women, War and
W inning E lections: G ender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era,” Political Research Quarterly

57 (2004): 479-490; D. Sunshine Hillygus and Todd Shields, “Moral Issues and Voter Decision Making
in the 2004 Presidential Election,” PS: Political Science and Politics 33 (2005): 201-209; Joshua D.
Clinton, “Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House,” Journal o f Politics
68 (2006): 397-410.
18 Poststratification weighting was employed to control for minor variations in the sample compared to
the general population.
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Ideally, a vast array of questions would be available to extensively probe
public attitudes toward increasing the House, but the funding for this study was not
limitless. Therefore some questions related to this topic will have to be left for future
research endeavors. The overarching theme pursued in the previous chapters revolved
around the tradeoff that exists between a small legislative chamber and a larger
constituency size and a large legislative chamber and a smaller constituency size. A
small chamber may facilitate a more efficient legislative process while a larger chamber
is more representative.19 This tradeoff involving all facets of legislative structure forms
the basis for the first question included in the survey.20 Because of the rudimentary
knowledge many U.S. citizens display toward U.S. institutions, the first question is
introduced with a brief explanation of the changes in the size of the U.S. House and the
growth of congressional districts. In doing so, each side of the tradeoff debate is also
included. The text of the question follows:

When the U.S. House o f Representatives was first constituted it consisted o f 65 members with
each congressional district having approximately 30,000 people. As you may know, the House
o f Representatives has grown to 435 members with each member representing approximately
640,000 people. Some have argued that the number o f representatives should be increased so
that each member would represent fewer people, would be closer to the people and provide
better representation. Others have argued that a House o f Representatives with greater than 435
members would be more costly and make the legislative process less efficient. In your opinion,
should the size o f the House be: (1) increased, (2) kept at its current size, (3) decreased.

By providing a detailed question that offers each of the major arguments on both
sides of the debate, this approach allows for a nuanced understanding of public attitudes

19 William F. Willoughby, Principles o f Legislative Organization and Administration (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1934).
20 Nelson W. Polsby, “The Institutionalization o f the House o f Representatives,” American Political
Science Review 62 (1968): 144-168; Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Representation and Governance: The Great
Legislative Trade-off,” Political Science Quarterly 103 (1988): 461-484.
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to be elicited. Those citizens inclined toward wanting to see a greater emphasis on
additional representation through institutional reforms should support an increase while
those citizens concerned with gridlock and the cost of government may prefer
maintenance of the status quo or even voice support for a reduction. Though most of
the debate centers on an increase beyond 435 members, many Americans may find a
reduction an appealing option. Indeed, a few commentators have urged consideration of
cutting back on the size o f the U.S. House.21
The remaining survey items investigate two of the other representational issues
that have arisen from a permanent freeze in the size of the U.S. House. First, as was
detailed in Chapter 3 one o f the most conspicuous consequences of the 435-seat limit
pertains to geographic representation. Several states have lost seats in the House over
the past century. Preventing this practice from continuing has been one of the most
prominent arguments advanced by promoters of House enlargement.22 Even rapidly
growing states do not receive an allocation of seats that is commensurate with their
population gains. Yet there has been a visible decline in the actual number of seats for
Midwestern and Northeastern regions despite the fact the population of these states has
continued to rise. For the purposes of this study the absolute losses of seats for states is
focused on here since this norm once played a pivotal role in determining how many
seats ought to be apportioned for the House. Would Americans favor a return to a
21 William Proxmire, “A House Divided in Half; Wanna Save Money Fire Every Other Person on Capitol
Hill,” Washington Post, February 5, 1989, D5; Morris Silverman, “Better Yet, Reduce the Size o f
House,” New York Times, January 14, 1991, A17.
22 Charles A. Kromkowski and John A. Kromkowski, “Why 435? A Question o f Political Arithmetic,”
Polity 24 (1991): 137; Christopher St. John Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve Outgrown?
An Argument for Increasing the Size o f the House o f Representatives,” Columbia Journal o f Law and
Social Problems 25 (1992): 161.
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process where apportionment no longer allows states to suffer a reduction in the
number o f seats allocated for the U.S. House?
The question gauging support for this proposition reads: “After the U.S. census
is taken every ten years some states lose seats in the U.S. House of Representatives
because their population growth is slower than the national rate. Would you support
increasing the size o f the House to prevent states from losing any seats?” This question
serves as a straightforward way to assess to what extent Americans are concerned about
the fact that many states are losing representation in the House due to the 435-seat limit.
One plausible expectation in relationship to opinion in this area is that residents from
the Northeast and Midwest may be more inclined to support an increase for this purpose
than would citizens in the other regions of the country, especially citizens from states
suffering a loss o f at least one House seat following the last round of reapportionment.
One of the major claims advanced by advocates of an upward adjustment in size
of the House is that it would increase representation for women and minorities.23 The
logic behind this argument is that most members are elected to the House not by
defeating a sitting incumbent, but rather when a seat becomes open either by retirement,
resignation or death.24 There is a greater likelihood that women will run for and emerge
victorious in open seat-races.25 Women have traditionally made noticeable gains in the

23 James Glassman, “Let’s B u ild a B ig g er House; Why Shouldn’t the Number o f Congressmen Grow with
the Population,” Washington Post, June 17, 1990, D2; Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 141;
Wilma Rule, “Expanded Congress Would Help Women,” New York Times, February 24, 1991, E16;
Yates, “A House o f Our Own or a House W e’ve Outgrown,” 193.
24 Ronald Keith Gaddie and Charles S. Bullock, Elections to Open Seats in the U.S. House: Where the
Action Is (Lanham, MD; Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).
25 Barbara C. Burrell, “Women Candidates in Open Seat Primaries for the U.S. House: 1968-1990,”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 17 (1992): 493-508.
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first election following reapportionment.26 After each census, the number o f new
seats apportioned would rise, creating additional opportunities for women and minority
to run successfully for the House. For African Americans and Latinos less, populated
congressional districts would make it easier to create majority-minority districts likely
to elect members of these underrepresented groups.27 As was discussed in Chapter 2,
descriptive representation has long occupied a place in this debate. The AntiFederalists were highly critical of the original size of the House because they felt if
failed to ensure that a wide cross-section of individuals in society would get adequate
representation in the national legislative body closest to the people.

-yo

While the concept of descriptive representation is frowned upon by many
normative political theorists, as Mansbridge observes, it may allow for unarticulated
interests to be heard in the deliberative process and may grant the chance for members
o f groups systematically excluded from full participation in politics to demonstrate their
ability to participate effectively in the governing process.29 Furthermore, when
constituents share the same race as their member of Congress, they are more likely to

26 Barbara C. Burrell, A Woman’s Place Is in the House: Campaigning fo r Congress in the Feminist Era
(Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press, 1994); Barbara Palmer and Dennis Simon, Breaking the
Political Glass Ceiling: Women and Congressional Elections (Rutledge: N ew York, 2006).
27 Glassman, “Let’s Build a Bigger House,” D2; Kromkowski and Kromkowski, “Why 435,” 141. For a
contrary assessment disputing the potential benefits to minorities, see L. Marvin Overby,
“Apportionment, Politics and Political Science: A Response to Kromkowski and Kromkowski” Polity 24
(1992): 483-494; Mark E. Rush, “Making the House More Representative: Hidden Costs and Unintended
Consequences,” in The U.S. House o f Representatives: Reform or Rebuild, eds. Joseph F. Zimmerman
and Wilma Rule (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 53-54.
28 Rosemarie Zagarri, The Politics o f Size: Representation in the United States, 1776-1850 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1987), 49.
29 Jane Mansbridge, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent
‘Y e s Journal o f Politics 61 (1999): 628-657.
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express approval o f their representatives, all else equal.

" 3 ft

•

•

•

The same relationship is

present for women represented by a female member of Congress as well.

T1

Thus,

increasing the size of the House may have the effect of increasing the level of political
efficacy some citizens feel toward the political system were they to see more people like
themselves serving in government. To discern whether there is support for increasing
the size of the House on this basis, a third question was asked in this survey : “Some
argue that increasing the numerical size of the U.S. House of Representatives would
create more opportunities for members of underrepresented groups such as women and
racial minorities to get elected. Would you be very supportive, somewhat supportive,
somewhat opposed or very opposed to increasing the size o f the House for this
purpose?”
Even if there is opposition among the broader public to an increase on these
grounds, if certain segments of society who have faced historical systemic barriers to
full participation in the electoral process communicate support for an increase, it could
be a meaningful way to help build political efficacy among these groups of citizens. In
reviewing the responses to these questions, particular attention will be paid to answers
given by women, African Americans, and Hispanic respondents. To reiterate, a much
broader set of questions would be needed to encompass public attitudes on all of the
arguments put forward on behalf of raising the 43 5-seat limit on the size of the House.

30 Claudine Gay, “Spirals o f Trust? The Effect o f Descriptive Representation on the Relationship between
Citizens and Their Government,” American Journal o f Political Science 46 (2002): 717-732; Katherine
Tate, Black Faces in the M irror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
31 Jennifer L. Lawless, “Politics or Presence? Congresswomen and Symbolic Representation,” Political
Research Quarterly 57 (2004): 81-99.
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Notwithstanding these constraints, the survey items administered for this study
touch on some o f the main considerations that have been raised in this debate.

Support for Increasing the Size of the U.S. House in the Context of the Legislative
Tradeoff

The first set of results gauges public support for an increase in the size of the
U.S. House in the context o f the legislative tradeoff between governance and
representation. Table 26 reveals that Americans are solidly behind keeping the House
at its present size. Overall, 61.9% of those individuals surveyed selected that option
while only 18.9% favored an increase and just 19.3 supported a reduction in the
membership of the body. There is some degree of variation across the subgroups listed
in Table 28. Conservatives, Republicans, and older citizens are less likely to favor an
increase. Conversely, liberals, African Americans, Hispanics, women, and younger
people express the highest levels of support for an increase. It has to be noted,
however, that for each o f these groups the support for an increase is less than thirty
percent and the disparities between them is quite modest. A majority in all categories
favor maintaining the present size of the House. There is minimal regional variation
contained in the results as well.
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Table 26 Support for an Increase in the Size o f the U.S. H ouse to Im prove Representation

Respondents

Increase

Keep at Present Size

Decri

All

18.9

61.9

19.3

Republicans

11.3

70.2

18.5

Democrats

23.7

58.0

18.3

Independents/Other

22.7

54.3

23.0

Liberal

27.0

55.8

17.3

Moderate

20.7

58.4

20.9

Conservative

11.7

71.0

17.3

Men

16.5

59.6

23.9

Women

2 1 .2

63.9

15.0

White

15.5

64.6

19.9

Black

28.0

57.9

14.0

Hispanic

23.4

56.5

2 0 .2

Less Than High School

18.1

63.2

18.8

High School

16.6

57.2

26.2

Some College

2 2 .1

59.0

18.8

Bachelor’s Degree or Higher

18.6

69.5

11.9

Less than $50,000

2 0 .6

59.1

2 0 .2

$50,000-75,000

15.0

64.7

20.3

$75,000-100,000

14.3

74.0

11.7

$100,000 or Higher

19.9

. 60.8

19.3

Northeast

19.7

55.9

24.4

Midwest

17.5

6 6 .2

16.3

South

18.1

63.6

18.3

West

20.7

59.7

19.6

Party ID

Ideology

G ender

Race

Education

H ousehold Incom e

Region

(continued on following page)
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Table 26 Continued
Respondents

Increase

Keep at Present Size

Decrease

18-24

24.1

62.7

13.2

25-34

2 1 .8

62.2

15.9

35-44

19.1

60.3

2 0 .6

45-54

17.7

61.5

2 0 .8

55-64

2 1 .6

59.2

19.1

65 and Higher

10.4

65.7

23.9

Age

Note-. Cell entries represent the percentage of respondents who fall within each category.

Despite the extremely dim appraisal of the job Congress was doing at the time of
this survey, Americans o f all political stripes do not want to reduce the number of
politicians they send to Washington. These results buttress the conclusions of prior
scholarship by illustrating strong support for the House as an institution, despite the
hostility toward the actions o f the members who run and occupy it.

'X'J

On the other hand,

citizens are not willing to go along with an increase even if it would lead to an
improvement in representation.
In order to get a better handle on which groups of citizens are most likely to
support increasing and decreasing the size of the House a multinomial probit model was
formulated to predict responses to this question.33 The reference category in this model
was support for maintaining the House at its present size. Several independent variables
were employed as predictors in the model including political ideology, dummy

32 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy.
33 Multinomial probit was employed instead o f multinomial logit because since it allows errors to be
correlated across choices, a multinomial probit model eliminates the independence o f irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) assumption. See J. Scott Long, Regression Models fo r Categorical and Limited
Dependent Variables (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997), 184.
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variables for African Americans and Hispanic respondents, dummy variables for
Republicans and independents, and a standard set of demographic variables including
age, education, income, and marital status. Dummy variables were also created for
residents in the Northeast, Midwest, and West, with the South as the omitted category.
Another variable was entered into the model measuring how closely respondents follow
politics. Finally, this analysis incorporates a variable indicating whether the respondent
is personally acquainted with a member of Congress, state legislator, or local elected
official. This variable is used to tap the positive sentiments of citizens who personally
know politicians, since they may feel more positively toward them in general, raising
the likelihood that they would favor an increase.
Table 27 reports the results of this analysis. First, examining the predictors of
support for an increase versus support for maintenance of the status quo reveals that
politically interested citizens are more inclined to support an increase, as are individuals
who are personally acquainted with a politician. As expected, conservatives,
Republicans, and wealthier, and older citizens are less likely to favor an increase.34
Members o f these subgroups are less concerned with bolstering the representational
relationship that would come from increase and are more troubled by the cost and
greater legislative inefficiency that might ensue. The coefficients for the other variables
in the model were not significant at better than the .10 level.

34 This lack o f support among conservatives runs counter to the views of a number o f conservative
opinion writers who have come out in favor o f increasing the U.S. House in recent years. See Robert
Novak, Completing the Revolution: A Vision fo r Victory in 2000. New York: The Free Press, 2000, 187188; George Will, “Congress Just Isn’t Big Enough,” Washington Post, January 14, 2001, B7; Jeff
Jacoby, “A Bigger More Democratic Congress,” Boston Globe, January 13, 2005.
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T able 27 M ultinom ial Probit Model Estim ating Support for Increasing or
D ecreasing the Size o f the House________________________________________

Independent Variable

Increase

Decrease

African-American

.269
(.257)

-.236
(.278)-

Hispanic

.297
(.284)

.063
(.281)

.201
(.157)

-.377*
(.160)

Republican

-.399#
(.207)

-.088
(.202)

Independent

.123
(.226)

.123
(.226)

Ideology (Conservative)

-.128*

-.086

(.060)

(.061)

Age

-.009#
(.005)

.004
(.005)

Education

.016
(.055)

-.110*
(.050)

Income

-.040#
(.022)

-.027
(.022)

Married

-.168
(.164)

.442**
(■171)

Political Interest

.188*
(.089)

-.007
(.091)

Personally Acquainted with a Politician

.372#
(.214)

.218
(.207)

Northeast

.195
(.235)

.216
(.214)

Midwest

.089
(.215)

-.198
(.207)

West

.205
(.209)

.057
(.216)

Constant

-.376
(.470)

-.160
(.466)

Female

978
N
#p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01
Note: Dependent variable is the respondent’s support for increasing or
decreasing the size o f the U.S. House with “keep the same size” the omitted
category.

978
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Scrutinizing the data on support for a decrease in the size of the House
versus keeping it at 435 seats, one finds that married respondents are the only group
significantly more likely to support a decrease in the size of the House. Conversely,
women and highly educated citizens are significantly less likely to favor a decrease.
The latter relationship is consistent with earlier work showing that more educated
citizens tend to rate Congress higher as an institution,35 which may translate into less
willingness to endorse a reduction of the House membership. None of the other
variables are significantly related to opposition to a decrease. Women and highly
educated citizens are more concerned about the loss of representation that would come
from a reduction in the House membership whereas married voters do not share the
same apprehension. Overall, however, the responses to this question paint a picture of
public satisfaction with the size of the House. In spite of the possible enhancement of
representation that might result from an increase, the American people are not willing to
accept the tradeoff of a more costly and less efficient legislative operation in the House.

Support for Increasing the Size of the House to Prevent States from Losing States

The loss o f seats by states in the Northeast and Midwest has been one of the
centerpieces o f the case advanced by advocates of increasing the size of the U.S. House.
This section o f the chapter provides the results of the survey question ascertaining
whether U.S. citizens are in support of enlarging the House to prevent states from losing
seats in subsequent rounds of reapportionment. According to the data contained in

35 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy, 120.
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Table 28, Americans do not perceive this development as a compelling rationale to
alter the size of the institution. Altogether, 66.4% of respondents are against the idea
for this purpose. This view is consistent among a broad cross-section of groups in
society. Only African-Americans give majority support for an increase to preserve
representation for the states. A sizable racial gap is present in public opinion on the
question, with Whites 22.5 points less supportive than African Americans. This finding
is consistent with the actions o f members of the Congressional Black Caucus such as
Alcee Hastings o f Florida who have called for re-examination of the size of the House.
While both liberals and conservatives are against the idea, there is a 15-point difference
in the level of opposition, with conservatives more uniformly against it. Most women
are also opposed, but there is a substantial gender gap with female respondents
approximately 17 points more supportive than men. As with the first question, younger
people are more sympathetic to the cause of precluding states from losing representation
in the House. One striking aspect of the results contained in Table 28 is the negligible
regional variation. One might expect that respondents in areas that have experienced
modest population growth would be predisposed to support an increase for this purpose,
but that supposition is not corroborated. Southerners are slightly more opposed than
individuals living in other regions of the country; however, residents of the Midwest
and Northeast stand solidly in opposition. Residents in these regions may not be
familiar with the size of the House delegation in their states but they should have some
knowledge that slower population growth is decreasing their political influence. Just as
House members have been willing to accept this outcome of the 435 seat-limit, the
people they represent express little concern as well.
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Table 28 Support for Increasing the Size o f the House to
Prevent States from Losing Seats__________________________________
Respondents
Support
Oppose
All

33.6

66.4

Republicans

26.2

73.8

Democrats

39.2

60.2

Independents/Other

33.4

66.6

Liberal

41.2

58.8

Moderate

36.2

63.8

Conservative

25.2

74.2

Men

24.8

75.2

Women

41.7

58.3

White

30.2

69.8

Black

52.7

47.3

Hispanic

33.7

66.3

Less Than High School

39.9

60.1

High School

34.8

65.2

Some College

36.9

63.1

Bachelor’s Degree or Higher

25.4

74.6

Less than $50,000

35.6

64.4

$50,000-75,000

32.2

67.8

$75,000-100,000

31.1

68.9

$100,000 and Higher

25.2

74.8

Northeast

34.4

65.6

Midwest

36.0

64.0

South

30.2

69.8

West

36.1

63.9

Party ID

Ideology

Gender

Race

Education

H ousehold Incom e

Region

(continued on following page)
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Table 28 Continued
Respondents

Support

Oppose

18-24

43.4

56.6

25-34

36.5

63.5

35-44

37.9

62.1

45-54

28.0

72.0

55-64

27.8

72.2

Age

31.2
65 and Higher
Note: Cell entries represent the percentage of respondents who fall
within each category.

68.8

To gain further leverage on variance in public opinion on this question, a logistic
regression model was formulated for this analysis. Most of the independent variables in
this model are similar to the previous multivariate analysis, with one addition. To parse
out whether any systematic geographic differences were overlooked in the cross-tabular
analysis, a dummy variable was included in the model coded 1 for residents in the 10
states that lost a seat following the 2000 census and 0 otherwise. The results of this
model are contained in Table 29. The previous analysis is largely confirmed. There is
no significant regional variation, and residents from states losing seats after the last
census are not more likely to support an increase for this purpose. Alternative model
specifications with interaction terms for state seat loss in tandem with region, education,
and political interest also uncovered no support for the state interest hypothesis. Put
another way, even highly educated, politically attentive citizens in these states are not
significantly more likely to back an increase.
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Table 29 Logistic Regression Model Predicting Support for Increasing
the Size o f the House to Prevent States from Losing Seats in the House
Coefficient
Independent Variable

S.E.

Northeast

.387

.301

Midwest

.471

.299

West

.324

.241

Respondent’s State Lost a
House Seat in the 2000 Census

-.106

.272

Republican

-.284

.220

Independent

-.217

.257

Ideology (Conservative)

-.122#

.066

Age

-.012*

.005

Education

-.105#

.063

Income

-.017

.024

Political Interest

.048

.101

African-American

.781**

.296

Hispanic

-.026

.315

Female

772***

.174

Married

-.233

.184

Constant

.373

.506

Log-Likelihood

-584.604

Pseudo R2

.072

984
N
#p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Note'. Dependent variable is the respondent’s support for increasing the
size of the House to prevent states from losing seats coded 1 for support
and 0 otherwise.
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The impact o f party identification washes out in the multivariate analysis,
although conservative ideological identification is marginally associated with greater
opposition. Older persons are significantly less likely to back an increase to enhance
state representation. The pattern of support from African Americans and women holds
in this analysis as well. The coefficients for these variables are significant at better than
the .01 level. Members o f these groups are the most concerned about the
representational costs o f the size of the House failing to expand in line with the U.S.
population. Altogether this evidence suggests that Americans are not bothered by the
loss of representation for the states and do not find that it is a persuasive justification for
an upward adjustment in the number o f House seats.

Support for Increasing the Size of the U.S. to Enhance Descriptive Representation

Thus far the evidence presented in this chapter indicates that there is no public
enthusiasm for increasing the size of the House to improve the quality o f representation
House members provide or to end the practice of subtracting from the apportionment of
seats from states with lagging population growth. This final analysis explores whether
Americans are receptive to enlarging the numerical composition of the House to
enhance the prospects for women and minorities to gain additional opportunities to be
elected and serve in the body. As shown in Table 30 there is almost a split decision on
this question: 15.5% o f respondents are very supportive of the idea, 33.1 are somewhat
supportive, 29.6% are somewhat opposed, and 21.8% are very opposed. Combining the
response categories produces a figure of 48.6% in support, just short of a majority.
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T able 30 Support for an Increase in the Size o f the H ouse to Increase the
Chances o f W om en and M inorities G etting Elected __________________

Respondents

Very
Supportive

Somewhat
Supportive

Somewhat
Opposed

Very
Oppo

All

15.5

33.1

29.6

21.8

Republicans

8.2

25.7

35.2

30.9

Democrats

22.2

37.5

27.1

13.1

Independents/Other

14.0

37.5

24.4

24.0

Liberal

24.7

37.1

24.1

14.0

Moderate

14.5

42.7

24.3

18.5

Conservative

10.4

20.5

38.4

30.7

Men

12.8

28.0

33.6

25.6

Women

18.0

37.8

26.0

18.1

White

11.0

31.3

32.2

25.5

Black

33.9

42.9

15.7

7.5

Hispanic

23.6

31.6

27.8

17.0

Less than High School

16.1

37.1

27.2

19.6

High School

13.3

33.9

30.4

22.4

Some College

19.0

28.9

32.0

20.1

Bachelor’s Degree or Higher

14.1

34.2

27.7

24.0

Less than $50,000

16.6

34.9

30.7

17.8

$50,000-75,000

14.1

33.0

26.2

26.7

$75,000-100,000

11.2

33.1

28.9

26.7

$100,000 and Higher

15.6

20.5

30.3

33.6

Northeast

14.8

27.5

31.2

26.5

Midwest

12.0

34.1

31.6

22.3

South

17.2

34.3

29.9

18.6

West

16.7

34.8

26.0

22.5

P arty ID

Ideology

G ender

R ace

Education

H ousehold Incom e

Region

(continued on following page)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

214
Table 30 Continued
Very
Supportive

Somewhat
Supportive

Somewhat
Opposed

Very
Opposed

18-24

31.1

33.0

21.0

15.0

25-34

15.1

38.3

35.4

11.2

35-44

14.3

38.6

26.5

20.5

45-54

13.4

41.3

24.3

21.0

55-64

17.1

20.9

30.4

31.5

Respondents
Age

8.5
21.7
33.3
65 and higher
Note: Cell entries represent the percentage of respondents who fall within each category.

36.6

Though a slight majority remains opposed to an increase, the cause of
descriptive representation generates the largest reservoir of support from the U.S. public
on behalf of taking this policy action. Giving members of underrepresented groups
more opportunities to serve in the House finds a receptive audience among some
Americans not persuaded about the need for an increase for other reasons.
One must be cautious in interpreting these results because, due to the nature of this
question, social desirability effects may be at work. Some individuals may simply be
voicing support for this idea because they do not want to openly express their
opposition to this cause for fear of being perceived as sexist or racially insensitive. A
large body o f academic literature has documented the social desirability phenomenon.36
However, in this case that possibility is not as worrisome since Knowledge Networks

36 Steven E. Finkel, Thomas M. Guterbock, and Marian J. Borg, “Race-of-Interviewer-Effects in
Preelection Polls: Virginia 1989,” Public Opinion Quarterly 55 (1991): 313-330; Emily W. Kane and
Laura J. Macaulay, “Interviewer Gender and Gender Attitudes,” Public Opinion Quarterly 57 (1993): 128; Adam J. Berinsky, “The Two Faces o f Public Opinion,” American Journal o f Political Science 43
(1999): 1209-1230.
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conducts it surveys via the Internet, lessening the chances that interview effects are
at work.37
Unlike the previous two questions utilized for this chapter there are some major
systematic differences in public opinion among various segments of the population.
These results confirm the ideological realignment that has transpired in the electorate
over the past generation.38 Conservatives and Republicans are the least supportive of a
House size increase to improve descriptive representation while liberals and Democrats
take a diametrically opposing position. Approximately two-thirds of Republicans and
conservatives are against an increase on this basis, compared to about sixty percent of
Democrats and liberals who express some form of support. The partisan and
ideological polarization on this issue suggests that if policymakers tried to propose an
increase for purposes o f descriptive representation there, a bipartisan consensus on the
matter would not emerge. These data also lend credence to the notion that race is still
an important cleavage dividing party followers in the electorate,39 contrary to the
conclusions of some scholars who contend it has faded in importance.40

37 For evidence that increased levels o f privacy in the administration o f surveys reduces the likelihood
that White respondents will give socially desirable answers see Maria Krysan, “Privacy and the
Expression o f White Racial Attitudes: A Comparison Across Three Contexts,” Public Opinion Quarterly
62 (1998): 506-544.
38 Alan I. Abramowitz and Kyle L. Saunders, “Ideological Realignment in the US Electorate,” Journal o f
Politics 60 (1998): 634-652.
39 Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation o f
American Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
40 Alan I. Abramowitz, “Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the US
Electorate,” American Journal o f Political Science 38 (1994): 1-24.
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A further inspection of these data brings to light that a gender gap exists on
this question, just as it does on other policy issues as well.41 About 55.8% of women
are behind the idea compared to only 40.8% of men. This gap is substantial but it pales
in comparison to the racial gap that exists on this question. Over three quarters of
African Americans want to see the House enlarged to enhance descriptive
representation and slightly more than 55% of Hispanics are in favor as well. In
contrast, only about 42% of Whites offer some degree of support. This cavernous
divide, particularly between Blacks and Whites, is highly illustrative of the different
conceptions of matters of race and representation that are still present in U.S. society.
African Americans still feel there are strides that need to be made in opening up the
political process while most White Americans do not see the same need to alter
institutional arrangements to help the electoral prospects of women and minorities.
This question is another area where racial division is present in public opinion just as it
is on a variety of other issues 42
Age differences also exist in attitudes toward a House size increase for better
descriptive representation, especially at the two ends of the age spectrum. The youngest
age cohort, 18-24 years old, expresses 64.1% support compared to 30.2% support from
individuals over 65. There are some slight regional differences in reactions to this
question but not necessarily what would be anticipated. Solid majorities of residents in
the Northeast and Midwest reject this idea while a majority of Southerners and
41 Virginia Sapiro, “It’s the Context, Situation and Opinion, Stupid: The Gender Basis o f Public
Opinion,” in Understanding Public Opinion, eds. Barbra Norrander and Clyde W ilcox (Washington DC:
CQ Press, 2002), 21-42
42 Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996).
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Westerners are in favor. However, this finding could be a function of the high
concentrations of minorities in parts of the South and West.43
To rule out the possibility that the preceding analysis consisted of any spurious
relationships, a multivariate analysis employing an ordered probit model was
undertaken. The independent variables utilized in this analysis are similar to the
previous multivariate models presented in this chapter, with one addition. A dummy
variable indicating a respondent’s status as a gay, lesbian or bisexual American was
incorporated to account for the possibility that members of this community may be
more receptive to enhancement of descriptive representation. Table 31 generally
bolsters the conclusions of the study thus far. Republicans, conservatives, older persons
and married individuals are all significantly less likely to support an increase to help
more women and minorities get elected. Consistent with the class divide present in the
American political landscape,44 wealthier citizens have a lower inclination to support
House size expansion to aid descriptive representation. Political independents are also
less likely to lend their support to an increase. Contrary to expectations, gay, lesbian or
bisexual status is negatively related to higher levels of support. In contrast, the two
strongest predictors o f support were status as a woman or an African American. These
two groups have been the most consistent supporters of representation in the context of
the size of the U.S. House.

43 Fifty-six percent o f the African American respondents in this sample resided in the South.
44 Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Class and Party in American Politics (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2000);
Nolan M. McCarthy, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance o f Ideology
and Unequal Riches (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2006); Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Political Parties Matter:
Realignment and the Return o f Partisan Voting (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).
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T ab le 31 O rdered Probit Model o f Support for Increasing the House
to Increase Representation for W omen and M inorities_________ ___

Independent Variable

Coefficient

Robust S.E.

African-American

.553***

.142

Hispanic

.216

.165

Female

.290***

.083

Republican

-.376***

.108

independent

-.264*

.135

Ideology (Conservative)

-.110**

.035

Age

- 011***

.003

Education

.035

.029

Income

-.035**

.013

Married

-.199*

.086

Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual

-.693#

.402

Political Interest

-.050

.049

Northeast

-.064

.119

Midwest

.003

.106

West

-.056

.119

Threshold 1

-2.310

.266

Threshold 2

-1.394

.262

Threshold 3

-.274

.255

Pseudo R2

.080

N

980
< .10 * p - .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Note: Dependent variable is the respondent’s level of support for increasing the size
o f the House to increase representation for women and racial minorities, coded: 4 =
Very Supportive, 3 = Somewhat Supportive, 2 = Somewhat Opposed, 1 = Very
Opposed.
-p
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To expand on this premise, Figure 11 contains the predicted probabilities of
the level of support for white male and female Democrats, White male and female
Republicans, and African American male and female Democrats, holding all the other
variables in the model at their appropriate means, medians, and modes 45 The average
African American female Democrat has a predicted probability of .40 of being very
supportive or somewhat supportive of an increase. The corresponding figures for
African American males are .30 and .40 respectively. The numbers for white male
Republicans are completely at odds with the story for African Americans. For the
typical member of this group the predicted probability of being very supportive is .07
and .29 for the somewhat supportive category. The estimates for White female
Republicans are .12 and .35 for the same categories. The average White male Democrat
is notably more supportive than a Republican with the same characteristics but more
likely to voice some form o f opposition than an African American Democrat (Very
Supportive = .14; Somewhat Supportive = .37). The role of gender is evident, with the
predicted probabilities for White female Democrats .21 for the very supportive category
and .41 for the somewhat supportive category.

45 African American Republicans were not included in this analysis due their limited presence in this
sample.
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Figure 11 Probability of Level o f Support for Increasing the Size of the U.S. House to Increase the
Chances wom en and Minorities Getting Elected

These numbers are indicative of the importance party, gender, and race play in
determining the role that representation should play in the institutional design of the
national legislature. African Americans and women are generally more favorable to the
type of representation they receive when there is racial and gender congruence with
their member of Congress.46 Allocating extra positions in the U.S. House could elevate
the likelihood that women and minorities would be represented by someone like
themselves and potentially feel more efficacious toward the broader political system.
There are already intense partisan and ideological disagreements about the propriety of
overt government efforts to aid women and minorities, and these fault lines are only
46 Gay, “Spirals o f Trust”; Tate, Black Faces in the Mirror, Lawless, “Politics or Presence?”
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heightened even further when race and sex become a part of the equation. Not
surprisingly, it is the politics of race and the rights of women that most polarize the U.S.
public on the underlying principles that warrant an increase in the size of the House.

Conclusion

The absence o f available survey data gauging public attitudes toward increasing
the size o f the U.S. House necessitated gathering a systematic estimate of where
Americans stand on this crucial issue. Simply because national lawmakers have taken it
off the decision agenda does not mean it is unworthy of attention for survey researchers.
The growth of House district constituency size and the tangible consequences for
representation that have stemmed from it are deserving of empirical investigation.47
The evidence supplied in this chapter has gone a long way toward expanding
knowledge of public opinion on this subject. Serious political observers who have
weighed in on this debate have not had the benefit of public opinion data to shape their
arguments. The results presented in this chapter show that advocates of House
enlargement do not reflect the will of the people, even if those supporters seek to
improve the representative quality of the institution. A larger House may be more
representative but it represents a policy option the people hold in disfavor. If members
of Congress were to enact a sizable increase in the size of the U.S. House it might
provoke a backlash and further undermine the degree of trust in the national
government that is already severely hemorrhaging.
47 Peverill Squire and Keith E. Hamm, 101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures and the Future o f
Legislative Studies (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2005), 55-58.
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When the question was posed providing each side of the legislative tradeoff
argument the vast majority of citizens selected the status quo. Less than 20% want an
increase even if it would help counter the growth in the average size of congressional
districts and improve the quality of representation. The financial costs and possible
damage to the legislative operations of the U.S. House of Representatives outweighed
the possible benefits that would accrue for representation. The U.S. public sees no
pressing need for an expansion of the House beyond the 435 limit. It must also be noted
in this discussion that there is no clamor among American citizens for a decrease in the
size of the House either. Americans are not reflexively anti-politician nor do they seek
to make radical changes to the institutions of the U.S political system based on their
dissatisfaction with the behavior and motivations of members of Congress.
There is no widespread support for an increase to remedy the recurring
phenomenon of House seats being transferred from the Midwest and Northeast to the
South and West. Most Americans see this outcome as a legitimate result of shifting
migration patterns in the country and harbor no desire to reverse it. Even residents in
the slowest growing regions o f the country or in states that have had their House
delegations slashed due to reapportionment are not motivated to support a policy of
House enlargements to stem the tide of states losing House seats every ten years. It is a
plausible argument that the issue is not particularly salient to most Americans and that
were leaders in these states to mount a concerted campaign to change the existing
policy, opinion would shift in favor. That may be a reasonable assumption regarding
the citizens of state population growth laggards but not necessarily in the rest of the
country. Perhaps advancing an argument that states gaining House seats suffer a loss of
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representation relative to population growth could generate broader support.
However, the more likely outcome is that most citizens will continue voicing opposition
on these grounds, if they contemplate the issue at all. Geographic representation in the
context of increasing legislative size is poised to galvanize neither wide nor deep
support in the U.S. population.
Without question the reason for increasing the size of the House that gathered
the highest level of support in this study was the prospect that it would potentially
enhance descriptive representation for women and minorities. Though a slim majority
was against an increase on these grounds, the results revealed that this argument has
resonance for many members of society. This sentiment is especially salient as it
applies to women and minorities. Members of these groups feel they are
underrepresented in the nation’s political institutions and sense that an increase in the
size of the U.S. House o f Representatives would increase the possibility they would be
represented by someone o f their own social group and therefore express higher levels of
approval toward their member of the House. Beyond a more ample level of support for
this rationale, what distinguished the responses to this question was the polarized
reaction it generated. Republicans and conservatives overwhelmingly reject this
proposition while Democrats and liberals openly embrace it. A similar divide makes its
presence felt along racial and gender lines as well. Hence, the justification for
increasing the size o f the House that has the most support also stokes highly partisan
reactions. So for House enlargement advocates they are likely to find that incorporating
the gains for descriptive representation as a part of their case will not find much success
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as long as Republicans and conservatives control key positions within the national
political system.
One major caveat must be offered in assessing the validity of these findings that
suggests support for an increase is more robust than was documented in this chapter.
This survey was conducted at a time when the popularity of Congress was approaching
record lows. For instance, a CBS/New York Times survey conducted during a similar
interval of time showed approval of Congress was a paltry 25%.48 Given this
heightened level of negativity toward the performance of Congress it is not
unreasonable to assume that under different circumstances support for an increase on all
three questions may have been higher. This assumption is particularly relevant when
applied to Democrats and liberals had they not been so disenchanted with Republican
control of the U.S. House. Of course this speculation would require subsequent polling
at a time when the performance of Congress was held in higher esteem in order to be
confirmed. Nevertheless, given the overwhelming opposition to an increase that was
manifested in the responses to the first two questions in this study it does not seem
likely that most U.S. citizens would feel sanguine about increasing the size of the House
no matter how positive the political environment. This conclusion is the overriding
lesson that can be gleaned from the analysis of public opinion conducted for this study.

48 Adam Nagoumey and Janet Elder, “Only 25% in Poll Approve o f the Congress,” New York Times,
September 21, 2006, The survey was conducted from September 15-19, 2006, A l.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

The forgoing chapters amassed a collection of data estimating the impact of
retaining the 435-seat limit on the size of the U.S. House of Representatives while the
nation’s population has soared dramatically over the past century. This study has built
on some o f the past research on legislative and constituency size by examining the case
of the U.S. House in extensive detail. It has added a degree of empirical insight into
what has been a largely normative discussion over the optimal size of the U.S. House
and the growth of congressional district populations. This concluding chapter aims to
accomplish two main objectives. First, it will restate and summarize the findings
generated by this study and discuss the implications of the representational tradeoff that
has resulted from maintaining the House size status quo for such a lengthy period of
time. Second, it delves into the future prospects for increasing the size of the House in
the context o f the present political environment.

Summary o f the Findings

Over the past few decades there has been some newfound interest among
political scientists, journalists and other political observers concerning the advisability
o f increasing the size of the U.S. House. This renewed attention has been ignited by the
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results of the two preceding censuses conducted by the U.S. Commerce Department
revealing a sizable expansion o f House district populations. However, as Chapter 2
showed, this debate was once a decennial feature of the American political landscape
going back to the deliberations at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. The dispute
over the appropriate size of the institution centered on a need to balance the chief
requirements o f any legislative body, enacting policy in an efficient manner while still
providing adequate representation of a diverse population of citizens.1 The founders
were not of one mind on how to achieve this balance but ultimately crafted a policy that
would allow the size of the nation’s lower house to grow in line with the population
every ten years. Though the Anti-Federalists lambasted the original size of the House,
the institution experienced an upward adjustment in the number of seats after each
census all but one time from the founding until 1920, when the Congress failed to pass a
reapportionment bill. Over this period the impetus behind these enlargements shifted
from maintaining a small constituency size to preserving representation for the states as
national lawmakers emphasized reducing the costs to representation rather than
focusing on worries about the consequences for legislative operations in the House.
In the decade o f the 1920s a broad consensus among House members was
reached that continuing with further additions of seats would be untenable for the
maintenance o f an orderly legislative process. Congress failed to enact reapportionment
legislation during much o f this decade but finally agreed in 1929 to pass a statute that
made 435 seats a permanent fixture and provided for the U.S. Commerce Department to
1 Nelson W. Polsby, “The Institutionalization o f the House o f Representatives,” American Political
Science Review 62 (1968): 144-168; Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Representation and Governance: The Great
Legislative Trade-off,” Political Science Quarterly 103 (1988): 461-484.
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automatically apportion seats following every decennial census. The
representational imperative was jettisoned in favor of an automatic process of
apportioning seats and a fixed numerical composition of members that would not
undermine legislative operations in the House. Since this time there has been only one
serious attempt to revisit the size of the U.S. House and that effort failed to bring about
permanent change in the 1960s.2 The inertia of the present policy has not been altered
by any internal or external momentum to enact change. There appears to be only minor
concern evinced by House members over how representation has been influenced in the
aftermath o f this decision. Proposals to re-evaluate the size of the House and the
average number of citizens per congressional district have received underwhelming
support.
Chapter 3 began this study’s empirical look at the impact of permanence of the
435-seat figure and the ensuing growth in the ratio of citizens per representative. Three
of the most common criticisms lodged by House enlargement advocates concerning the
435-seat limit include the steep rise in House district populations, the size of the House
compared to legislative institutions in other developed countries and the loss of seats
that has occurred for states with population growth lagging the national average. The
average number of constituents each House member represents is now over 400,000
greater than when the House was first constituted of 435 members, far in excess of
anything the nation’s founders could have envisioned, certainly a sizable uptick but not
so astounding when compared to other legislative chambers internationally and at the
subnational level in the United States. The members of India’s lower house of the

2 CQ Almanac, vol. 18 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1962), 395.
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national legislature represent about three times as many people as their U.S.
counterparts. Furthermore, state senators in both California and Texas serve an average
constituency more numerous than U.S. House members.3 In spite of these examples,
U.S. House district populations are on the expansive side from both a comparative and
historical perspective.
The numerical allocation o f seats for the U.S. House is less than would be
predicted by the size of the U.S. population. The House has drifted farther and farther
from conformance with the cube root law of national assembly size that scholars have
argued facilitates the optimum communication between citizens and their
representatives and between representatives within the chamber itself. Once again,
however, India’s deviation from this rule surpasses the U.S. House. Moreover, every
country has a distinctive set of political dynamics that shapes institutional size
distinctive from population. The results from a more fully specified model including
factors in addition to population revealed the U.S. House is constituted of
approximately 90 seats fewer than would be predicted. It is clearly out o f line with
international norms but still less than some historical and comparative scholars have
called for in terms of an increase in its numerical size.4
The analysis of the fallout for the states from almost a century o f 435 seats
reveals that slow-growing states have taken the worse absolute losses in terms of
representation of the House. Population growth behind the national average has

3 Peverill Squire and Keith E. Hamm, 101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures and the Future o f
Legislative Studies (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2005), 55-58.
4 Arend Lijphart, “Reforming the House: Three Moderately Radical Proposals,” in The US House o f
Representatives: Reform or Rebuild, eds. Joseph Zimmerman and Wilma Rule (Westport, CT: Praeger
Publishing, 2000), 135-140.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

229

decimated the delegations o f states such as Illinois, New York, Ohio and
Pennsylvania and will continue to do so in the future. One of the key points highlighted
in Chapter 3 was that all states have experienced population growth over this interval
but that many states now have less representation in the House while their shrunken
delegations represent more and more people. Perhaps most noteworthy is the finding
that relative to population trends, it is the states with the fastest growth rates that have
lost representation in the House. These states have made absolute gains in
representation but have also lost out on additional seats that would have come their way
had Congress not imposed the 435-seat ceiling. Moreover, these states are some of the
most diverse in the country and the fact that they have not been allocated more seats has
slowed the progress o f electoral gains for underrepresented minorities in the House.
Most scholars have focused on the losses that have plagued the beleaguered Northeast
and the Midwest but have failed to account for the relative loss of representation the
South and West have experienced. Both developments merit comment when evaluating
the representational consequences of the 435-seat limit.
Chapter 4 of this study reviewed how the rise of constituency size has
influenced House elections. Though the electoral process in the House has been heavily
studied by political scientists in general, this aspect has not been as thoroughly
scrutinized. The results revealed that as House districts encompass additional citizens,
incumbents suffer a decline in the percentage of the vote they receive. While not as
influential as district partisanship or previous margin of victory in determining electoral
outcomes, district population does tend to depress the victory margins incumbent
representatives are able to achieve. Still, there are other factors in congressional
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elections that have intervened over the past few decades that have more than offset
any o f the added level of competition larger constituencies generate. Furthermore,
although constituency size negatively influences margin of victory, it does not have a
significant impact on the probability that an incumbent will lose. Ultimately, district
population growth may make the electoral playing field slightly more treacherous for
incumbents, but it is not strong enough to create additional accountability and turnover
in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Although the results in Chapter 4 seem like they point to a positive derivative of
the 435-seat limitation by stimulating electoral competition, this conclusion may not tell
the full story. As Chapter 5 showed, this diminished electoral support for incumbents
may be linked to the dissatisfaction citizens have with their members of the House in
more populous districts. Supporters of keeping the legislative constituency size as
small as possible predict that failing to so will promote detachment from the
constituency on the part of the representative. Indeed, this supposition is corroborated
from the ANES data presented in Chapter 5. As constituency size goes up, citizens are
less likely to report having contact with their representative and having met their
representative in person. They are also less likely to make an overt attempt to initiate
contact as well. Therefore, it seems that serving additional numbers of persons in the
district does weaken the citizen-representative connection.
Not only is contact undermined by this phenomenon but so are perceptions of
service responsiveness as well. Citizens in the most heavily populated congressional
districts are less likely to believe their representative would be helpful should the need
to contact them arise. The same holds true when citizens are queried about whether
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their representative does an adequate job of staying in touch with the people in the
district. There is a robust negative relationship between constituency size and
perceptions of representatives’ ability to remain close to their constituents. As the
population level in the district climbs, citizens do not sense that their House member
displays the kind of assistance to and contact with the district that they expect.
These negative feelings are translated into the overall evaluations people give to
their representatives in Washington. Citizens may dislike Congress but like their own
member o f Congress.5 However, in the most populous districts the evidence indicates
that citizens like their representatives less so, all else being equal. As House members’
constituency size expands, citizens in their districts feel less warmly toward them based
on feeling thermometer ratings. The same holds true for the strength of approval House
members receive as well. Serving additional constituents increases the probability they
will be disapproved of by the people in their districts. This relationship is operational at
both the individual and the district level, as the NAES data confirm. Though most
citizens tend to rate their representative highly even when the national political climate
is imbued with negative feelings toward politicians, the average House district
constituency size could reach a point where it noticeably undermines House
incumbents’ standing with their constituents, Americans want their representatives to
do a better job staying in touch with the people in their districts and a perceived failure

5 Glenn R. Parker and Roger H. Davidson, “Why Do Americans Love Their Congressmen So Much More
than Their Congress,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4 (1979); 52-61; Timothy Cook, “Legislature vs.
legislator: A Note on the Paradox o f Congressional Support,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4 (1979): 4352.
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to do so creates greater mistrust of politicians.6 Future increases in the ratio of
citizens per representative seem likely to fuel the discontent citizens feel toward their
elected representatives in the U.S. House.
A further outgrowth of the mushrooming House district population average is
that it creates more policy divergence between constituents and their representatives
than would otherwise be the case. Previous scholarship has shown that as
constituencies become larger the probability that a representative will reflect
constituency opinion in the district declines.7 This representational dynamic is present
for the U.S. House as well. This outcome was predicted by opponents of the 435-seat
limit at the time it was established. The presence of a considerable number of
additional citizens in the district has the effect of pushing representatives farther away
from the views o f their constituents. The result is a voting record that caters to the
activist base o f party supporters in the district and veers farther away from the median
voter than would be the case in a smaller constituency. Chapter 6 presents evidence
indicating that constituency size is not the primary factor that leads to divergence, so
caution should be exhibited not to read too much into these findings. Nevertheless, they
do extend support to theoretical expectations o f prior research in this area and lend
further credence to the diminished capacity for representation that stems from
unchecked constituency population growth.

6 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy: Public Attitudes Toward
American Political Institutions (New York: Cambridge University, 1995); David C. Kimball and Samuel
C. Patterson, “Living Up to Expectations: Public Attitudes toward Congress,” Journal o f Politics 59
(1997): 701-728.
7 Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1973), 84-85.
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Chapter 7 aimed to remove this debate from the exclusive domain of
academics and political pundits in order to allow the American public to weigh in on the
matter. After all, if the implications of representation are to be fully evaluated there
must be some accounting of public attitudes on this subject. If it truly is the people’s
House then there is great merit in discerning what exactly is the American people’s
reaction to a proposed increase in its numerical size. This chapter provided
groundbreaking survey results on this question. Overall, they demonstrated that the
American citizens evince very little enthusiasm for the idea. Even when the question
was prefaced with arguments that failing to increase the size of the House has produced
a sizeable increase in the average population size of congressional districts and reduced
the quality of representation, the public was disinclined to accept the tradeoff of greater
costs and the possibility the legislative process would become less efficient. The
argument for an increase to offset a further loss of seats from states elicited considerable
opposition as well. U.S. citizens are not sympathetic to the plight of states with
population growth that is less than the national average and are comfortable with this
loss of representation in the House.
The widest degree o f support for expanding the size of the House emerged when
the public was asked whether this policy should be taken to improve the chances that
women and minorities would be elected to serve in the institution. Almost 49% of the
respondents agreed that it should. Support for an increase on these grounds exceeded

the number of positive responses for the other questions but was still less than a
majority. Nevertheless, members of underrepresented groups in Congress were highly
supportive of this idea, particularly African Americans. The results underscored that
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descriptive representation is of great import for citizens who have not been full
participants in the U.S political system. Furthermore, the findings in this chapter
showed that debates surrounding questions of race, sex, and representation in the
context of legislative size spark highly polarized reactions along partisan, ideological,
gender and class lines just as they do on other important political issues.
The totality o f the findings in this study paint a decidedly mixed picture of the
representational implications that have emerged from the 435 seat ceiling imposed on
the size the U.S. House. There is something from the results generated by this study for
all sides in this debate to grab on to. Each camp now has a stronger empirical
foundation for advancing their normative claims. Any interpretation of the findings
hinges on whether one places a greater emphasis on representation or legislative
efficiency. On the one hand, the bulk of the evidence suggests that representation is
undermined on most of the indicators examined in the previous chapters. Advocates of
an increase will see these results as further validation of their basic contention that the
House has become less representative. There has been a discemable tradeoff for
representation, as critics o f the idea projected would occur. Enlargement supporters
will latch on to the results showing that constituency size is negatively related to House
members’ contact with citizens and perceptions of House members’ performance. They
will also underscore the evidence indicating that a rising constituency size increases
divergence between the representative and the m edian voter in the district. Proponents
of an increase can rightly point out that the present policy has measurable consequences
for both policy and service responsiveness.
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However, skeptics of an increase might concede these relationships do exist
but that they are only modestly undermining representation. The opponents can
justifiably claim that individual House members still get high approval ratings from
their constituents and generally respond to the policy wishes and service needs of the
people in their districts. An increase of a few hundred thousand constituents has made
the task only marginally more difficult. They would maintain that reducing these
modest costs to representation is not worth creating an institution that would run less
efficiently, as opponents insist would be the case with substantially more members.
Ultimately, though, the opposition to an increase has the public on their side. On the
question o f whether the citizenry wants a more representative House, the U.S. public is
reluctant to embrace changing its size for this purpose. Therefore, the critics can argue
that to make the House a more responsive institution through an increase would
contravene what the people want and further chip away at the esteem with which the
institution is held.
The chief conclusion of this study is the paradoxical reality that increasing the
size of the U.S. House would have positive consequences for representation, but it does
not represent a policy direction that most American would like to see enacted. Neither
side in this dispute is likely to be convinced thoroughly enough to alter their position
based this central conclusion. Regardless of whether the public agrees with increasing
the size o f the House, enlargement supporters will continue to press their case. Even
though the House has become less representative, the opponents of an increase will
continue to place a higher priority on the maintenance of legislative efficiency.
However, most o f the participants in this debate are either political pundits or scholars
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and have little influence over whether the present policy will be altered. The more
important question is how governmental decision makers will reconcile this paradox.
Hence, the final section of this chapter sizes up the prospects that lawmakers will
fundamentally change the size of the House in the foreseeable future.

Outlook for Changes in the Size of the House

This study has gone a long way toward crystallizing how the present policy of
automatically reapportioning 435 seats for the House every ten years has detracted from
the quality of representation constituents receive from their national legislators. In spite
of this evidence the prospects for altering the existing numerical composition of the
House seems bleak. The recent discussions of a two-seat increase to accommodate the
effort to grant the residents of Washington, D.C., a seat in the U.S. House would
constitute only a minor alteration in the institution’s size. Even the chances this
legislation will advance in the process are highly uncertain at the time of this writing.
The absence of widespread congressional support for just a meager increase in the size
of the House does not portend well for more ambitious efforts to go beyond the 43 5-seat
threshold. This section of the chapter outlines some of the reasons why the outlook for
change is so bleak.
One o f the first hurdles is the design o f the U .S . political system . Enacting any
change in existing policy is a struggle in a separation of powers system. There is a
powerful bias in favor in maintaining the status quo position when the structure of the
political system consists of a chief executive elected separately from the legislative
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branch.8 In most policy domains there is a stasis that reigns unless a set of
developments occurs that undermines support for the existing policy arrangement.9 In
the case o f determining the size of the U.S. House very few exogenous or endogenous
forces have exerted pressure on lawmakers to depart from the present policy. The need
for Congress to pass an apportionment bill every ten years once provided a stimulus
forcing the issue to be consistently revisited. However, once the Congress transferred
that authority to the executive branch it has been freed from a fundamental re
examination o f the institution’s size. The entrance of Alaska and Hawaii into the Union
created an opportunity to consider a modification of the 435-seat limit, but so few
members seemed dissatisfied with it that even a three-seat increase failed to be enacted.
The path for any increase to make it on to the policy agenda and navigate its
way through the legislative phalanx of hurdles it would encounter is highly problematic.
While it requires only statutory enactment, not amending the Constitution, as would
other reforms like term limits, the obstacles in the way of any proposal of this kind are
formidable. Even if a majority of members in the House favored an enlargement it
would still have to get approval from key committee and House leaders who would
have to deliver a firm commitment to pass it. Next it would have to surpass the pivot
point in the senate, which is typically the 60th vote, to invoke cloture to end debate.10
Furthermore, the open amendment process in the Senate might unravel any delicate
8 Terry Moe, “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side o f the Story,” Journal o f Law Economics and
Organization 6 (1990): 213-254.
9 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1993).
10 Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory o f U.S. Lawmaking (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press,
1998).
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political compromise achieved in the House unless a unanimous consent agreement
limiting amendments was reached on the proposed legislation.11 Then it would have to
be signed by the president who might defer to the legislative branch on this sort of issue
as has been the case in the past. However, if there was public opposition to the plan, the
president could veto the proposed law and then the threshold for enactment would be a
two-thirds vote in each House. Given the infrequency with which vetoes have been
overridden in the past three presidential administrations, the chances of an enlargement
coming to fruition under this scenario are quite remote.
Even if the institutional incentives for gridlock could be overcome, there are
other factors that would lead House members to want to maintain the 435 seat ceiling.
Any additional allocation of seats for the House would diminish the influence of each
member.12 One representative in a 435-member body already requires intense effort to
gain power and attention. A further expansion of the institution would only heighten
that difficulty. Imagine trying to drum up media coverage to advertise various activities
in office with hundreds of extra members, as has been proposed. Since House members
already operate in Washington, D.C., with less exposure than do U.S. senators,
detracting from the limited state of attention they receive would not go over very well.
In addition, it would create more competition for leadership and raise the number of
members that would have to be convinced to launch a successful bid for one of the top

11 Barbara Sinclair, “The New World o f US Senators,” in Congress Reconsidered, 8th ed., eds. Lawrence
Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer (Washington: CQ Press, 2005), 1-22.
12 William Proxmire, “A House Divided in Half; Wanna Save Money Fire Every Other Person on Capitol
Hill,” Washington Post, February 5, 1989, D5.
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positions within the caucus. Thus, it makes acquiring more power within the
institution a far less taxonomical enterprise.
Committee membership would also be impacted. Either the number of members
on committees would have to be increased or members would have to be limited to
fewer committee assignments. Given the efforts of some committee chairs to reduce the
size o f committees under the present numerical composition and the desire of members
to serve on multiple committees to further their electoral and policy goals, neither
option appears to be appealing for members of the House.13
Another choice members of the House would face is between either reducing the
size o f their staffs to accommodate the new membership level or make the politically
costly decision to raise the amount of spending on congressional staff. They would
most likely select the second option, but it would still subject members to being rebuked
by their constituents and electoral challengers.14 The U.S. public already thinks there
are too many staff people on Capitol Hill with the House at its present size.15 The lack
o f office space is also problematic. Capitol office space is already in short supply and
there would have to be a substantial investment in the infrastructure necessary to create
sufficient capacity for additional members.16

13 Lawrence C. Evans and Walter J. Oleszek, “If It Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix it a Lot” in The US House o f
Representatives: Reform or Rebuild, eds. Joseph Zimmerman and Wilma Rule (Westport, Connecticut:
Praeger Publishing, 2000), 189-190.
14 L. Marvin Overby, “Apportionment, Politics and Political Science: A Response to Kromkowski and
Kromkowski,” Polity 24 (1992): 490.
15 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy, 67.
16 Evans and Oleszek, “If It Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix It a Lot,” 189-190.
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Ultimately, though, it is the impact on the legislative process that most
members could not countenance if the House were substantially increased. As was
documented through the textual analysis of congressional debates throughout U.S.
history, many representatives express the fear that House enlargement would make the
legislative process more unwieldy. Communication between members would be
stunted and the task of building coalitions would become more onerous.17 Forcing
leaders to placate a larger numerical threshold to gamer majority support for legislation
is an unattractive prospect both for the leadership and individual legislators. It would
produce new demands upon the legislative process in the House. Accordingly, one
skeptic of increasing the House contends, “An enlarged membership would inevitably
entail more interested parties, more demands for inclusion, more delay, more
compromise, and a greater likelihood that the negotiations would fail to produce the
consensus needed for congressional action.”

1R

Research on the organizational dynamics of legislative bodies has empirically
verified a positive relationship between legislative size and the degree of restrictiveness
o f institutional rules.19 Increasing the size of the House may require even more
restrictive rules for debate than are currently in effect.20 Representatives are already

17 William F. Willoughby, Principles o f Legislative Organization and Administration (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1934), 263; Morris Silverman, “Better Yet, Reduce the Size o f House,” The
New York Times, January 14, 1991, A17; Evans and Oleszek, “If It Ain’t Broke D on’t Fix It a Lot,” 187194.
18 Overby, “Apportionment, Politics and Political Science,” 489.
19 Andrew J. Taylor, “Size, Power and Electoral Systems: Exogenous Determinants o f Legislative
Procedural Choice,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 31 (2006): 323-345.
20 Evans and Oleszek, “If It A in’t Broke D on’t Fix It a Lot,” 190.
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constricted in the time available for deliberation in the House and having to allocate
this time to other members is not an attractive prospect. Members of the House
recognized all of these issues when they debated stopping decennial increases and found
them so compelling that they have opted to maintain the status for almost a century.
These same issues existed then and they continue to provide incentives to keep the
House frozen at 435 members in present times.
Even if members of the House did perceive that an increase was warranted
based on a belief that they have sacrificed too much representation to preserve effective
governance, the issue could be politically volatile. There is hardly an outcry from the
American people for an increase, as the survey evidence reported in Chapter 7
demonstrated. Were incumbent representatives in Washington to propose an increase it
could be fodder for challengers looking for a popular issue to run on. It is easy to
envision a wave o f campaign advertisements attacking members of Congress for adding
to the cost o f government and further creating more incentives for gridlock. Running
on the slogan, “Elect me because the last thing we need in Washington is more
politicians” would be a great issue for any challenger, especially if approval of the U.S.
Congress is extremely low. House members may not have poll data on this question at
their disposal, but as astute political observers they can sense the direction of public
opinion toward an enlargement.21 There is very little reason in the current political
landscape to effectuate such a potentially unpopular change. A minimal increase in the

House might not generate such a backlash. However, anything beyond a handful of
additional members would not be well received by the public.
21 James A., Stimson, Michael MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson, “Dynamic Representation,” American
Political Science Review 89 (1995): 543-565.
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The political effects that would result from a sizable increase also stand as
an impediment for the possibility of change. Given the close partisan division in the
House, any change of this nature could alter the political landscape. There is no
compelling political reason for Republicans to reverse the shift of states from the
Northeast and Midwest, where the party’s fortunes are declining, to the Sunbelt where
they have been steadily acquiring more power. Hence, preserving the automatic
apportionment of 435 seats has helped Republican electoral fortunes. Furthermore, if
their party followers in the electorate are opposed to the idea, why would GOP leaders
in Congress endorse any proposal for House enlargement unless there were other
compelling incentives to do so?
Are there any conditions that could help bring about an increase in the size of
the House? If the ratio of citizens per congressional district reaches the point that it
becomes overly burdensome for members of the House, this development might create
impetus for change. A heavier workload or the declining approval rate that comes from
a larger constituency may be catalysts for re-examination of the issue. At this point,
however, very few members o f the House publicly articulate this concern. Though the
representation of more populated constituencies is a greater burden, most individual
members of the House still enjoy favorable evaluations from voters in their districts.22
If organized groups representing the interests of women and minorities made a
priority o f increasing the H ouse it m ight gam er sym pathy from som e Dem ocratic

members who could champion the cause. It certainly receives broad support among
women, African Americans, and Hispanics in the general population. At this point,
22 Gary C Jacobson, The Politics o f Congressional Elections, 6th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2004), 137-138.
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beyond some interest by a limited number of members of the Congressional Black
Caucus, most of these groups have had little to say about this policy option as a vehicle
to improve descriptive representation. Even if this cause did gamer the backing of civil
rights and feminist groups, it would still face stiff resistance from Republicans in the
U.S. Congress.
In the final analysis, a United States House of Representatives consisting of
close to 435 members seems likely to remain a permanent fixture of the political system
for years to come. This study has illuminated some of the consequences for
representation if this policy remains in effect. Although the implications for
representation are decidedly negative, the size of the U.S. House will not be altered
significantly anytime soon. Legislative and constituency size still remain areas in need
o f further empirical exploration. More work can be done concerning the ramifications
of the size o f the U.S. House and the surge in the average number of constituents each
member represents.23 This study has provided an extensive accounting of these issues,
and future research must continue to enhance scholarly understanding in this area of
legislative politics.

23 Squire and Hamm, 101 Chambers.
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APPENDIX
CHAPTER 7 SURVEY QUESTIONS
Q1
When the U.S. House of Representatives was first constituted it consisted of 65
members with each congressional district having approximately 30,000 people. As you
may know, the House of Representatives has grown to 435 members with each member
representing approximately 640,000 people. Some have argued that the number of
representatives should be increased so that each member would represent fewer people,
would be closer to the people and provide better representation. Others have argued
that a House of Representatives with greater than 435 members would be more costly
and make the legislative process less efficient. In your opinion, should the size of the
House be:
1
2
3

Increased
Kept at its current size
Decreased

Q2
After the U.S. census is taken every ten years some states lose seats in the U.S.
House o f Representatives because their population growth is slower than the national
rate. Would you support increasing the size of the House to prevent states from losing
any seats?
1
2

Yes
No

Q3
Some argue that increasing the numerical size of the U.S. House of
Representatives would create more opportunities for members of underrepresented
groups such as women and racial minorities to get elected. Would you be very
supportive, somewhat supportive, somewhat opposed or very opposed to increasing the
size of the House for this purpose?
1
2

Very supportive
Somewhat supportive

3

Som ew hat opposed

4

Very opposed
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List of Variables
African American: Dummy variable coded 1 for African American respondents and 0
otherwise.
Hispanic: Dummy variable coded 1 for Hispanic respondents and 0 otherwise.
Female: Dummy variable coded 1 for female respondents and 0 otherwise.
Age: Actual age in years.
Education: Highest degree received coded: 1 = Less than HS; 2 = Some HS, no
diploma; 3 - Graduated from HS - Diploma or equivalent (GED); 4 = Some college, no
degree; 5 = Associate degree (AA, AS); 6 = Bachelor's degree; 7 = Master's degree; 8 =
Professional degree (MD, DDS, LLB, JD); 9 = Doctorate degree.
Income: Household income coded: 1 - Less than $5,000; 2 = $5,000 to $7,499; 3 =
$7,500 to $9,999; 4 = $10,000 to $12,499; 5 = $12,500 to $14,999; 6 = $15,000 to
$19,999; 7 = $20,000 to $24,999; 8 = $25,000 to $29,999; 9 = $30,000 to $34,999; 10 =
$35,000 to $39,999; 11 = $40,000 to $49,999; 12 = $50,000 to $59,999; 13 = $60,000 to
$74,999; 14 = $75,000 to $84,999; 15 = $85,000 to $99,999; 16 = $100,000 to
$124,999; 17 = $125,000 to $149,999; 18 = $150,000 to $174,999; 19 $175,000 or
more.
Marital Status: Dummy variable coded 1 for married respondents and 0 otherwise.
Political Interest: In general, how interested are you in politics and public affairs? 4 =
Very Interested; Somewhat Interested = 3; Slightly Interested = 2; Not At All Interested
=

1.

State Lost a Seat in the Last Census: Coded 1 for respondents in Connecticut, New
York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Wisconsin and 0 otherwise.
Republican: Dummy variable coded 1 for respondents identifying as Republican and 0
otherwise.
Independent: Dummy variable coded 1 for those respondents not identifying as either
Republicans or Dem ocrats.

Personally Acquainted with a Politician: Are you personally acquainted with any of
the following people? 1 = A current member o f the US Congress or Senate; A current
member o f your state legislature; A local government official; 0 = None of these.
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Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual: Dummy Variable Coded 1 for gay, lesbian, or bisexual
respondents and 0 otherwise.
Ideology: In general, do you think of yourself as: 1 =Extremely Liberal; 2 = Liberal;
Slightly Liberal; 3 = Slightly Liberal; 4 = Moderate or Middle of the Road; 5 = Slightly
Conservative; Conservative; 7 = Extremely Conservative.
Northeast: Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent resides in Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, or
Pennsylvania and 0 otherwise.
Midwest: Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent resides in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa
or Missouri and 0 otherwise.
West: Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent resides in Montana, Idaho, Wyoming,
Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California,
Hawaii or Alaska and 0 otherwise.
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